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Regulation in pharmaceutical markets is pervasive in most countries, especially in Eu-
rope. The nature of existing regulations is diverse, as they serve a number of purposes:
guaranteeing safety, ecacy and security of drug usage; but also ensuring patients access
to treatment, preserving aordability and fostering pharmaceutical innovation.
A number of regulatory interventions are purposely designed to bring about more e-
cient pharmaceutical markets. These interventions are ultimately intended to increase
welfare for patients today and patients tomorrow. Welfare today requires ensuring pa-
tients access to existing pharmacological treatment at an aordable cost. Welfare to-
morrow requires ensuring a continued eort on research and development to produce
pharmaceutical innovations that respond to currently unmet medical needs.
The chapters of this thesis focus on a number of regulatory interventions that attract
notable attention due to their eect on access, aordability and innovation. These
include the regulation of pharmaceutical parallel trade, direct-to-consumer advertising
of prescription drugs and o-patent pharmaceutical markets. By assessing the impact
of public interventions on market outcomes and patients welfare, this thesis aims at
contributing to the debate about optimal regulation of pharmaceutical markets.
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Regulation in pharmaceutical markets is pervasive in most countries, especially in Eu-
rope. The nature of existing regulations is diverse, as they serve a number of purposes:
guaranteeing safety, ecacy and security of drug usage; but also ensuring patients access
to treatment, preserving aordability and fostering pharmaceutical innovation.
Most types of regulation have an economic impact, as they often modify the incentives
given to the relevant stakeholders in the pharmaceutical markets and shape the norma-
tive framework within which stakeholders operate. Even regulations intended mainly to
set scientic and technological standards are relevant from an economic perspective, as
they typically have an impact both on the value delivered by medicines and the costs of
development, production and provision to patients.
A number of regulatory interventions are purposely designed to bring about more e-
cient pharmaceutical markets. These interventions are ultimately intended to increase
welfare for patients today and patients tomorrow. Welfare today requires ensuring pa-
tients access to existing pharmacological treatment at an aordable cost. Welfare to-
morrow requires ensuring a continued eort on research and development to produce
pharmaceutical innovations that respond to currently unmet medical needs.
The chapters of this thesis focus on a number of regulatory interventions that attract
notable attention due to their eect on access, aordability and innovation. By assessing
their impact on market outcomes and patients welfare, this thesis aims at contributing
to the debate about optimal regulation of pharmaceutical markets.
Chapter 1
Parallel trade and incentives to innovate when governments regulate prices
Chapter 1 looks at how parallel trade of pharmaceuticals may contribute to the avail-
ability of cheaper drugs in certain markets at the expense of those drugs being more
expensive in other countries. Parallel trade may as a consequence have an impact on
patients access to medicines in exporting and importing markets, while distorting incen-
tives to innovation by aecting returns to R&D investment.
Parallel trade limits the capacity of the manufacturer to price discriminate across cus-
tomers in dierent geographic markets. In chapter 1 we assess the welfare eects of
parallel trade when decisions on prices are not taken unilaterally by rms, as it is the
case for instance in the pharmaceutical sector. We develop a model where governments
impose price ceilings to show that the welfare implications of parallel trade depend
crucially on who is the price setter. When rms unilaterally set prices, parallel trade
xix
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rms from optimally discriminating
in prices. When governments impose price ceilings, parallel trade is welfare enhancing
because it mitigates the incentives to free-ride on other countries contribution to innova-
tion. In both cases, the higher are the dierences in demand across countries, the worse
are the welfare properties of parallel trade.
Chapter 2
Direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs: informing patients or
persuading physicians?
In chapter 2 we discuss the impact of direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) on pa-
tients access to appropriate pharmacological treatment. DTCA increases the availability
of information to patients about diseases, symptoms and available treatments, thus con-
tributing to reduce under-diagnosis and increase access to treatment. It may however
convey persuasive information that in certain circumstances could distort prescription
decisions if the incentives of prescribers make them vulnerable to patients' demands.
DTCA may give patients the ability of better learning their needs, both regarding physi-
cian consultations and available treatments. DTCA may consequently reduce informa-
tion asymmetries in the relation between the patient and the physician. Persuasive
advertising may induce consumer demand not based on therapeutic grounds, eventually
exacerbating informational problems. The purpose of chapter 2 is to analyse the welfare
properties of DTCA, taking into account both its informative and persuasive eects.
In our model, physicians are assumed to face some harassment costs when contradict-
ing the preferences of their patients over the drugs prescribed, what creates an agency
problem between the patient and the physician. We analyse the welfare properties of
DTCA under the scenarios of perfect and imperfect agency. In the rst case, DTCA
can only have an informative eect on consumers. In the second case, it can have also a
persuasive eect. We show that DTCA tends to be welfare enhancing when physicians
are perfect agents. On the contrary, when they are imperfect agents, DTCA welfare
eects are ambiguous. In particular, it can be detrimental to consumer welfare when
harassment costs are relatively high.
Chapter 3
A theoretical framework for the analysis of branded-generic competition in
o-patent pharmaceutical markets
In chapter 3 we study the impact of generic competition in o-patent pharmaceutical
markets when patients perceive the branded product as being of higher quality than the
generics and are allowed to pay a co-payment to consume the branded product. We
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branded and generic rms are able to coordinate around high-price equilibria with a
detrimental impact on welfare. This is the case when the branded rm can commit to a
certain preferred price before generics choose the quantities they produce. We argue that
price regulation and authorised generics may facilitate this type of coordination. We also
show that policy interventions that seek to increase generic market share by distorting
patients choices may have the unintended eect of softening generic competition and
lead to higher generic prices.
Chapter 4
Patterns of generic entry: number of entrants and time to entry
Generic entry is the main source of competition in o-patent pharmaceutical markets.
However, generic entry does not occur in every market and it often tends to occur with
a signicant delay with respect to the date of loss of exclusivity by the patent holder. In
chapter 4 we look at the patterns of generic entry in a number of European countries and
identify the main factors that attract early generic entry. In particular, we are interested
in the impact that pervasive regulation of European pharmaceutical markets has on the
occurrence and pattern of generic entry. We show that patterns of generic entry dier
signicantly across European countries and types of drugs, and identify some factors
that explain this heterogeneity. We observe that early entry is more likely in larger
markets, when price regulation is less strict and where regulatory incentives for generic
prescription and dispensation are in place.
Chapter 5
Eects of generic entry on market structure and prices
Generic competition is considered to be the main mechanism to erode the market power
that patent-holders enjoy during the period of market exclusivity. However, generics do
not appear to be always equally eective at driving market prices down and at gaining
market share. In chapter 5 we look at the development of prices and market structure
after loss of exclusivity and in presence of generic entry in a number of European coun-
tries. In particular, we are interested in the impact that pervasive regulation of European
pharmaceutical markets has on the competitive landscape of o-patent pharmaceutical
markets. We show that prices and market shares behave dierently across European
countries and types of drugs, and identify some factors that explain this heterogeneity.
Price competition and generic uptake are positively correlated with the value of the
market, the number of generic entrants, the absence of price controls, and the existence
of regulatory incentives for the prescription and dispensation of generics.
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Parallel trade and incentives to innovate when
governments regulate prices
Abstract
Parallel trade limits the capacity of the manufacturer to price discriminate across cus-
tomers in dierent geographic markets. In this paper we assess the welfare eects of
parallel trade when decisions on prices are not taken unilaterally by rms, as it hap-
pens for instance in the pharmaceutical sector. We develop a model where governments
may impose price ceilings to show that the welfare implications of parallel trade depend
crucially on who is the price setter. When rms unilaterally set prices, parallel trade
tends to be welfare detrimental because it prevents rms from optimally discriminating
in prices. When governments impose price ceilings, parallel trade is welfare enhancing
because it mitigates the incentives to free-ride on other countries' contribution to in-
novation. In both cases, the higher are the dierences in demand across countries, the
worse are the welfare properties of parallel trade.
Key words: Pharmaceuticals, Parallel trade, Price discrimination, Innovation
JEL Classications: I11; K21; L41; L51
* This chapter was nalised during a stay at the Paris School of Economics (PSE) as an exchange
PhD student of the European Doctoral Programme (EDP). I wish to thank Prof. Massimo Motta,
Prof. Bernard Caillaud, Prof. Pierre-Yves Geoard, Emanuele Tarantino, the participants to the EDP
Jamboree 2009 and the participants to the TOM seminars for comments and discussions on previous
versions of this chapter. The usual disclaimer applies.
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1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Policy and case law
Parallel trade is the resale of a product by a wholesaler in a market other than that
intended by the manufacturer. When a manufacturer sells the same product in dierent
markets at dierent prices, then parallel trade is simply arbitrage. Parallel trade limits
the capacity of the manufacturer to price discriminate across customers in dierent
geographic markets. Competition policy in the European Union tends to foster parallel
trade as a means to integrate markets and enhance competition. Increased competition
is thought to provide eciency gains, but may also erode rms' incentives to innovate.
The convenience of allowing parallel trade to take place or not is closely related to the
welfare eects of price discrimination.
Price discrimination across countries is a typical feature of many industries, and in par-
ticular of those industries that are intensive in the use of knowledge under protection of
intellectual property rights. Dierences in prices create an incentive to buy the product
in a low-price market and resell it at a higher price in another market, that is, price dif-
ferentials create room for arbitraging through parallel trade. Allowing this practice may
conict with intellectual property law, because recognizing the right of buyers to freely
trade with any good they buy may erode the right of owners of intellectual property
rights to be the sole sellers of a given good.
Intellectual property rights usually give their holder the right to price discriminate be-
tween countries, while prohibiting at the same time parallel imports through contractual
means. This is a consequence of the `national-exhaustion' interpretation of patent law,
which considers that by selling a product in one market the patent holder does not
lose the right to be the only seller of that product in any other market. This view has
been increasingly challenged, on the grounds of what has been called the `international-
exhaustion' interpretation of patent law. According to the latter, the patent holder
would lose all property rights over a product once it has been sold in one market, what
includes losing the right to prevent the buyer from reselling the product in any other
market. The implications of moving from one interpretation to the other are evident, as
one leads to the prohibition of parallel trade without the consent of the patent holder
while the other leads to its legalization.
This was a contentious issue in the negotiation of the WTO's agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). Developing countries argued
Saurí, Lluís (2012), An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/37014Chapter 1. Parallel trade and incentives to innovate 5
that their licensees should be able to export their products to developed countries with-
out restrictions based on intellectual property rights. The nal agreement did not en-
dorse any particular interpretation of property rights exhaustion, thus allowing countries
to continue prohibiting international parallel imports on the grounds of patent law. One
exception is the compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals that any country can impose to
deal with national health crises. Pharmaceuticals produced under compulsory licensing
could be reexported to other markets without infringing any patent law or contractual
agreement, because even if they are intended to satisfy domestic needs, there is no formal
limitation to their exportation, other than those imposed by the destination country.
The convenience of allowing parallel trade has been an issue of debate also within de-
veloped countries due to the observed dierences in pharmaceutical prices. These dif-
ferences in prices are often the consequence of the variety of national regulatory regimes
aecting the pharmaceutical industry. Typically, prices are lower in countries where
governments participate in the price-setting process than they are in countries where
prices are unilaterally set by rms. Canada is an example of the former and the United
States are an example of the latter. Proximity and dierences in prices have led to a
substantial amount of cross border purchases by US buyers (Szymanski and Valletti [9]).
While parallel trade of pharmaceuticals remains illegal in most countries, it is allowed
and even favoured within the European Union. The `national-exhaustion' interpretation
of intellectual property law is not recognized by European legislation as far as parallel
trade within the EU is concerned. The Treaty of Rome eliminates any right to bar unau-
thorized trade between member States. The primacy of free trade over patent protection
has been upheld by the European Court of Justice's ruling in Merck v. Primecrown
1,
which held that a manufacturer's patent rights are internationally exhausted within the
EU once a product is placed on the market in any member country. However, this
initial interpretation has recently been complemented by the ruling of the European
Court of First Instance in GlaxoSmithKline v. EC Commission
2, according to which
price discrimination may have to be preserved if it gave rise to an economic advantage
by contributing to promote innovation. It does not appear to be clear yet, hence, how
this conict should be solved.
As a consequence of market integration in Europe, parallel imports of pharmaceuticals
have increasingly undermined price dierentials across European countries. Kanavos
and Costa-Font [5] provide evidence of the signicative amount of parallel trade in the
EU (the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are the countries with higher share of
1Case C-267-268/95. Merck & Co. Inc. v. Primecrown Limited. Court of Justice of the European
Communities. Press Release No 58/96, 5 December 1996.
2Case T-168/01. GlaxoSmithKline v. EC Commission. Court of First Instance of the European
Communities. Press Release No 79/06, 27 September 2006.
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imported pharmaceuticals, which represent 20% and 14% of the their markets respec-
tively) and comment on its eects in terms of price convergence of pharmaceuticals in
Europe. In fact, the European Commission has fostered parallel trade with the aim of ef-
fectively creating a single European market for pharmaceuticals and with the conviction
that free trade would yield eciency gains. However, parallel trade in pharmaceuti-
cals may reduce economic welfare partly because countries achieve low pharmaceutical
prices by regulation that could potentially undermine patients' access to medicines and
partly because of the eects that parallel trade may have on incentives to innovate. The
trade o between uniform pricing and innovation is at the base of the CFI's ruling in
GlaxoSmithKline v. EC Commission.
1.1.2 Economic Analysis
Even without considering incentives to innovate, allowing rms to price discriminate
may be controversial because the eects of third-degree price discrimination on aggregate
welfare are ambiguous. Varian (1985) shows that price discrimination enhances social
welfare only if it leads to an increase in output. Price uniformity is welfare enhancing
when it does not imply the exclusion of any market from being served, but as soon as
price uniformity leads to the closure of markets, then price discrimination is shown to
be preferable.
Given that parallel trade limits the scope for price discrimination, we can follow the same
line of reasoning as Varian [11] to conclude that the eects of parallel trade on social
welfare may be ambiguous. Malueg and Schwartz [7] show that parallel trade between
markets enjoying dierent prices is welfare enhancing only when it does not lead to the
closure of any market. If the willingness to pay in one market were suciently low in
relation to others, parallel imports would lead to its closure and aggregate welfare be
reduced. They conclude that parallel trade benets consumers in high-price markets,
which see their price reduced, and punishes consumers in low-price markets, whose price
is raised and who may even get their market closed. Depending on the size of these
eects, parallel trade can turn out to be either benecial or detrimental to welfare. The
larger the dierences in demand across countries, the higher the chance that parallel
trade reduces welfare.
Other works introduce in the analysis some specic characteristics of the pharmaceutical
industry. Bordoy and Jelovac [1] propose a model that accounts for the distortion on
demand elasticities caused by copayments to nance the purchase of pharmaceuticals.
They nd that parallel trade is detrimental to welfare when it is motivated essentially by
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dierences in the public health systems, rather than by dierences in demands. Gans-
landt and Maskus [2] highlight the importance that problems of vertical control may have
when parallel imports are permitted. In the presence of vertical-control problems, the
manufacturer may use its ability to price discriminate in order to disincentivize parallel
trade and to limit its pro-competitive eects in the import market. The main limitation
of these works is that none of them studies the relation between price-discrimination
and incentives to innovate. They just look at the static eects of parallel trade, but not
at its dynamic eects on innovation.
The more innovation-based an industry is, the greater the importance of intellectual
property rights tends to be. Incentives to invest in R&D depend on the ex-post capacity
by the manufacturer to enjoy some market power to sell at prices above marginal cost.
The ability to price discriminate reinforces manufacturer's ex-post capacity to extract
rents from innovative goods, thus increasing incentives to spend in R&D. It is crucial
to understand the interplay between price discrimination and incentives to innovate in
order to determine whether and under what circumstances parallel trade is or not welfare
enhancing. Szymanski and Valletti [9] address this issue by endogenizing the quality of
the good sold. By doing so, they make quality decisions by the manufacturer depend on
the prices at which it will be able to sell the product in each market. In that setup, higher
prices foster R&D spending and parallel imports may have detrimental eects on quality
decisions if they lead to a suciently low uniform price. Li and Maskus [6] get similar
results through a dierent model in which the manufacturer decides how to invest in
cost-reducing innovation. Again, parallel trade has a potential to damage social welfare
by inhibiting R&D spending. Valletti [10] considers the case for imposing uniform pricing
through parallel trade in a framework in which markets are dierent on two dimensions:
marginal costs and consumer demands. The model leads to the conclusion that parallel
trade produces lower investment in R&D when dierential pricing is based on dierences
in countries' demands, while it fosters investment when the dierences in prices are due
to dierences in costs of production.
So far we have been considering that the manufacturer enjoying monopoly power, thanks
to patent protection, determines both prices and quality. In the pharmaceutical indus-
try, however, very often are governments to set prices, not rms. It may therefore not
be adequate to look at price discrimination using the case with rms xing prices as
the benchmark case. We should try to understand the actual process of determination
of pharmaceutical prices, in order to be able to evaluate the welfare eects of parallel
trade. Rey [8] proposes a model where pharmaceutical prices are the result of a negoti-
ation between governments and rms. The outcome of the negotiations depends on the
objective function of the governments, who care for low prices and high quality at the
same time. To the extent that parallel trade leads to price uniformity across markets,
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it also limits the scope for negotiation, thus limiting the search for an ecient outcome
from negotiations. Price uniformity prevents a country that is willing to pay high prices
in order to promote R&D from doing so, because the price set in the low-demand coun-
try prevails as the unique price everywhere. The author concludes that parallel trade
worsens the already non-ecient outcome obtained without parallel trade and leads to
price uniformity at the lowest level of R&D.
An important limitation of these works is that they ignore how dierent trade regimes
may create dierent incentives for governments setting price controls. In Rey [8], for
example, the contribution of each country to the nancing of innovation is independent
from the contribution of each other. Even if the public-good nature of innovation is
explicitly recognized, the author denes governments' objective functions in such a way
that make them completely insensitive to other governments contributions to innovation.
As shown in Grossman and Lai [3], national policies to foster innovation are strategic
substitutes in a two-country or many-country policy-setting game. This means that
the greater willingness to pay for quality in some countries create incentives for other
countries to free-ride on the contribution to innovation granted by the former ones.
This reasoning has been applied to parallel trade in Grossman and Lai [4], where they
develop a model for a world economy with ongoing innovation and trade and show that
parallel trade can mitigate free-riding in the nancing of innovation when governments
unilaterally set price controls.
In this paper we develop a model where governments may impose price ceilings to rms.
Even though the approach is similar to the one in Szymanski and Valletti [9], by intro-
ducing price regulation we account for the fact that prices of pharmaceuticals are only
exceptionally set by rms. In contrast with Rey [8], here governments take into con-
sideration other governments' policies when taking their own decisions on prices, what
creates incentives to free-ride as in Grossman and Lai [4]. In this model, the welfare
eects of parallel trade depend crucially on two factors: who leads the price setting pro-
cess, governments or rms, and the degree of demand dispersion across countries. We
show that depending on whether governments regulate prices or not, parallel trade may
have dierent welfare implications. When rms unilaterally set prices, parallel trade
tends to be welfare detrimental because prevents rms from optimally discriminate in
prices, what reduces their prots as well as their incentive to innovate and to improve
quality. When governments impose price ceilings, the possibility of sustaining price dif-
ferentials across markets creates incentives for governments in low-demand markets to
force their prices down in an attempt to free-ride on other governments' higher will-
ingness to pay for quality. In that case, parallel trade is welfare enhancing because it
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disciplines governments in low-demand markets by making them responsible for the uni-
form price that will prevail in all markets. In both cases, the higher are the dierences
in demand across countries, the worse are the welfare properties of parallel trade.
This Section has been devoted to explain the policy debate on the convenience of allowing
parallel trade and to briey summarize previous economic analysis on that topic. In
Section 2, we develop a model where prices are the result of the interaction between
governments and rms. We derive this model under two dierent regimes of exhaustion
of intellectual property rights: a national-exhaustion regime preventing parallel trade
and an international-exhaustion regime allowing parallel trade to take place. We present
the analytical results, show some numerical solutions and discuss their main implications.
Section 3 summarizes the conclusions of our analysis:
1.2 The model
1.2.1 Setup and Timing
To formalize the eects of parallel trade on prices, consider the following timing of
a game played by two governments, H and L, and an innovative rm F foreign to both
countries:
1. Governments H and L establish price ceilings  pH and  pL.
2. Firm F invests on R&D to produce a unique good of quality s and sets prices in
markets H and L, eventually constrained by the price ceilings established in the
rst stage.
3. If parallel trade is allowed, buyers decide whether they engage or not in parallel
trade.
The sequence of stages two and three are the same as in Valletti [10], where rms
rst invest on quality and set prices, and then buyers decide whether to engage on
parallel trade. However, by contrast here rms are constrained by the price ceilings set
by governments in a previous stage. Our timing leads us to assume full commitment
by governments to maintain their price ceilings once rm F has invested in quality.
We will see that in our model governments are willing to accept positive prices only to
promote innovation. Unless full commitment is assumed, once innovation has been done,
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governments have the incentive to cut price ceilings. For our purposes, the assumption
of full commitment is necessary to acknowledge the eects that the pricing policies
by governments have on the investment decisions taken by the monopolist. By giving
governments the ability to commit to certain pricing policies in the rst stage and
then letting the rm F decide on quality in the second stage, we can represent how
governments take into account the consequences of their pricing policies in terms of
quality. We could interpret it as if the history of pricing policies adopted by governments
allowed rms to forecast next-period's price ceilings.
Marginal cost of production for the good is assumed to be zero. To produce quality, rm
F has to invest in R&D at a quadratic cost C (s) = s2
2 . Quality in the pharmaceutical
industry should be interpreted here as the outcome of an innovative process conducted
by the manufacturer and oriented to the synthetization of a new active ingredient or to
the indication of new uses for an already existing active ingredient. Both results tend
to provide new treatments, thus widening the variety of treatments for a certain disease
or oering pharmaceutical treatment for diseases for which no medicine was indicated
before. Investments in R&D that provide this kind of quality improvements allow rm
F to expand the number of its potential nal customers. In this model the demand for
the good is specic to each country and expands with quality.








We assume that ai 2 (0;1] for i = H;L and aH  aL, where H and L stand for high
and low demand respectively. All agents are assumed to have perfect knowledge about
demand and cost characteristics.
1.2.2 Firm's decision on quality
In our model, governments and rm may have to take decisions under two alterna-
tive regimes. Under the rst regime, NPT, parallel trade is prohibited and buyers are
not allowed to export from one market to the other anything they may buy from rm
F. Under the second possible regime, PT, parallel trade is authorized and buyers are
allowed to decide whether or not they export products bought to rm F. The price that
buyers pay to rm F acts as their marginal cost, so even if products can be exported at
no cost, parallel trade can only occur from the low-price to the high-price market.
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Let us start by looking at what happens under these two alternative regimes in the third
stage and how it aects quality decisions taken by rm F in the second stage of the game.
Under NPT, in the third stage of the game buyers in one market are prevented from
reselling in the other market and price dierentials between countries do not give rise to
arbitrage. Firm F is able to sell in each market at a dierent price and has no incentive
to refuse supplying any market. We can characterize rm F's quality decision in the
second stage for given prices by solving the following prot-maximization problem:
max
s




















which implies that the level of quality chosen by rm F as a function of prices is:















where snpt stands for rm F's optimal level of quality under NPT and depends on the
price in each market. Quality depends positively on prices just up to a certain level
of prices and negatively onwards, thus reecting the fact that high prices may destroy
incentives to innovate by restraining demand.
Let us now look at what happens under PT. In the third stage of the game buyers in
the low-price market are allowed to resell in the high-price market. Assume that rm
F and buyers from the low-price market compete  a la Bertrand when they meet in the
high-price market and that the exportation cost is zero. Then parallel trade makes price
dierentials unsustainable. As we will see in Section 2.3, when demands in both countries
are close enough, rm F has no incentive to refuse supplying any market and sells in
both markets at the same uniform price. Attempting to raise the price in one market,
rm F would immediately trigger parallel trade by buyers from the other market, which
would undercut it. The threat of parallel trade is sucient to impose a uniform price and
no parallel trade occurs in equilibrium. Under these circumstances, rm F's decision on
quality can be characterized by imposing a uniform price for both countries in equation
(1.3), which means that rm F anticipates that a uniform price is imposed by the threat
of arbitrage in the third stage:
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where spt stands for rm F's optimal level of quality under PT when no market is
excluded by rm F and pU is the uniform price. Again, quality depends positively on
price up to a certain price level.
However, as we will see, rm F may have incentive to exclude the low-price market if
demand in the two markets are suciently dierent. That is, rm F may have incentives
to refuse supplying the low-price market and concentrate on selling just in the other
market at a higher price, rather than serving both countries at a low uniform price.
When this is the case, rm F's decision of quality will be driven only by the incentives
from the non-excluded market i:








where sexc stands for the rm F's optimal level of quality under PT when the market
other than i is excluded by rm F. Again, quality depends positively on prices just up
to a certain price.
1.2.3 Firm unilaterally sets prices
We turn now to the pricing decisions taken by rm F if no price ceilings have been
established by governments in the rst stage, and look at these pricing decisions under
the two alternative trade regimes. Focus rst on the NPT regime. Firm F is free to
set a dierent price in each country in order to maximize prots, anticipating its own
decision on quality. The fact that rm F decides on both quality and prices in the
same stage, makes irrelevant the question of whether we solve rst for quality, for prices
or simultaneously. Substituting for the equilibrium level of quality we obtain rm F's
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where p
npt
i stands for the equilibrium price in market i under NPT. The optimal price
in one market depends only on the characteristics of demand in that market and not
surprisingly price is higher in the more inelastic market. Under NPT, rm F is able to
discriminate in prices across markets and to charge a higher price in the low-elasticity
market H without any threat of arbitrage by retailers from the high-elasticity market
L.
Let us now look at what happens under PT, when price dierentials across markets are
unsustainable due to the threat of arbitrage. In this case, rm F must choose between
serving both countries at a uniform price and excluding the low-price market L to sell
only in market H at a higher price. In the former case of uniform pricing, rm F
unilaterally sets the uniform price in order to maximize prots, anticipating its own

























U stands for the equilibrium uniform price under PT when both markets are
served. Firm F will sell in both markets at this uniform price only if it cannot enjoy
higher prots by excluding market L. In the latter case of exclusion, rm F will charge
in market H the same price as if under NPT, which we already saw that depends just







H stands for the equilibrium price in market H when market L is excluded by
rm F.
This allows us to write down the following incentive compatibility constraint, which says
that no market is excluded if rm F's prots from serving both countries at uniform
price p
pt
U are higher than its prots from selling only in market H at price pexc
H :
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which implies that rm F excludes market L whenever 3aL < aH, that is, when demands
in the two markets are dierent enough.
These results can be summarized in the following table:
Table 1.1: Firms' unilateral prices


















Proposition 1.1. When rm F unilaterally decides on prices and aL  aH
3 , allowing
parallel trade leads rm F to charge an intermediate uniform price between the prices







When rm F unilaterally decides on prices but aL < aH
3 , allowing parallel trade leads
rm F to exclude market L and to sell only in market H at a price equal to the price it




1.2.4 Governments establish price ceilings
Up to now, we have just analyzed the situation in which rm F can unilaterally set
prices because prices are not regulated. In this section we derive equilibrium prices when
governments establish price ceilings in the rst stage. As we will see, price ceilings are
binding for all values of the parameters and restrict the ability of rm F to set prices.
Let us start by the NPT regime. In the rst stage, each government sets the maximum
price in its country in order to maximize consumer surplus, anticipating rm F's decision
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We nd the rst order conditions of this problem for government i, which leads us to





























with i;j = H;L and i 6= j, and where  p
npt
i stands for the optimal price ceiling set by









that maximize consumer surpluses while guaranteeing positive







which ensures that second order conditions for maximization are satised and that price
ceilings are binding in both markets, given that they are lower than the optimal prices
that rm F would unilaterally set if prices were not regulated.
Moreover, the optimal price ceiling in one market depends on the price ceiling established
in the other market, which denotes that governments strategically interact with each
other when setting their pricing policies. In fact, we observe that the cross-derivatives















This means that governments regard price ceilings as strategic substitutes. The higher
is the optimal price ceiling for one government, the lower is the optimal price ceiling
for the other. This result is coherent with the view of innovation as a global public
good. In our model, governments are willing to set positive price ceilings in order to
incentivize rm F to invest on innovation, but they have incentives to free ride on the
other government's willingness to pay for innovation.
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For the values of the parameters aH and aL for which these interior solutions hold, it can
be shown that the optimal price ceiling is higher in the market with a lower elasticity
of demand. It may be however the case that for some values of the parameters aH and
aL, this maximization problem leads to non-interior solutions. It can be shown that  p
npt
L
increases with aL, that is, the more price inelastic is the demand in L, the higher is the
optimal price ceiling in market L3. Knowing that, it is easy to see that for aL < 3
8aH
the rst order conditions give negative values for  p
npt
L . For these values of the elasticity
parameters the problem of the government has a corner solution with the optimal price










where the solution to  p
npt
H comes from substituting  p
npt
L by zero in equation (1.14). Zero
price means that the price ceiling is set at the level of marginal cost, hence compatible
with non-negative prots.
Lemma 1.2. Under NPT, the price ceiling set by government H is higher than the price
ceiling set by government L:  p
npt
H >  p
npt
L .
We proceed now to look at the alternative trade regime PT. Let us assume for the
moment that rm F has no incentive to exclude any market. Governments anticipate
rm F's decision on quality in the second stage and the fact that the same price ceiling
will prevail in both markets in the third stage due to the threat of arbitrage. Government




















with i = H;L. We nd the rst order conditions of this problem, which leads us to the
following set of conditions:
















daL must be of opposite sign for every value of aL. By totally dierenti-









































daL must be the same for every





daL > 0 for all aL 2 (0;aH].
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i stands for the optimal price ceiling set by government i when the threat of
parallel trade imposes a uniform price ceiling for both markets. From these conditions,
we obtain that the price ceiling  p
pt
i that maximizes consumer surplus in market i while



















i and therefore is binding for rm F. In the third stage,
due to the threat of arbitrage, the lowest price ceiling  p
pt
i will prevail in both markets.
It can be shown that the lowest price ceiling is the one set by government L and that
government H has no incentive to set a price ceiling below  p
pt
L, as stated in the following
lemma.
Lemma 1.3. Under PT, government L sets a price ceiling  p
pt
L that prevails in both
markets as the uniform price ceiling:  p
pt
U =  p
pt
L. This is the only subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of the game because  p
pt
H >  p
pt
L and there is no price ceiling  p such that  p <  p
pt
L







Let's look now at the possibility of exclusion of market L. Firm F has incentive to
exclude market L if its prots when selling only in market H are higher than its prots
when serving both markets at the uniform price ceiling  p
pt
U. The fact that rm F has
incentives to exclude market L does not immediately lead to its eective exclusion.
Provided that at the price ceiling  p
pt
U the consumer surplus in market L is positive,
government L may have room to rise its price ceiling to avoid exclusion while maintaining
a positive consumer surplus. The lowest possible uniform price at which rm F has no
incentive to exclude market L is the price at which rm F enjoys the same amount of








 aL (3aH   13aL)
4(aH + aL)
(1.21)
obtained from equating rm F's prots with and without exclusion of market L. Govern-
ment L will set  pav
U as price ceiling to avoid being excluded by rm F if two requirements
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are met: rst, if rm F had incentive to exclude market L in case the price ceiling  p
pt
U
were imposed; and second, if at the alternative price ceiling  pav
U the consumer surplus
in L were positive. This means that government L will be able to avoid exclusion by
setting price ceiling  pav
U for the following interval of values of the parameter aL:
3
13







where "  0:0142 is a scalar4. For lower values of aL, willingness to pay in market L is
too low for the government to be able of setting a price ceiling high enough to convince
rm F not to exclude its market and low enough to produce a positive consumer surplus
in market L. The rst inequality in expression (1.22) can be conceived as the incentive
compatibility constraint that guarantees no exclusion when governments regulate prices.
For lower values of aL, rm F will exclude market L and concentrate on selling in market






which is the optimal price ceiling for governments H when market L is excluded.
These results can be summarized in the following table:
Table 1.2: Governments' price ceilings













































Before proceeding to the welfare analysis of parallel trade, it is necessary to understand
whether the uniform price ceiling prevailing under PT is higher or lower than the price
ceilings that each government sets under NPT. It can be shown that for all values of
aH and aL, the price ceiling  p
pt
U set by government L under PT is strictly higher than
the price ceiling  p
npt
L set by the same government L under NPT. Moreover as we show

















Saurí, Lluís (2012), An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/37014Chapter 1. Parallel trade and incentives to innovate 19
below, for values of aL suciently close to aH, the uniform price ceiling  p
pt
U under PT is
even higher than the price ceiling  p
npt
H set by government H under NPT.
This result contrasts with the prediction in Rey [8], namely that parallel trade produces
a uniform regulated price equal to the lowest regulated price when no parallel trade is
allowed. As we have already argued above when commenting on the cross-derivatives of
consumer surpluses, in our model innovation is a global public good. When no parallel
trade is allowed, each government tends to free ride on the other government's willingness
to pay for innovation, leading to low price ceilings and undernancing of innovation. By
allowing parallel trade, a uniform price is imposed, what eliminates any possibility of
free riding and forces government L to set a uniform price ceiling for both markets taking
into account that this will be the only source of incentives for rm F to innovate. This
is stated formally in the following proposition:
Proposition 1.4. (Free-riding) The uniform price ceiling under parallel trade is higher
than the lowest price ceiling when no parallel trade is permitted:  p
pt
U >  p
npt
L , which means
that parallel trade does not lead to a convergence of prices to the lowest price ceiling.
When demands in markets H and L are close enough, the uniform price ceiling under
parallel trade is higher than the highest price ceiling observed when no parallel trade is
permitted:  p
pt
U >  p
npt
H for L suciently close to aH, what exemplies that parallel trade
corrects the free-riding problem faced by governments when no parallel trade is allowed.
1.2.5 Welfare analysis of parallel trade
When governments do not regulate prices and rm F is able to freely set its pricing
policy subject to the parallel trade regime under which it is operating, then allowing
parallel trade to take place tends to be detrimental to aggregate welfare. It can be
inferred from the table below, which summarizes the level of prots, consumer surpluses
and welfare in each of the equilibrium situations dened in Section 2.3.
Table 1.3: No price ceilings
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Start by looking at the situation in which demands in both markets are relatively similar
(aL close to aH), parallel trade imposes a uniform price in both markets and no market
is excluded. This prevents rm F from maximizing prots by optimally discriminating
in prices across markets. Given that quality is an increasing function of prots, the fact
that under parallel trade prots are lower implies that also the level of quality provided
by rm F is lower when parallel trade is allowed. Consumer surplus in market H is
higher under parallel trade because the negative eects of the decrease in quality are
oset by the positive eects of the reduction in the price faced by its consumers. On
the contrary, consumer surplus in market L is lower under parallel trade as a result of
both the decrease in quality and the increase in the price paid by consumers in L. The
overall eect of parallel trade on aggregate welfare, dened as the sum of prots and
consumer surpluses, is negative when no market is excluded by rm F.
Let us turn now to the case in which the price elasticity of demand is substantially higher
in market L than in market H (low values of aL), and rm F has incentive to exclude
market L and concentrate on selling in market H at a higher price. When this happens,
the contribution of market L to the nancing of innovation disappears and consumers
in market H must nance on their own the level of quality they desire to consume. This
repercutes negatively on the consumer surplus in market H, while consumers in market
L lose all their surplus as a result of being excluded from buying the product produced
by rm F. As a results, parallel trade turns out to be particularly harmful for consumer
surpluses and aggregate welfare when it leads to the exclusion of market L.
These results coincide with those in Valletti [10], where it is argued that parallel trade
can be welfare detrimental because it may erode incentives to innovate by preventing
rms from optimally discriminating in prices across markets. However, as we show below,
these results may change considerably if price regulation by governments prevents rms
from optimally discriminating in prices even when no parallel trade can take place.
Let us start by looking at the extreme symmetric case in which both markets are iden-
tical, i.e., aH = aL and price elasticities are hence the same. We can obtain without
diculty the equilibrium values for prots, consumer surpluses and aggregate welfare
for that case:
Table 1.4: Price ceilings and equal demands
Prots CSH CSL Welfare
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It shows that in the symmetric case with equal demands, allowing parallel trade increases
rm F's prots, consumer surpluses in both markets and hence also aggregate welfare.
As we have already seen in the previous section, for values of aL suciently close to aH
the uniform price ceiling imposed by government L under parallel trade is higher than
the price ceilings imposed by any of the governments when parallel trade is forbidden.
This is so because in the rst stage both governments anticipate that the threat of
parallel trade will impose a uniform price ceiling and therefore there is no possibility for
any government to free-ride on others willingness to pay for quality. Allowing parallel
trade eliminates incentives to free-ride and may lead to higher uniform prices, quality
(that is an increasing function of prots) and welfare. As we will see in Section 2.6,
where we complete the analysis by computing numerical solutions, when governments
establish price ceilings and for L suciently close to aH, aggregate welfare is higher
when parallel trade is allowed than when it is prohibited.
On the other hand, when aL < 3
13aH and market L is excluded, aggregate welfare is
higher if parallel trade is prohibited. Exclusion of market L eliminates any consumer
surplus from this market, while not contributing to rise neither rm F's prots nor the
consumer surplus in market H that are realized when parallel trade is prohibited:
Table 1.5: Price ceilings and exclusion
Prots CSH CSL Welfare























For intermediate values of aL, we cannot reach any conclusive analytical results on the
welfare eects of parallel trade. In the following Section we present a numerical example
illustrating the results presented so far and complementing this welfare analysis.
1.2.6 Numerical example
In the analysis presented so far, we were unable to present closed-form solutions of
prices for all possible equilibria. Even though this has not prevented us from oering
a series of analytical results that characterize the equilibria, it is worth to devote some
attention to comment on the numerical results of our model.
Let us normalize the parameter of demand in market H, aH, to one. Qualitative results
are the same for any alternative value of aH 2 (0;1]. We have looked for equilibrium
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Figure 1.1: Equilibrium prices
prices under each regulatory and trade regime for dierent values of aL 2 (0;aH]. The
gures below show graphically the numerical results obtained from performing iterations
for one thousand evenly distributed dierent values of aL.
Figure 1.1 shows how equilibrium prices vary with L. Thin lines represent equilibrium
prices under NPT and thick lines represent equilibrium prices under PT. The gure
on the left shows prices when governments do not impose price ceilings. When prices
are set unilaterally by a prot-maximizing rm, parallel trade imposes an intermediate
uniform price between the lower and the higher prices that prevail locally when markets
are segmented. Under parallel trade and for values of the demand parameter such that
L < 1
3, rm F prefers to exclude market L and to sell only in market H at a higher
price.
Giving local governments the possibility of establishing price ceilings constitutes a kind of
decentralization of pricing decisions that creates a public-good problem when no parallel
trade is allowed. A price increase in any of the two markets raises the level of quality
available in both markets, but may eventually erode consumer surplus just in the market
that has raised prices. The greater taste for quality in market H leads its government
to be willing to set a higher price in order to incentivate high levels of quality. The
government in L, whose preferred level of quality is lower, sets a lower price than it
would be willing to set otherwise and lets government H to be the one who mainly pays
for quality. That is, government L has incentive to free-ride and let government H be
the only one to nance innovation, what leads to ineciently low prices. Innovation
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Figure 1.2: Quality
behaves as a global public good and gets undernanced when governments set prices
and no parallel trade is permitted.
Allowing parallel trade to take place partially solves the public-good problem by making
government L responsible for the uniform price that will prevail in both markets, and
therefore eliminating any possibility of free-riding. Again, for suciently low values
of the demand parameter L, rm F chooses to exclude market L in order to avoid
government L imposing an excessively low price in both markets. In the gure on the
right, which shows equilibrium prices when price ceilings are imposed by governments,
we identify two regions. For L < 3
13, there is no price that guarantees a non-negative
consumer surplus in market L, while avoiding incentives for rm F to exclude that
market. Therefore, in this region rm F sells only in market H at a constant price that
does not depend on the parameter L. For L > 3
13, rm F does not exclude market L
and serves both markets at the uniform price ceiling imposed by government L.
Figures 1.2 and 1.5 show how quality and aggregate welfare vary with L (gures for
prots and cosnumer surpluses are included in Appendix II). When rm F sets prices
unilaterally, both quality and aggregate welfare are lower under parallel trade than
without it. Parallel trade does not allow rm F to optimally discriminate in prices
according to the demand in each market. This implies that under parallel trade rm
F's prots are lower than they are when no parallel trade can take place. This in turn
results into lower quality and aggregate welfare for any value of the demand parameter
L below 1. When governments establish price ceilings, then parallel trade helps to
prevent government L from free-riding on government H's willingness to pay for quality.
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Figure 1.3: Aggregate welfare
We observe that for values of L suciently close to 1, quality and aggregate welfare
are higher under parallel trade than they are when parallel trade is not permitted. On
the contrary, for intermediate values of L the eects of parallel trade on quality and
aggregate welfare are less clear-cut. There is a trade o between addressing the public
good problem to nance quality and optimally discriminating in prices across markets.
For values of L close to 1, the loss of prots and quality associated to price uniformity
is relatively low compared with the gains of solving the public-good problem through
arbitrage. Therefore, aggregate welfare is higher under parallel trade for high values of
L. The ineciency of price uniformity grows with the dispersion of the demands, and
for low values of L this ineciency outweighs any gain from arbitrage. That is the
reason why parallel trade is detrimental to welfare for low values of L.
The discussion on the welfare eects of parallel trade is driven by the trade-o between
the positive eect of price discrimination on prots and quality and the negative eect
on quality of the miscoordination of governments' pricing policies when price dieren-
tials are sustainable. The intensity of the price discrimination ineciency depends on
the value of the parameter L. The larger is the dierence between demands in the two
countries, the more inecient is price uniformity in terms of prot maximization. Conse-
quently, parallel trade tends to be welfare enhancing when governments set price ceilings
and markets have similar demands (L close to 1). On the contrary, price discrimination
is always preferable either when rm unilaterally sets prices or when governments set
price ceilings but markets have suciently dierent demands (L far from 1).
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1.3 Extensions: F as a domestic rm and supply
constraints
In the previous sections we have assumed that rm F is located neither in country H
nor L, but in a third country. Consequently, governments H and L set price ceilings
to maximise just their countries' consumer surpluses. In this section we discuss how
equlibria change when rm F is located either in H or L.
1.3.1 Governments' decisions on price ceilings when F is a domestic
rm
Let's assume that rm F is located in country H. A government L that maximises
consumer surplus would not change its policy with respect to the case analysed above,
where rm F is located in a third country. A welfare-maximising government in H would
have to set price ceilings taking into account their impact on both consumer surplus in




WH(pH;pL) = CSH(pH;pL) + (pH;pL) (1.24)
We know from 1.15 that the price p
npt
H that maximises (pH;pL) is higher than the price
ceiling pnot
H maximising CSH(pH;pL). Hence, the welfare-maximising price ceiling under
NPT, ^ pH must lie in-between the price ceiling that maximises consumer surplus and the








While the maximisation problem of government L does not vary, we know from 1.16
that governments H and L view their respective price ceilings as strategic substitutes.
Therefore, when rm F is located in H, then the price ceiling imposed by government






Under the NPT regime, consumers in H face a higher equilibrium price and consumers
in L face a lower equilibrium price when rm F is located in H. Firm F's prots in H are
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higher when it is located in H than when it is in a third country, as the new equilibrium
is the result from incorporating prots into government H's objective function. Firm
F's prots in L are instead lower.
Under the PT regime, it is irrelevant whether rm F is located in H or in a third
country. Government L establishes a price ceiling to maximise the same consumer-






If rm F is located in H, the dierence between price ceilings in H and L tends to
be larger. The higher willingness to pay of government H is likely to exacerbate the
incentive for government L to free-ride by further lowering its price ceiling.
Let's assume conversely that rm F is located in country L. Government H establishes
a price ceiling to maximise the same consumer-surplus function irrespectively of whether
rm F is located in L or in a third country. A government H that maximises consumer
surplus would not change its policy with respect to the case where rm F is located in
a third country. Conversely, a welfare-maximising government in L would have to set a
price ceiling taking into account its impact on both consumer surplus in L and prots




WL(pH;pL) = CSL(pH;pL) + (pH;pL) (1.28)
Again, we know from 1.15 that the price p
npt
L that maximises (pH;pL) is higher than the
price ceiling pL maximising CSL(pH;pL). Hence, the welfare-maximising price ceiling
under NPT, ^ ^ p
npt
L must lie in-between the price ceiling that maximises consumer surplus








While the maximisation problem of government H does not vary, we know from 1.16
that governments H and L view their respective price ceilings as strategic substitutes.
Therefore, when rm F is located in L, then the price ceiling imposed by government
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Under NPT, consumers in H face a lower equilibrium price and consumers in L face a
higher equilibrium price when rm F is located in L. Firm F's prots in L are higher
when it is located in L than when it is located in a third country, as the new equilibrium
is the result from incorporating prots into government L's objective function. Firm F
's prots in H are instead lower.
Under the PT regime, government L also establishes a price ceiling ^ ^ p
pt
L taking into
account their impact on both consumer surplus in L and prots of rm F. As long
as this price ceiling is lower than the price ceiling that maximises consumer surplus in
H, ^ ^ p
npt
H , it becomes the prevalent price both in H and L. This is the case when the
dierence in demand elasticities between countries is suciently large and rm's prots
are suciently small compared to consumer surplus in L.
If rm F is located in L, the dierence between price ceilings in H and L tends to be
smaller. The higher willingness to pay of government L reduces its incentive to free-ride.
1.3.2 Sustainability of parallel trade in equilibrium when rm F has
the ability to impose supply constraints
In the previous sections we have assumed that buyers face no constraint to their capacity
to export unlimited quantities of product. It is reasonable to think that the manufacturer
has some ability to impose capacity constraints on parallel traders by supplying limited
quantities of product. While manufacturers are typically not allowed to refuse supplying,
they may still be able to supply limited quantities of their product.
Let's assume that buyers can export a maximum quantity  > 0 from the low-price to
the high-price market after having fully served the low-price market. We assume that
buyers have a legal obligation to serve their domestic market and that they are only
able to export exceeding quantities of pharmaceuticals. At the same time, we assume
that the manufacturer can only imperfectly observe the quantities required to guarantee
continued supply and reserve stocks in the low-price market and must therefore agree
to supply an exceeding quantity of product. These exceeding quantity is the maximum
exportable quantity .
In these circumstances, under the PT regime the manufacturer has two alternative
strategies:
 To set a uniform price, as analysed above
 To discriminate prices, setting ~ p
pt
H > ~ p
pt
L
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We have already solved for the optimal uniform price in section 1.2.3. Let's solve for
the optimal prices if the manufacturer choses to discriminate prices when buyers are
constrained in their exporting capacity. In this case, buyers in L are able to export
a limited quantity  from L to H, while rm F serves the remaining fraction of the






































H > ~ p
pt
L, as long as  < aH aL
aH+aL. Firm F chooses to price discriminate if and only
if it produces higher prots than setting a uniform price. It can be shown that this is
the case when  is suciently small.
Proposition 1.5. When rm F is able to constrain buyers' capacity to export to a
sucient degree ( is suciently low), then it is optimal for rm F to price discriminate
across markets. In that case, buyers in L are able to serve a fraction of the demand in
H at price ~ p
pt




The greater is rm F's ability to impose constraints to buyers' exporting capacity, the
stronger is the incentive for rm F to price discriminate, as shown by the rst derivatives

















The lower is the exporting capacity of parallel traders (the lower is ), the higher is ~ p
pt
H
and the lower is ~ p
pt
L. In the extreme case of  ! 0, the equilibrium under the PT regime
approaches the equilibrium under the NPT regime.
Saurí, Lluís (2012), An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/37014Chapter 1. Parallel trade and incentives to innovate 29
1.4 Conclusions
The debate on the convenience of allowing parallel trade of pharmaceuticals to
take place has been substantial in the last years. Increasing pressure from developing
countries, unsatisfaction of consumers in high-price countries or market integration in
Europe have been some of the factors that have contributed to challenge the traditional
national exhaustion interpretation of intellectual property rights. Even if it seems clear
that parallel trade may be benecial in some respects, especially in the short run, it is not
easy to assess its welfare eects in a long run perspective. Parallel imports may help de-
velop incipient pharmaceutical industries in developing countries, may provide medicines
at lower prices to consumers in certain countries and may even enhance regional-wide
competition in Europe. But it may also reduce prots of innovative pharmaceutical pro-
ducers and undermine the incentives to spend in R&D that intellectual property rights
are intended to create.
In this paper we have tried to assess incentives to invest and welfare eects of parallel
trade taking into account all these considerations and, particularly, focusing on the fact
that decisions on prices in the pharmaceutical industry are only exceptionally taken by
rms on a unilateral basis. The pharmaceutical industry is a highly regulated industry
and in most countries governments actively participate in the price-setting of medicines.
When evaluating the welfare implications of parallel trade, it is convenient to take into
account how prices are determined.
We have used a model where governments and rms interact on setting prices to show
that parallel trade may be either benecial or detrimental to welfare, depending on
who is deciding on prices and on the degree of demand dispersion across countries.
When rms unilaterally set prices, parallel trade tends to be welfare detrimental because
prevents rms from optimally discriminating in prices, what reduces their prots as well
as their incentive to innovate. When governments impose price ceilings, the possibility
of sustaining price dierentials across markets creates incentives for governments in
low-demand markets to force their prices down in an attempt to free-ride on other
governments' higher willingness to pay for quality. In that case, parallel trade is welfare
enhancing because it disciplines governments in low-demand markets by making them
responsible for the uniform price that will prevail in all markets. The higher are the
dierences in demand across countries, the worse are the welfare properties of parallel
trade.
The results in this paper allow us to draw some policy implications. Allowing parallel
trade to take place between countries with great dierences of demand may have negative
implications on welfare. It may either destroy incentives to innovate substantially by
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forcing an ineciently low uniform price, or may even lead to the exclusion of low-
demand countries. This may be the case of parallel imports from developing to developed
countries. On the contrary, parallel trade between countries with similar demands may
be a good instrument to discipline governments that actively participate in the price-
setting processes and that may have the temptation of free-riding on others willingness
to pay for quality. This could be the case in the European Union.
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1.5 Appendix I: Proofs
Proof. of Lemma 2











ai and guarantees that any pair of prices satisfying the FOCs, satises also the
SOCs.





L . Then we can say that 1   1
aH  p
npt
H  1   1
aL  p
npt



















































































Operating, we can reformulate this pair of inequalities to get the following:




















which allows us to restate them as a unique inequality:
aH   2 p
npt












As we already said, by denition aH  aL, which implies that  p
npt
H   p
npt
L . This is
in contradiction with the initial guess. It proves by contradiction the statement in the
proposition.





, function CSi (pi;pj) is continuous in pi and its second
derivative with respect to pi is negative. The rst derivative is positive if evaluated at
the lower bound and negative if evaluated at the upper bound of the interval. Hence,





that maximizes CSi (pi;pj).
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Proof. of Lemma 3





L. Then we can say that 1  1
aH  p
pt
H  1  1
aL  p
pt
L and 1  aH+aL
aHaL  p
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Additionally, for the FOC in L to hold, it must be that either 2   aH+aL
aHaL  p
pt




L  0. However, we know that 2   aH+aL
aHaL  p
pt
L  0 is not possible because
it would imply  p
pt
L  2 aHaL
aH+aL > aL, giving a negative demand in market L. Therefore
we know that  p
pt
L  aHaL
aH+aL, which together with the inequality derived above implies
that necessarily  p
pt
H   p
pt
L. This is in contradiction with the initial guess. It proves by
contradiction that  p
pt
H >  p
pt
L.






, function CSi (pi) is continuous and concave. The rst
derivative is positive if evaluated at the lower bound and negative if evaluated at the








Consequently, the rst derivative of CSH (pH) evaluated at any positive price lower than
 p
pt
H is negative, and therefore there is no  p <  p
pt







Proof. of Proposition 4
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because by assumption in this proof  p
pt
U   p
npt
H  aL






























































































which implies that aL > 3aH. This is a contradiction and therefore it proves that
 p
pt
U >  p
npt
L .
On the other hand, we know that  p
npt
H decreases with aL and we can show that  p
pt
U




























By evaluating equilibrium prices for aL = 4
5aH, we obtain that  p
npt
H  0:1912 and
 p
pt
U  0:2067. Hence, we can say that at least for aL > 4
5aH it is true that  p
pt
U >  p
npt
H .
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1.6 Appendix II: Figures
In this Annex we enclose some complementary gures that show the behavior of
prots and consumer surpluses with respect to variations in the parameter L and for
H = 1.
Figure 1.4: Prots
Figure 1.5: Consumer Surpluses
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Direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription
drugs: informing patients or persuading
physicians?
Abstract
DTCA gives patients the ability of better learning their needs, both regarding physician
consultations and available treatments, and may reduce information asymmetries in the
relation between the patient and the physician. Persuasive advertising may induce con-
sumer demand not based on therapeutic grounds, eventually exacerbating informational
problems. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the welfare properties of DTCA,
taking into account both its informative and persuasive eects. In our model, physicians
are assumed to face some harassment costs when contradicting the preferences of their
patients over the drugs prescribed, what creates an agency problem between the patient
and the physician. We analyse the welfare properties of DTCA under the scenarios of
perfect and imperfect agency. We show that DTCA tends to be welfare enhancing when
physicians are perfect agents. On the contrary, when they are imperfect agents, DTCA
welfare eects are ambiguous. In particular, it can be detrimental to consumer welfare
when harassment costs are relatively high.
Key words: Pharmaceuticals, Advertisement, Principal-agent, Regulation
JEL Classications: I11; K23; L51; M38
* This chapter was written during a stay at the Paris School of Economics (PSE) as an exchange PhD
student of the European Doctoral Programme. I wish to thank Prof. Massimo Motta, Prof. Richard
Spady, Prof. Bauke Visser, Luca Aguzzoni, Emanuele Tarantino and the participants to the EUI seminars
for comments and discussions on earlier drafts of this chapter. The usual disclaimer applies.
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2.1 Introduction: The controversy on DTCA
Advertising activities in the pharmaceutical industry have traditionally been subject
to strict regulation by national authorities in order to avoid potential negative eects
related to the informational structure of the market for drugs. Specically, DTCA is
often prohibited on the grounds that it could induce consumers to ask for inappropriate
treatments and it might undermine the patient protection that the health legislation
seeks by requiring physicians to certify patients' need for prescription drugs.
There are a number of arguments in favor and against the allowance of DTCA for
prescription drugs. The reasons in its favor focus on the informative role played by
advertising, meaning that through DTCA the public may come to know about the
existence of new treatments for their diseases and thus that the match between patient
and drug can be improved by allowing pharmaceutical rms to advertise directly to
consumers. Proponents argue that better informed patients reduce the level of under-
diagnosis of some diseases by increasing physician visits. DTCA would be protable
for rms and benecial for patients because of this market-expanding eect. On the
other hand, opponents of DTCA fear that it may aect the choice of prescription and
lead to the consumption of unnecessarily expensive or even inappropriate therapies.
This business-stealing eect may be protable for rms carrying on DTCA, while being
harmful for patients and leading to unreasonably high pharmaceutical spending.
The persuasive or informative nature of advertising lies at the base of the distinction
between these two potential eects of DTCA. Informative advertising may give patients
the ability of better learning their needs, both about visiting the physician and about
possible treatments, and may reduce information asymmetries in the relation between
the patient and the physician. Persuasive advertising may induce consumer demand not
based on therapeutic grounds, eventually exacerbating informational problems.
2.1.1 The regulation on pharmaceutical advertising
While advertising to physicians (so-called detailing) has been traditionally recognized
as an acceptable practice in the pharmaceutical industry, even if subject to regulations
aiming at guaranteeing its informative purpose; for a long time DTCA of pharmaceuti-
cals has been considered as not convenient.
In the US, prescription drugs are subject to a specic marketing regulation since the
1962 Kefauver-Harris amendments that made the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
responsible for monitoring the promotion of prescription drugs. According to these
amendments, promotional materials cannot be false or misleading; they must provide
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a fair-balance coverage of risks and benets of using the drug; they must provide a
summary of contraindications, side eects, and eectiveness; and they must also meet
specic guidelines for readability and size of print [see 12, p. 694]. Restrictions on
DTCA were relaxed in 1997 with the issue of new FDA guidelines, allowing producers
to advertise drugs without having to enclose a summary of side eects and other risks.
Since this regulatory reform, it can be considered that DTCA is a legal practice in the
US.
In contrast, Europe has not yet changed its legislation to allow for DTCA, even though
the issue is under debate and the reform is clearly in the agenda of the pharmaceuti-
cal industry. DTCA in Europe is prevented under the Council Directive 92/28/EEC,
which requires the Member States to prohibit the advertising of prescription drugs to the
general public [see 15]. However, the European Commission has launched in December
2007 a public consultation about the reform of the legislation on pharmaceutical infor-
mation to patients. In the last months, several stakeholders in the pharmaceutical sector
and notably the associations of the pharmaceutical industry have published a number
of reports to inform the Commission about their positions. A complete permission of
DTCA has been already excluded, but there is an interest in facilitating increased ows
of information from rms directly to consumers.
2.1.2 The physician-patient relationship
It has been traditionally assumed that the decision of consuming prescription drugs
corresponds to the physician acting as prescriber, while the patient just accepts the
physicians decision. This peculiar feature of the demand for drugs arises from the pres-
ence of information asymmetries, the patient being incapable of performing a correct
self-diagnosis and an appropriate self-medication and thus having to rely on the physi-
cian's advice. This perspective of the pharmaceutical markets has been gradually called
into question, while there is an increasing interest on understanding what could be the
role of an informed patient.
If we assume that DTCA plays just an informative role, then allowing pharmaceutical
rms to advertise directly to consumers could mitigate this information asymmetry,
and reduce under-diagnosis without aecting the choice of prescription. Any misleading
or persuasive eect on patients associated to DTCA should not aect the prescription
choice, provided that the nal decision on medication is taken by the physician. One
can however think that this could not be the case and that, to the extent that the
patient is able to inuence physicians' nal prescription, the positive eects of DTCA
on consumers welfare should be put under closer scrutiny.
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Nonetheless, it remains to be explained why a physician would change a choice of pre-
scription according to the preferences of the patient. A rst explanation refers to the
physicians will of avoiding a conictive relationship with the patient, that is, he would
be willing to satisfy the prescription preferences of patients in order to avoid any ha-
rassment cost. Alternatively, we could think about remuneration mechanisms leading
physicians to have strong incentives to satisfy patients requests. This would be, for in-
stance, the case of private practitioners afraid of losing customers and of practitioners in
the public sector being paid according to the number of patients treated or the number
of visits performed. Understanding the features of the physician-patient relationship
is essential in order to determine to which extent is there room for persuasive eects
associated to DTCA. In this paper we propose a model that formalises this relationship
to assess the welfare properties of DTCA.
2.1.3 Economic analysis on DTCA
There is not much theoretical work on the motivations and eects of DTCA, while
a substantial amount of empirical research has been carried on lately, especially since
the modication of the FDA guidelines in 1997. Rosenthal et al. [14] nd that DTCA
increases aggregate demand of drugs, without aecting market shares within each thera-
peutic class. Wosinska [17] shows that demand eects of DTCA are substantially smaller
than those of detailing. Iizuka and Jin [10] nd that DTCA increases visits to physi-
cians by new patients, but does not aect the choice of prescription done by physicians.
Iizuka [8] nds that rms are more likely to advertise new and high-quality drugs, that
advertising is more intense when the number of potential rather than current patients
is higher, and that rms advertise less as competition gets more intense. Iizuka and Jin
[9] conclude that DTCA has mainly a market-expanding eect, while recognising that
the weaknesses of their empirical work do not allow a comprehensive assessment of the
welfare eects of DTCA. Berndt et al. [1] show that pharmaceutical marketing has not
only a market-expanding eect, but also a business-stealing eect.
Despite the fact that theoretical work on DTCA is scarce, there are some recent works
available. Brekke and Kuhn [2] study the interaction between DTCA and detailing,
showing that these are complementary marketing strategies for pharmaceutical rms
and that they have a positive impact on consumers' welfare. Their model reects the
informational asymmetries between physician and patient, and assumes that detailing
has mainly a business-stealing eect, while DTCA has just a market-expanding eect.
Thus, the assumptions in the model tend to match the ndings of the empirical literature.
Brekke and Straume [3] study the relation between DTCA and pharmaceutical R&D
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and show that both tools can be used as strategic substitutes by an incumbent rm
facing the entry of a potential competitor.
Brekke and Kuhn [2] discard by assumption any possible persuasive eect of DTCA.
On the one hand, they assume that the only eect of DTCA on patients is to encourage
them to visit their physician. On the other hand, physicians are assumed to be perfect
agents that only care for their patients' health. Persuasive eects on patients and the
view of physicians as imperfect agents are precisely the main line of reasoning against
DTCA. In order to assess the welfare eects of DTCA, we try to formalize these con-
siderations. To do that, we assume that physicians are not necessarily perfect agents
for their patients. That physicians take into account a variety of considerations when
taking their prescription decisions has been already shown in the literature. Gruber
and Owings [7] show that in the face of negative income shocks, physicians may exploit
their agency relationship with patients by providing excessive care. In particular, they
show a relation between physicians nancial incentives and cesarean delivery. Lundin
[13] shows that patients tastes and costs matter when prescribing generic or branded
versions of a drug.
In order to incorporate the potential persuasive eect of DTCA, we propose to analyze
how the induced consumer demand may translate into prescriptions signed by physi-
cians. This leads us to a principal-agent approach to represent the relationship between
physicians and patients. Physicians can be assumed to have some interest on prescrib-
ing the appropriate medication to patients, but also to minimize conict with patients
or to maximize some nancial incentives. Harassment costs or inadequate institutional
frameworks could give physicians strong incentives to deviate from prescribing the most
suitable treatment and to satisfy patient requests induced by DTCA.
In this paper, we propose a Hotelling-type model in the line of Brekke and Kuhn [2]. In
our model, physicians are assumed to face some harassment costs when contradicting the
preferences of their patients over the drugs prescribed. We take the notion of harassment
cost, following Lindbeck and Snower [11] as our main reference, and we introduce it in
the physician's utility function as to create a problem of agency between the patient
and the physician. We analyse the welfare properties of DTCA under two scenarios: in
the rst one, harassment costs are zero and physicians behave as perfect agents; in the
second one, harassment costs are positive and physicians act as imperfect agents. In the
former case, DTCA can only have an informative eect on consumers. In the latter, it
can also have a persuasive eect. We show that DTCA tends to be welfare enhancing
when physicians are perfect agents. On the contrary, when they are imperfect agents,
DTCA welfare eects are ambiguous. In particular, it can be detrimental to consumer
welfare when harassment costs are relatively high.
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In Section 2.2.1 we present the setup of the model. Section 2.2.2 describes the problem
faced by physicians when prescribing a treatment. Section 2.2.3 solves the rm's problem
and characterizes the equilibria. In Section 2.2.4 we present the problem of the regulator
and proceed to the welfare analysis of DTCA under each scenario. Section 2.3 concludes.
2.2 The model
2.2.1 Basic setup
We use a Hotelling-type model to describe the interaction between two pharmaceutical
rms, each one selling a drug with similar therapeutic properties. We build on the
framework proposed by Brekke and Kuhn [2], but we depart from their analysis to
account for the persuasive eect of DTCA. Consider a pharmaceutical market with a
continuum of individuals uniformly distributed on the line segment [0;1] with mass 1.
A fraction s of all the individuals are in need of medical treatment, while the rest are
healthy. The location of an arbitrary individual, x 2 [0;1], is associated with his personal
characteristics. There are two pharmaceutical rms, indexed by i = 0;1, in this market,
where rm i sells drug i at a uniform price pi. The drugs are located at either end of the
unit interval, reecting their diering chemical compounds and associated side eects.
The gross utility derived by an individual in need of medical care from consuming one
unit of either drug is given by v, where v represents the therapeutic value of the drug
consumed and is assumed to be the same for both drugs. Alternatively, a healthy
individual gets zero gross utility from consuming either drug. Individual's net utility
from consuming drug i is obtained by subtracting to the value v, the proportion of the
price paid by the individual and the negative side eects caused by the consumption
of a given drug. These side-eects are assumed to depend on personal characteristics






v   tjx   ij   pi if x is an ill patient,
 tjx   ij   pi otherwise,
(2.1)
where v > 0, t > 0, and  2 (0;1]. The parameter t captures the utility loss (`mismatch
cost') per unit distance between drug i and a patient x. Finally, the parameter  denotes
the copayment rate, i.e., the fraction of the drug's price paid by the patient.
We assume that individuals ignore their health status and their location in the unit
segment. They have to visit a physician to get a diagnostic and eventually a drug
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prescription. We let z 2 [0;1] be the fraction of individuals that attend the physician's
practice either because they have developed some symptoms of their condition or as part
of a regular check-up. The remaining fraction (1   z) do not visit the physician as, for
instance, they do not have developed any symptoms.
If allowed by health authorities, pharmaceutical rms can advertise directly to con-
sumers. On one side, we assume that DTCA inuences individuals' decisions on whether
or not to seek medical advice by a physician, informing about the possible symptoms
associated with the disease and about the existence of an indicated drug. On the other
side, we assume that DTCA aects individual's preferences by informing just about one
of the two pharmacological therapies available in the market. Let i 2 [0;1] denote
the fraction of patients who receive an ad from rm i. The informative eect of DTCA
induces every individual who has seen at least one ad to visit a physician. Only the frac-
tion of the individuals who have not been exposed to an ad do not seek medical advice,
and this is given by (1 z)(1 0)(1 1). The persuasive eect of DTCA determines
individual's preferences over the two existing drugs. We assume that patients who have
seen just one ad express a preference for the drug they have seen in the ad. On the
contrary, patients exposed to both ads or to neither of them are indierent between the
two drugs. The expected fraction of individuals attending a physician for medical advice
being indierent between the two drugs is the following:
N01() = 01 + z(1   0)(1   1); (2.2)
where  = (0;1). While the expected fractions of individuals that go to the physician
and prefer drug 0 or 1 are respectively the following:
N0() = 0(1   1);
N1() = (1   0)1; (2.3)
where N() = N01() + N0() + N1() is the expected fraction of all the individuals
seeking for medical advice. To ease the exposition, from now on we will refer to this
expected fraction just as fraction or number of individuals. The number of individuals
with a preference for drug i depends positively on the amount of advertising conducted
by rm i and negatively on the amount of advertising by the other rm, while the overall
number of individuals going to the physician depends on the amount of advertising done
by either rm.
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Once the basic setup has been described, we can proceed to present the structure of the
game. The following sequence of moves is considered and solved by backwards induction:
 Stage 1: The regulator decides on whether or not to allow DTCA.
 Stage 2: Pharmaceutical rms determine spending on DTCA and set prices.
 Stage 3: Some patients go to the physician, who prescribes either drug 0, drug 1
or no treatment at all.
2.2.2 The physician's problem
Physicians are identical and face the same distribution of patients. They have the skills
to identify a patient's health status, healthy or ill, and his personal characteristics, i.e.,
the location x 2 [0;1]. Assume that physicians are imperfect agents for their patients.
During the medical visits, patients with a preference for one of the drugs will suggest
the physician to prescribe their preferred drug. When patients ask for the wrong drug,
physicians who care only for the patient's health have to bear the cost of litigating
with the patient about the drug to be prescribed. The same happens when a healthy
individual insists on getting a drug prescription. That is, if physicians want to be perfect
agents, they face a 'harassment cost' that may involve just a longer medical visit (to
give the necessary explanations to change the patient's mind) or that may even imply
the loss of the patient (and perhaps the corresponding retribution). When prescribing,
physicians maximize patient's utility minus the harassment cost:
max
i
V (x;i;pi) = U(x;i;pi)   (i)  h; (2.4)
where  is an indicator function that takes value 1 when patient x has only received an
ad from the rm other than i and value 0 otherwise, and h is a scalar indicating the
magnitude of the harassment cost.
Let us look rst at the prescription behavior that would maximize the utility U(x;i;pi)
of an ill patient. Drug i should be prescribed to patient x if the following holds:
U(x;i;pi)  0 (2.5)
If U(x;i;pi) < 0, then the patient should not be given any treatment at all, as it is the
case for healthy individuals. Letting ^ x denote the patient who is indierent between the
two drugs, we have:
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where p = (p0;p1). Let us assume that every ill patient is better o consuming a drug
than getting no treatment. That is, U(x;0;p0) > 0 for any ill patient such that x  ^ x(p)
and U(x;1;p1) > 0 for any ill patient such that x  ^ x(p). This guarantees that only
healthy patients should not be prescribed to consume any drug. Physicians who only
care for the utility of their patients should prescribe drug 0 to every ill patient in the
interval [0; ^ x] and drug 1 to every ill patient in (^ x;1]. No drug should be prescribed to
healthy individuals.
In this model, however, physicians are imperfect agents whose prescription behavior
is oriented to maximize their own utility rather than patients' utility. Let us look
rst at prescription decisions for the fraction s of the population that is in need of
pharmacological treatment. Physician's utility V (x;i;pi) coincides with patient's utility
U(x;i;pi) for every ill patient that is indierent between the two drugs. In this case, the
physician will act as a perfect agent for the patient, prescribing according to the criteria
above.
On the contrary, for individuals with a preference towards a particular drug, the physi-
cian's utility function V (x;i;pi) diers from U(x;i;pi) because of the harassment cost h.
Take an ill patient who has only seen an ad from rm 0 and therefore asks his physician
to prescribe drug 1 to him. The physician prescribes drug 0 if the following inequality
is satised:
V (x;0;p0)  V (x;1;p1) , v   tx   p0  v   t(1   x)   p1   h (2.7)
Rearranging this inequality and substituting for ^ x, we observe that a physician prescribes
drug 0 to a patient x with a preference for drug 0 if and only if the following is true:




Otherwise, the physician prescribes drug 1. Physicians prescribe drug 0 to every ill
patient with a preference for drug 0 in the interval [0; ^ x + h
2t] and drug 1 to every ill
patient with a preference for drug 0 in (^ x+ h
2t;1]. The higher the harassment cost h and
the lower the negative side eects t, the higher the number of patients who get drug 0,
in spite of drug 1 being more suitable for them.
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Analogously, we know that an ill patient x with a preference for drug 1 will be prescribed
drug 0 if and only if:




and drug 1 otherwise. Physicians prescribe drug 0 to every ill patient with a preference
for drug 1 in the interval [0; ^ x   h
2t] and drug 1 to every ill patient with a preference for
drug 1 in (^ x  h
2t;1]. Again, the higher the harassment cost h and the lower the negative
side eects t, the higher the number of patients who get the less suitable drug.
Let us look now at prescription decisions for healthy individuals going to the physician.
Some of them visit the physician for a regular check-up without having seen any adver-
tisement and do not get any drug prescription. However, this is not the case for healthy
individuals who have been exposed to advertising from one or both rms. Take either
a healthy individual who asks for a prescription of drug 0 after having seen an ad from
rm 0 or a healthy individual x such that x  ^ x and who asks for a drug prescription,
regardless of which is the precise drug prescribed, after having seen all ads. In both
cases, the physician satises the patient's request if the physician's utility when pre-
scribing drug 0 is higher than the harassment cost of convincing him of not taking any
drug. The physician prescribes drug 0 to a healthy individual x asking specically for





Otherwise, no treatment is prescribed. Analogously, a healthy individual x asking specif-
ically for drug 1 or generically for any drug gets a prescription for drug 1 if and only if
the following is true:




while no treatment is prescribed otherwise. The lower the negative side eects t and the
lower the monetary cost p of drug 0 for the patient, the higher the probability that the
physician accepts to prescribe it even if the patient does not really need it. The higher
the harassment cost h, the higher the probability of the unnecessary prescription. Given
that x 2 [0;1], a positive number of healthy individuals will be prescribed drug i if the
following inequality holds:
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h   pi > 0 (2.12)
These prescription decisions lead to the following expected demands for drug 0 or 1,
respectively:

















[01 + N1()] (2.13)
The rst term in the RHS of each equation accounts for the amount of prescriptions not
distorted by the harassment cost as a consequence of the persuasive eect of DTCA.
That is, these terms give the amount of patients for which the physicians have prescribed
the best treatment available. The second term in the RHS of each equation gives the
amount of prescriptions distorted by DTCA, i.e., the number of patients for whom a more
suitable drug could have been prescribed. Finally, the third term in the RHS of each
equation corresponds to the amount of healthy individuals to whom physicians end up
prescribing a drug, although they would be better o without taking any pharmacological
treatment at all.
2.2.3 The rm's problem
Now that we have already solved the physician's problem in the third stage and we
have obtained the demand for each drug, we can proceed backwards to solve the rm's
problem in the second stage. Pharmaceutical rms face identical and constant marginal
production costs, which we normalize to zero. The R&D costs are considered sunk at
the time marketing and price decisions are taken and play no role in the analysis. The
cost of advertising is the same for both rms. This allows us to write down the expected
prot function of rm i as follows:
i(;p) = piQi(;p)   K(i) (2.14)
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Brekke and Kuhn [2], building on the framework introduced by Butters [4], assume that
the cost of reaching a fraction i of patients is given by the following general advertising
cost function, K(i). The function K() is increasing and convex in the quantity of
DTCA. In order to simplify exposition, we assume additionally that the cost function






2.2.3.1 The benchmark case: no DTCA is allowed
Let us start by looking at the case in which DTCA is prohibited by the regulator.
This situation corresponds to the current European regulation on DTCA and will be
the benchmark case throughout the paper. In this case, levels of DTCA are ex ante set
to be zero, i = 0. Firm 0 maximizes prots only with respect to p0, as no DTCA is
allowed, anticipating the number of patients attending the physicians and the physicians
prescription choices. This problem can be written as follows:
max
p0
0(p) = p0sz^ x(p); (2.16)










Firm 1 faces a symmetric problem and a symmetric set of rst-order conditions. We
therefore impose symmetry in order to derive the equilibrium price and level of DTCA.
Symmetry implies that prices are equal, i.e., p0 = p1 = p. With identical prices, only
the median patient is indierent between the two drugs:




We have assumed above that every ill patient is better o consuming some drug than
without being treated. In the symmetric equilibrium, this assumption implies that the
following condition must hold:
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The symmetric equilibrium prices and DTCA levels in the benchmark case with DTCA





b = 0; (2.20)
where the superscript b denotes the benchmark equilibrium. The equilibrium price comes
from imposing symmetry in equation 2.17, while the level of DTCA has been determined
ex ante by the regulator.
2.2.3.2 DTCA is allowed and physicians are perfect agents
Suppose now that the regulator allows pharmaceutical rms to advertise directly to
consumers, but also that consumers are completely unable to distort prescription de-
cisions taken by physicians. This is the case analyzed in Brekke and Kuhn [2], where
DTCA is assumed to have only an informative eect. Under these circumstances, rms
are able to choose positive levels of DTCA while anticipating that h = 0. Firm 0 faces
now the following problem:
max
p0;0
0(;p) = p0s^ x(p)N()   K(i) (2.21)
where the rst term in the RHS is the revenue from prescriptions to ill patients and the
second term is the cost of advertising. Firm 0 gets no revenue from selling to healthy
individuals because for h = 0 condition 2.12 is not satised and physicians do not write
any unnecessary prescription to healthy patients. The solution to this problem is dened












= p0s^ x(p)(1   z)(1   1)   k0 = 0 (2.22)
Firm 1 faces a symmetric problem and a symmetric set of rst-order conditions. We
therefore impose symmetry in order to derive the equilibrium prices and DTCA levels,
which are given by
Saurí, Lluís (2012), An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Markets 
European University Institute
 







ts(1   z) + 2k
; (2.23)
with the superscript p denoting equilibrium under perfect agency. Equilibrium prices
are the same with and without DTCA, provided that physicians act as perfect agents for
their patients. Positive DTCA equilibrium levels increase the number of ill patients who
get access to a pharmacological treatment. Assuming that physicians are perfect agents,
i.e., that h = 0, we nd that allowing DTCA must have a positive eect on consumer
surplus, while the eect on aggregate welfare will depend on how prots react. As
expected, these results coincide with those in Brekke and Kuhn [2]. We will come back
to this discussion in Section 2.2.4, where we present a welfare analysis to assess the
regulator's decision on DTCA.
2.2.3.3 DTCA is allowed and physicians are imperfect agents
Let us now allow for positive values of h, which implies that harassment costs might
now distort prescription choices by physicians in the way described in Section 2.2.2.
Firm 0 maximizes prots with respect to 0 and p0, anticipating the number of patients
attending the physicians and the eect of harassment costs on prescription choices. The
problem faced by rm 0 can be written in the following manner:
max
p0;0










The rst term in the RHS accounts for the revenue from correct prescriptions that
have not been distorted by the persuasive eect of DTCA. The second term represents
the revenue from wrong prescriptions to patients that would be better of consuming
the alternative drug. The third term corresponds to the revenue from unnecessary
prescriptions to healthy people. The fourth term in the RHS is the cost of advertising.
The solution to this problem is dened by the following set of rst-order conditions:
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Again, rm 1 faces a symmetric problem and a symmetric set of rst-order conditions.
Imposing symmetry, we obtain equilibrium prices and DTCA levels as implicitly given





sN(h) + (1   s)h




phs(1   z) + 2k
+
ph 
sh + 2(1   s)(h   ph)

t[phs(1   z) + 2k]
; (2.26)
with the superscript h denoting equilibrium under imperfect agency. This system does
not allow to nd a closed-form explicit solution for ph and h for the whole range of
parameter values. We can however draw some conclusions. First, we observe now that
price depends positively on the fraction s of patients that need some medical treatment.
This result means that the higher is the fraction of healthy people, the more important
are healthy customers for the rm. Given that these customers do not get any benet
from following a pharmacological treatment, physicians tend to be particularly reluctant
to prescribe any drug to them, unless the secondary eects and the price are suciently
low. While secondary eects are out of the rm's control, price can be adjusted down-
wards as the importance of the healthy customers increase. Second, even if everybody
is healthy and nobody can benet from any drug, i.e., s = 0, in equilibrium we observe
a positive level of DTCA, provided that condition 2.12 is satised. This is so because in
our model the persuasive eect of DTCA may lead some healthy individuals to ask for
and obtain unnecessary prescriptions.
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Finally, let us compare system 2.26 with the results under perfect agency derived in the
previous section shown in 2.23. It is easy to see that the second factor in the product at
the RHS of the rst equation in 2.26 cannot be higher than 1. Therefore, comparing this
with the rst equation in 2.23, we conclude that equilibrium prices are lower or equal
under imperfect agency than they are under perfect agency. Moreover, the rst term in
the RHS of the second equation in 2.26 is higher or equal than the whole RHS of the
second equation in 2.23, while the second term is positive. Hence, equilibrium levels of
DTCA are higher under imperfect agency than they are under perfect agency. Let us
sum up these comparative statics in the following pair of inequalities:
pb = pp  ph;
b  p  h; (2.27)
When physicians are imperfect agents, prices are lower and DTCA more intensive than
when physicians are perfect agents. However, from these comparative statics, we can
still not determine whether the positive eect on consumer welfare from the lower prices
dominates or not the negative eect of inecient prescription choices. We devote the
next section to present a welfare analysis to answer this question.
2.2.4 The regulator's problem
In our game, the regulator decides in the rst stage whether to allow or not pharma-
ceutical rms to advertise directly to consumers, anticipating the consequences of this
decision in terms of welfare. As we show below, these consequences depend crucially
on the incentives that determine prescription choices by physicians, while the regulator
may take dierent decisions depending on whether he is aiming at maximising consumer
welfare or aggregate welfare. In the exposition that follows we reproduce the structure
of the analysis in the previous section. We start by look at the benchmark case with
prohibition of DTCA, then we study what happens with DTCA under perfect agency,
and nally we proceed to the case with DTCA under imperfect agency.
2.2.4.1 The benchmark case: DTCA is not allowed
Recall rm i's prots in the benchmark case from equation 2.16 and substitute for the
equilibrium values to obtain prots in equilibrium:
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Prots depend positively on the fraction s of individuals in need of treatment, the frac-
tion z of individuals seeking for medical advice and the mismatch cost t, and negatively










[v   p1   t(1   x)]dx
#
(2.29)
We can distinguish two denite integrals between brackets in the RHS, the rst corre-
sponding to consumer surplus of patients consuming drug 0 and the second correspond-
ing to consumer surplus of patients consuming drug 1. Substituting for the equilibrium








The positivity of this expression is ensured by condition 2.19. Consumer surplus de-
pends positively on the fraction s of individuals in need of treatment, the fraction z of
individuals seeking for medical advice and the benecial eect v for an ill patient from
consuming a drug, and negatively on the mismatch cost t.
Apart from prots and consumer surplus, we must also take into account public expen-
diture on pharmaceuticals, which depends on the level of copayment . This expected
public expenditure equals the number of prescriptions times the part of the price paid
by the regulator, and for the benchmark case can be expressed as follows:
Xb = tsz (2.31)
In the discussion about the regulator's decision on whether to allow DTCA or not, we
consider two possible objective functions. A `consumer-oriented' regulator will be mainly
concerned about consumer welfare. We assume that such a regulator seeks to maximize
consumer surplus minus public expenditures (which are assumed to be indirectly paid by
consumers through taxes). We will refer to this objective function as consumer welfare:
CWb = CSb   Xb (2.32)
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Alternatively, an `industry-oriented' regulator may include in his objective function also
prots and therefore maximize aggregate welfare, which can be written as follows when
DTCA is prohibited:
AWb = 2b
i + CSb   Xb; (2.33)
2.2.4.2 DTCA is allowed and physicians are perfect agents
When DTCA is allowed, rms obtain some additional revenue from individuals who
visit the physician only after being exposed to some ad. To obtain the equilibrium level



























ts(1   z) + 2k
2
(2.34)
The rst element in the RHS represents prots without the contribution of DTCA, and
the second and third elements are the contribution to prots from the supplementary
sales originated by DTCA and its cost, respectively.
If physicians are assumed to be perfect agents, DTCA increases the number of pre-
scriptions without distorting prescription choices. Under these circumstances, consumer
surplus can still be written as in equation 2.29. Substituting for equilibrium values we



















where we can distinguish two elements in the RHS, the rst corresponding to the fraction
of consumer surplus independent from DTCA and the second representing the contri-
bution to consumer surplus of new patients treated thanks to the informative eect of
DTCA.
Rearranging equations 2.34 and 2.35, it can be easily proved that both prots and
consumer surpluses are higher with than without DTCA, provided that physicians are
perfect agents. This is so because DTCA is assumed to have only an informative eect,
leading to an expansion of the market just among individuals with the need of being
treated, but without distorting prescriptions.
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Now, public expenditure on pharmaceuticals is higher because of the additional amount
of prescriptions signed by physicians:





ts(1   z) + 2k
2#
(2.36)




i + CWp = 2
p
i + CSp   Xp (2.37)
2.2.4.3 DTCA is allowed and physicians are imperfect agents
We now turn our attention to the welfare implications of DTCA's persuasive potential.
As shown in Section 2.2.3.3, it is not possible to nd explicit closed-form solutions for
prices and DTCA levels in equilibrium for the whole range of possible parameter values.
Let us therefore restrict for the moment our attention to the particular case with s = 1,
that is, suppose that the whole population is in need of pharmacological treatment. As
we discuss further below, by restricting to this particular case we will be able to reach
some analytical results, before relaxing this restriction when proceeding to the numerical
welfare analysis.
As shown before, when DTCA is allowed rms obtain some additional revenue from
individuals who visit the physician only after being exposed to some ad. They should
also receive some revenues from unnecessary prescriptions to healthy individuals who
have been persuaded by DTCA of being in need of treatment. The latter does not apply
now, given that we have momentarily restricted our attention to the situation in which
everybody is ill and needs treatment. To obtain the equilibrium level of prots of a
single rm, we substitute in equation 2.24 for the equilibrium prices and levels of DTCA
























t(1   z) + h
t(1   z) + 2k
2
(2.38)
On the other hand, consumer surplus of patients can now be expressed as follows:
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[v   p1   t(1   x)]dx (2.39)
As before, in the rst term in the RHS we can distinguish two denite integrals between
brackets, the rst corresponding to the consumer surplus of indierent patients consum-
ing drug 0 and the second corresponding to the consumer surplus of indierent patients
consuming drug 1. Now, we nd two additional terms corresponding respectively to
non-indierent patients that consume drug 0 even if some of them would be better o
consuming drug 1 and to non-indierent patients that consume drug 1 even if some of
them would be better o consuming drug. The symmetry of the equilibrium allows us



















[t(1   z) + h](2k   h)





The rst term in the RHS is equal to the consumer surplus when DTCA is allowed.
The second term reects the positive impact that the informative eect of DTCA has
on consumer surplus, by giving access to pharmacological treatment to some patients
that otherwise would not be treated. The third term accounts for the negative impact of
the persuasive eect of DTCA, which leads to suboptimal treatments for some patients.
Public expenditure on pharmaceuticals is the same as in 2.36, i. e., Xh = Xp because
the number of prescriptions is the same under perfect and imperfect agency for s = 1.
This will not be true for other values of s. Again, two alternative measures of welfare
can be considered:
AWh = 2h
i + CWh = 2h
i + CSh   Xh (2.41)
When physicians are imperfect agents and s = 1, the overall eect of DTCA on prots
and consumer surplus depends on the values of the parameters. Prots are higher
with DTCA if the revenue from additional sales is higher than the cost of DTCA. This
Saurí, Lluís (2012), An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/37014Chapter 2. Direct-to-consumer advertising 57
could seem similar to what happened in the previous Section under perfect agency. The
dierence is that now rms advertise not only to increase the number of individuals
attending the physician, but also to avoid patients being persuaded by the competing
rm. This may lead rms to increase the amount of DTCA in equilibrium, accepting an
increase in costs to avoid a loss of sales in favour of the competing rm. From equation
2.38, we know that prots are higher with DTCA if the following inequality is satised:
[t(1   z) + h]
2
[t(1   z) + 2k]




Similarly, consumer surplus is higher when DTCA is allowed if the positive contribution
from new prescriptions is higher than the loss associated to inecient prescriptions. This
is the case when the following inequality holds:
[t(1   z) + h](2k   h)
[t(1   z) + 2k]   (2k   h)









For values of z close to one, the RHS in both inequalities converges to zero and hence
they are less likely to hold. This result is reasonable. High values of z indicate a
well informed population with a high propensity to seek medical advice. Under these
circumstances, the contribution of DTCA to consumer surplus in terms of informing
population about their health status is relatively low in comparison with the losses from
inecient prescription practices induced by DTCA. Moreover, the moderate increase in
sales may not even cover the costs of DTCA, thus leading to lower prots for the rms.
Conversely, when z is low and hence a signicant fraction of population does not go to
the physician in spite of being ill, DTCA may positively contribute to consumer surplus
and rms' prots by inducing a substantial increase in the number of ill people treated,
which more than compensates the negative eect of potential distortions in prescription
choices.
The results presented so far about the welfare eects of DTCA under imperfect agency
have been derived assuming that s = 1. By relaxing this assumption, we introduce
the possibility that DTCA leads to the unnecessary treatment of healthy individuals,
which contributes negatively to consumer surplus. On the other hand, we have already
seen that equilibrium prices depend positively on the fraction of individuals in need
of treatment: lower values of s imply lower prices, which benets consumers. The
overall impact on consumer surplus will depend on which of the two eects dominates
and remains ambiguous. In order to get a better picture of this trade-o, we must
numerically solve for the equilibrium values.
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2.2.4.4 Numerical analysis
In this section we present some numerical results that allow us to better understand
the welfare properties of DTCA in the two scenarios considered, perfect and imperfect
agency. Even though we have computed the equilibrium values for a wide range of
parameter values, here we present only some of them. In particular, we focus on how
the welfare properties of DTCA depend on the magnitude of the harassment cost h. We
have found a persistent tendency for DTCA to be less desirable for consumer welfare
as h increases. This is what can be observed in the tables below, where the last two
columns are the increments of consumer welfare and aggregate welfare when DTCA is
allowed under a given regime j, where j = p;h, departing from the benchmark case b:
4CWj = CWj   CWb
4AWj = AWj   AWb
The rst line in each able corresponds to the equilibrium values under perfect agency. In
that case, physicians do not face any harassment cost and therefore results are invariable
to h. The last lines in each table correspond to the equilibrium values under imperfect
agency. In that case, results depend substantially on the value of h. The values of the
parameters shown in the tables satisfy conditions 2.12 and 2.19.
Let us start by looking at the equilibrium prices and levels of DTCA. As stated in 2.27,
when physicians are imperfect agents, rms tend to set lower prices and do more DTCA.
This is reasonable, as under imperfect agency DTCA may be used to steal customers
from the competing rm. Competition is then tougher and rms tend to behave more
aggressively. However, this only translates into lower prots for high values of s, that
is, when the fraction of people in need of medical treatment is high. To see that, note
that each table shows results for a dierent value of s. Under perfect agency, a low
value of s implies low sales, because healthy people do not get any prescription. On
the contrary, under imperfect agency, DTCA may cause some healthy individuals to get
prescriptions. The lower is s, the higher are the potential gains from DTCA for the
rms in terms of sales under imperfect agency, in comparison with the potential gains
under perfect agency.
DTCA tends to have a positive eect on consumer surplus if public expenditures are
not taken into account. Even when physicians are imperfect agents, the positive impact
of the informative eect of DTCA on consumer surplus through additional prescriptions
seem to dominate the negative impact of the persuasive eect of DTCA through ine-
cient prescriptions. The higher is the fraction s of ill people, the more important is the
informative role of DTCA.
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Table 2.1: Numerical analysis with a low fraction of ill population
z = t =  = 0:5, v = k = 1 and s = 0:25
pp p 
p
i CSp Xp 4CWp 4AWp
1.0000 0.0400 0.0662 0.1180 0.0674 0.0037 0.0111
h ph h h
i CSh Xh 4CWh 4AWh
0.5 0.5375 0.1347 0.1485 0.1657 0.0671 0.0517 0.2236
0.6 0.6293 0.1911 0.2166 0.1687 0.1044 0.0174 0.3256
0.7 0.7212 0.2607 0.3063 0.1722 0.1612 -0.0359 0.4518
0.8 0.8135 0.3459 0.4248 0.1761 0.2459 -0.1167 0.6080
0.9 0.9063 0.4504 0.5830 0.1802 0.3698 -0.2365 0.8045
Table 2.2: Numerical analysis with an intermediate fraction of ill population
z = t =  = 0:5, v = k = 1 and s = 0:5
pp p 
p
i CSp Xp 4CWp 4AWp
1.0000 0.0769 0.1391 0.2511 0.1435 0.0139 0.0420
h ph h h
i CSh Xh 4CWh 4AWh
0.5 0.5960 0.1873 0.1583 0.3417 0.1223 0.1256 0.1922
0.6 0.6748 0.2510 0.2128 0.3498 0.1658 0.0902 0.2658
0.7 0.7541 0.3259 0.2801 0.3582 0.2251 0.0393 0.3495
0.8 0.8343 0.4138 0.3635 0.3663 0.3049 -0.0323 0.4447
0.9 0.9161 0.5164 0.4677 0.3736 0.4113 -0.1314 0.5540
Table 2.3: Numerical analysis with all population ill
z = t =  = 0:5, v = k = 1 and s = 1
pp p 
p
i CSp Xp 4CWp 4AWp
1.0000 0.1111 0.2176 0.3970 0.2269 0.0295 0.0897
h ph h h
i CSh Xh 4CWh 4AWh
0.5 0.7033 0.2626 0.1819 0.5225 0.2057 0.1762 0.1650
0.6 0.7588 0.3284 0.2133 0.5369 0.2479 0.1485 0.2001
0.7 0.8156 0.4021 0.2470 0.5507 0.2991 0.1110 0.2300
0.8 0.8742 0.4845 0.2830 0.5631 0.3611 0.0614 0.2524
0.9 0.9355 0.5767 0.3212 0.5737 0.436 -0.0029 0.2646
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However, by substantially increasing the number of prescriptions, DTCA raises the
public expenditure on pharmaceuticals signicantly. In particular, when harassment
costs h are relatively high, DTCA leads to excessive consumption of drugs. This is
illustrated in the tables by the results for consumer welfare CWh. Let us compare the
two scenarios. On the one hand, when physicians are perfect agents who take their
prescription decisions just to maximise the utility of the patient, DTCA can only have
an informative eect. This contributes to a better public health, with more patients
correctly treated, and tends to have a positive impact on consumer welfare1. On the
other hand, when physicians are imperfect agents, DTCA may lead them to prescribe
suboptimal treatments to ill people and unnecessary treatments to healthy individuals.
The higher are the harassment costs h, the higher is the potential distortion caused
by DTCA on prescription choices. Suboptimal treatments impact negatively on the
consumer surplus (through a lower public health), while unnecessary treatments impact
negatively both on consumer surplus and on public nancial resources. This negative
impact can only be compensated by a substantial positive impact of DTCA on consumer
surplus through new prescriptions for ill people. This means that the higher is the
fraction s of ill people, the better are the welfare properties of DTCA under imperfect
agency. In fact, in the tables we can see that as s increases, the range of values for which
DTCA is detrimental to consumer welfare gets smaller.
Finally, the impact of DTCA on aggregate welfare seems to be positive both when
physicians are perfect agents and when they are imperfect agents. This is so because
the excessive consumption of drugs, which has a negative impact on consumer welfare,
makes in contrast a positive contribution to rm's prots. Therefore, while a `consumer-
oriented' regulator should be cautious when deciding whether to allow or not rms to
advertise directly to consumers, an `industry-oriented' regulator could have stronger
reasons to decide to allow them to do it.
2.3 Conclusions
The debate about the convenience of allowing DTCA focuses on the distortions that
its persuasive eect could impose on prescription decisions, eventually leading to sub-
optimal prescriptions and to excessive consumption. In this chapter, we have shown
that the persuasive eect of DTCA may indeed have these consequences, if physicians
are sensitive to the preferences of their patients. We have shown that if physicians are
1Unless the copayment is too low, in which case demand becomes inelastic and rms tend to increase
price without limit, with a negative impact on consumer welfare. In fact, some modications should be
introduced in the model to make it suitable to study this situation. It is, however, out of the scope of
our work.
Saurí, Lluís (2012), An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/37014Chapter 2. Direct-to-consumer advertising 61
able to act as ecient gatekeepers, prescribing the best treatments and prescribing only
when necessary, then DTCA could be a reasonable way of increasing patients' informa-
tion. On the contrary, if reimbursement schemes, patients' freedom to change physician
or simply patients' ability to harass physicians give an incentive to avoid contradicting
patients' preferences, then the persuasive potential of DTCA should be carefully taken
into account.
In this paper we have proposed a model to formalise the discussion about the welfare
properties of DTCA and showed how these properties depend crucially on the nature
of the relationship between physician and patient. There are some extensions that will
deserve some further attention. In the model presented above, there are two competing
rms that produce horizontally dierentiated drugs. One possible extension would con-
sist on dening a sequential game to understand if an incumbent rm could use DTCA
as a barrier to entry. That advertising costs can be conceived as endogenous sunk costs
fostering market concentration has already been theorised by Sutton [16]. In our case in
particular, it would be interesting to understand if DTCA before patent expiration can
be used by the holder of a patent to increase its rst-entrant advantage with respect to
potential generic competitors. The European Commission has indeed expressed some
concern about the strategic behaviours engaged by pharmaceutical rms holding patents
close to the expiration date, presuming that these are essentially oriented to limiting the
eects of competition from generics after patent expiration [see 5]. As far as DTCA is
concerned, we must bear in mind that advertising is a way of building reputation and
brand loyalty, which is stressed by Grabowski and Vernon [6] as an essential element to
be taken into account in any attempt to understand competition between branded and
generic drugs.
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A theoretical framework for the analysis of
branded-generic competition in o-patent
pharmaceutical markets
Abstract
In this chapter we study the impact of generic competition in o-patent pharmaceutical
markets when patients perceive the branded product as being of higher quality than the
generics and are allowed to pay a co-payment to consume the branded product. We show
that, while generic competition always drives prices down, under certain circumstances
branded and generic rms are able to coordinate around high-price equilibria with a
detrimental impact on welfare. This is the case when the branded rm can commit to
a certain preferred price before generics choose the quantities they produce. We argue
that price regulation may facilitate this type of coordination. We also show that policy
interventions that seek to increase generic market share by distorting patients' choices
may have the unintended eect of softening generic competition and lead to higher
generic prices.
Key words: Pharmaceuticals, Generic competition, Regulation
JEL Classications: I11; I18; K21; L41; L65
* I wish to thank Prof. Massimo Motta, Emanuele Tarantino and Tim Wilsdon for comments and
discussions on earlier drafts of this chapter. The usual disclaimer applies.
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a theoretical framework for the analysis of generic competition
in o-patent pharmaceutical markets. In particular, we look at the interaction between
branded original drugs and generic drugs within a regulatory environment that closely
resembles that of many European pharmaceutical markets. We build our analysis around
patients' perception branded products as being of higher quality than the generics and
account for they willingness to pay for quality.
An interesting feature of o-patent pharmaceutical markets is the observed persistence in
the demand of branded products even after generic entry and despite the price dierential
that often exists between branded and generic products. Although in many countries
generics often account for most of the consumption in o-patent markets, the branded
is only rarely driven out from the market and its share of the market tends to be higher
in terms of value than of volume. We show this in chapters 4 and 5, where we present
an empirical analysis of generic competition in European pharmaceutical markets. This
suggests that certain physicians or patients may perceive branded original products as
distinct from their generic competitors and prefer to pay a price dierential for the
branded product and avoid switching to the generic version.
The analysis in this chapter provides theoretical foundations to interpret the results from
the econometric analysis in chapters 4 and 5. We use a model of vertical dierentiation,
building on the framework proposed by Brekke et al. [1]. We depart from their analysis of
a branded-generic duopoly to consider the market equilibrium when the branded product
faces competition from a fringe of generic entrants. We incorporate price regulation to
the model and investigate whether it may lead to higher equilibrium prices and lower
consumer welfare. We look at the relations between the number of generic competitors,
prices and market shares, and assess the welfare properties of the set of market equilibria
obtained.
In our model, branded prices are higher than generic prices in equilibrium, with both
branded and generic prices decreasing with the number of generics active in the market.
A higher number of generics makes the generic segment of the market more competitive,
driving down both generic and branded prices. This is consistent with previous empirical
literature on generic competition.
A number of empirical papers have shown a relationship between the speed and extent
of generic entry and the expected protability of the market. Main references include
Hurwitz and Caves [9], Grabowski and Vernon [6] and Scott-Morton [16]. The paper by
Caves et al. [2] remains as a fundamental reference to understand the transformation in
the competitive dynamics in o-patent pharmaceutical markets since the introduction
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of generics in the US market in the eighties. The ability of generics to deliver more
competitive markets with lower prices has been shown in a number of papers, including
Grabowski and Vernon [5], Grabowski and Vernon [6], Frank and S. [4], Wiggins and
Maness [19], Reien and D. [13], Saha et al. [15] and Regan [12] among others. Attention
has been devoted in these papers to the reaction of branded incumbents to generic entry.
Some studies show that the branded incumbent tends to increase price after generic
entry, segmenting the markets between a high-price branded segment and a low-price
generic segment. Most papers, however, do not observe this behaviour, but rather show
the branded incumbents lower their price in response to generic competition. Evidence
suggests however that branded incumbents are able to sustain prices above their generic
competitors, giving support to the segmentation hypothesis. Most of the research has
been conducted for the US and relatively fewer research has been published regarding
European markets. Danzon and Li-Wei [3], Kanavos et al. [10] and Puig-Junoy and
Moreno-Torres [11] are some exceptions, although not the only. They tend to focus their
attention on the impact of market regulation on the competitive dynamics observed in
European markets.
In chapters 4 and 5 we present our empirical analysis, which is also consistent with
the main features of our theoretical framework. Branded prices are indeed shown to
be higher than generic prices and average market prices are negatively correlated with
the number of generics active in the market. The empirical analysis also shows that
the number of generics is positively correlated with the value of the market. This is
compatible with the structure of the market in our model in the presence of xed costs,
that constrains the number of generics sustainable with positive prots in the market.
We also use our theoretical framework to evaluate the likely impact of a number of
regulatory interventions. We show that policy interventions seeking to increase generic
market share by distorting patients' choices may have the unintended eect of softening
generic competition and lead to higher generic prices. We also show that, while tougher
generic competition always drives prices down, under certain circumstances branded
and generic rms are able to coordinate around high-price equilibria with a detrimental
impact on welfare. This is the case when the branded rm can commit to a certain
preferred price before generics choose the quantities they produce. We argue that price
regulation and especially authorised generics may facilitate this type of coordination.
This hypothesis is compatible with the results of our empirical analysis, which indicate
that price regulation is correlated with smaller reductions in price upon generic entry.
Our empirical analysis does not look at the eect of authorised generics.
An important lesson from our analysis is that, as long as patients perceive branded drugs
as being distinguishable from generic competitors, there may be a trade-o between
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minimising public pharmaceutical expenditure and maximising consumer welfare, even
if this tension does not have an impact on clinical outcomes. Branded and generic
products are clinically equivalent, but there are non-clinical dierences between drugs
produced by dierent manufacturers. Patients may be aware of the clinical equivalence of
branded and generic products, but still they may attach dierent subjective valuations to
non-clinical characteristics of the products, which are instead irrelevant for a government
that only values clinical outcomes.
The role of brands in pharmaceutical markets has attracted specic attention in the
empirical literature. Grabowski and Vernon [5] and Scott-Morton [17], for instance,
looked at the eect of brands as a barrier to generic entry without identifying a signif-
icant eect of brand recognition on the extent of generic entry. Richard and Van Horn
[14] concludes that the eect of brand loyalty takes the form of habit, in the sense of
persistence in prescription patterns and usage over time. Granlund and N. [7] provide
insight by looking at consumer loyalty towards branded drugs in the Swedish market.
They observe that patients are willing to pay a premium in order to receive the branded
pharmaceutical instead of a cheaper non-branded generic version. There is discussion
on whether branded products provide additional value to patients with respect to non-
branded products. While the higher willingness to pay indicates that the subjective
value of branded drugs is higher at least for a fraction of patients, it is less clear whether
there is also some intrinsic clinical value to branded products. Van Wijk et al. [18] and
Heaney and Sander [8], for instance, look at this question and conclude that there is no
evidence that brands provide any additional relative clinical eectiveness, even though
patients may often attribute a higher value to branded products. Our theoretical frame-
work, where patients are willing to pay a premium for clinically equivalent branded
products, is consistent with these ndings
This chapter contributes to the existing literature by providing a formalisation of the
impact of regulation on the competition between branded incumbents and generic en-
trants in o-patent pharmaceutical markets. It also contributes by providing analysis
of the eects that a number of specic types of regulatory interventions have on market
outcomes and consumer welfare.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.2 we propose a model of vertical
dierentiation for the analysis of competition between branded and generic drugs in
o-patent pharmaceutical markets. We show that, while generic competition always
drives prices down, under certain circumstances branded and generic rms are able to
coordinate around high-price equilibria with a detrimental impact on welfare. In section
3.3 we rst study the eects of two types of policy interventions: the introduction of price
ceilings and the encouragement of generic prescription and dispensation. Secondly, we
Saurí, Lluís (2012), An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/37014Chapter 3. Price regulation in o-patent pharmaceutical markets 71
briey discuss the relevance of brand recognition and patients' perceptions in our model.
Finally, in section 3.4 we confront the implications of our theoretical framework with
the results from the empirical analysis in chapters 4 and 5.
3.2 The model
3.2.1 Basic setup
We use a model of vertical dierentiation to describe the dierent perceptions that
patients have of branded and generic drugs. Consider a pharmaceutical market with a
continuum of individuals uniformly distributed on the line segment [;] with mass 1,
where  < 1. The location of an arbitrary individual,  2 [;], represents the gross
utility he is able to derive from receiving pharmaceutical treatment and depends on his
health status.
There are two types of pharmaceutical rms in this market, an originator rm b produc-
ing a branded drug and generic rms g producing non-branded versions of the same drug.
The branded drug enjoyed market exclusivity for a number of years, until patent expiry
allowed generic producers to launch their non-branded versions onto the market. Years
of market exclusivity allowed the originator product to accrue brand value in terms of
patients' perception. Generic products are perceived as less valuable by patients, which
is accounted for by a parameter  2 (0;1). Patients must pay a co-payment to receive





   ci if i = b
   ci if i = g
(3.1)
where ci is the co-payment that patients must pay to obtain drug i. We assume that
patients are universally covered by a health insurance that reimburses pharmaceutical
consumption up to the price of the cheapest version of a drug available in the market
and that the health insurer imposes a dispensing fee to all patients. This type of reim-
bursement mechanism, so-called generic reference pricing, is prevalent in most European
markets with some variations.1 They share the feature that the co-payment made by
the patient is the price dierential between the reference price and the actual price of
1Puig-Junoy [11] provides a review of reimbursement mechanisms in European o-patent pharma-
ceutical markets.
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the drug, often plus a xed fee, while the reference price is covered by the insurer. co-
payments are therefore dened as a xed payable fee plus the dierence between the
price of any dispensed drug and the price of the cheapest drug in the market:
ci = f + pi   pr (3.2)
where f is the xed fee that patients pay to the health insurer and pr is the price
of the cheapest available version of the drug, which is used as a reference price for
reimbursement purposes.2 Hence, rms earn the full price pi of their products for each
unit sold and the health insurer pays the reference price pr and earns the xed fee f for
each unit consumed by patients.
A patient will only be willing to get pharmacological treatment if he obtains a positive
net utility from consumption. We assume that co-payments are designed to guarantee
universal access to medical treatment which implies that f < . The higher the gross
utility  obtained by a patient, the more he will be willing to pay a higher co-payment
in order to obtain the branded drug. Let ^  denote the patient who is indierent between
consuming a branded or a generic drug:
^    cb = ^    cg (3.3)
Substituting for the co-payments:
^ (p) =






Patients with a gross utility above ^  will prefer to buy the branded version of the drug,
while the remaining patients will buy the generic drug. Demands for each type of drug
are dened by the following functions:3







2This structure of co-payments has the propriety of not distorting the allocation of consumers amongst
branded and generic products.
3Note that these demands are the same if patients pay the entire prices of the products instead of
paying only the co-payments, as long as the price of the cheapest product is low enough for the consumer
with the lowest valuation of the product not to be excluded.
Saurí, Lluís (2012), An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/37014Chapter 3. Price regulation in o-patent pharmaceutical markets 73
Demand for the branded drug is served by a unique rm b, while demand for the generic
versions of the drug is served by a nite number n of generic rms gi, where i = 1;:::;n.
We initially assume n to be exogenously determined, in the sense that there is a nite
number of generic producers with the technological capability to produce the drug.
In section 3.2.4 we relax this assumption and treat n as endogenous. However, it is
reasonable to think that market conditions are likely to have an impact on entry decisions
by potential generic competitors, thus recommending that n be treated as endogenous.
We assume the marginal cost of producing the drugs is the same for all rms and equal
to !, irrespectively of whether they produce a branded or a generic drug. All generic
rms incur in an entry cost F > 0, which the branded incumbent already paid in the
past to start selling the drug while patent protected.
3.2.2 A branded product facing generic competition in a
simultaneous game with vertical dierentiation
In this section we assume that branded and generic rms meet in the market place and
simultaneously choose their optimal strategies. In section 3.2.3 we look at the sequential
case in which the branded incumbent is able to commit to a price rst.
For each of these cases, we analyse rst market outcomes when just one generic competi-
tor enters the market and both the branded incumbent and the generic entrant compete
by setting prices. We then look at the more general situation with multiple generic
competitors entering the markets. The branded incumbent maximises prots by set-
ting its price, each producer in the fringe of homogeneous generic competitors chooses
the quantity produced and the equilibrium generic price is determined indirectly by the
symmetric decisions of generic producers on the quantities produced.
Admittedly, this approach is unusual as it implies that the incumbent decides on price
while generics compete in quantities. It provides, however, a simple way of introducing
market segmentation into the model, with homogeneous generic products competing
in quantities within the low-quality segment. Price competition amongst homogeneous
generic competitors would lead to a Bertrand-like market outcome, with generics priced
at marginal cost. We show that the market equilibrium in the duopoly with a branded
incumbent and a generic entrant competing in prices is a particular case of our model
with multiple generic entrants.
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3.2.2.1 Market equilibrium in the simultaneous game with multiple generic
competitors
Firm b produces the branded drug and chooses price pb to maximise its prots:












[pg + ! + (1   )] (3.7)
The n generic rms produce an homogeneous generic version of the same drug and
compete  a la Cournot to serve the demand for generics. Each generic rm i chooses the
quantity it produces, dgo, to maximise its prots:
gi = dgi (pg   !)   F (3.8)
Let's substitute for the generic price using the total generic demand:
gi = dgi
"




















Substituting in the inverse total generic demand we obtain the generic price as a function




[pb + n!   (1   )] (3.11)
Branded and generic products are strategic complements, as the cross derivatives of the
reaction functions reveal:
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We can obtain equilibrium prices by solving the previous equations describing optimal
responses:
p
b = ! + (1   )
1 + n(1 + )
2n + 1
p




When evauated at n = 1, these equilibrium prices are equal to the equilibrium prices in
the duopoly with one branded producer and one generic producer in the market. The
case of the branded-generic duopoly if formally derived in the ?? to this chapter.
All patients must pay a xed fee f, but patients consuming the branded product must
additionally pay a co-payment equal to the dierence between the branded and generic
prices:
c
b = (1   )




g = f (3.14)
Branded and generic market shares in equilibrium follow:
D
b =







3.2.2.2 Comparative-statics analysis in the simultaneous game
By inspecting these market outcomes, we see that the branded price is higher than the
generic price and that patients must pay a higher co-payment if they choose to consume
the branded product, as expected. The relative shares of branded and generic products
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depend on the parameters of the model. We look now at how the number of generics
active in the market has an impact on market outcomes.4
Proposition 3.1. In the simultaneous game of branded-generic competition, prices of
both branded and generic products, p
b and p
g decrease with the number n of generic
competitors active in the market, as n increases from 1 to 1. On the contrary, the
co-payment c
b paid by patients consuming the branded product increases with n. Con-
sequently, as n increases, the market share D
b of the branded product decreases, while
the aggregated market share D
g of all generic products increases (fewer patients buy the
branded product).
Proof. The partial derivatives of equilibrium prices with respect to the number of generic












2(1   )(1   )
(2n + 1)
2 < 0 (3.16)





= (1   )
1   
(2n + 1)
2 > 0 (3.17)














2 > 0 (3.18)
4We investigate the behaviour of the equilibrium variables as n increases from 1 to 1. In this section
we are interested in the impact of additional generics entering the market, rather than in the equilibrium
before and after the entry of the rst generic. It is not the purpose of this chapter to provide a welfare
analysis of generic entry as such, but to characterise the properties of the market equilibrium conditional
to generic entry taking place. The empirical evidence shows that the entry of the rst generic triggers a
process of price reductions, but the nal outcome of this process diers across markets. It is important
to characterise the market equilibria and to identify in what situations they can be reach. On the other
hand, in most European countries, before entry of the rst generic the price of the branded drug is a
negotiated price between the government and the branded producer. Our formalisation would not be
appropriate to characterise market equilibria before generic entry.
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Let us look at the two limiting cases with just one generic producer and a very large
number of generics. As the number of generic rms becomes very large, n ! 1, generic
price collapses to the level of marginal cost, !, and the branded producer is able to










g = ! (3.19)












(1   ) (3.20)
When n = 1 the market outcome is that of a branded generic duopoly. The following
equilibrium prices for the branded and generic drugs are obtained:
p





gjn=1 = ! +
1   
3
(1   ) (3.21)










(1   ) (3.22)
This shows that the branded-generic duopoly with price competition is a particular case
of the more general model with one branded incumbent setting prices and n generic
producers competing in quantities in the low-quality segment.
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As competition amongst generics drives equilibrium prices down, the branded rm tends
to compete less aggressively for marginal consumers. This can be conrmed by looking
at the behaviour of branded and generic market shares. As the number of generic
rms increases and competition in the low-end segment of the market becomes ercer,
the generic market share increases at the expense of the branded market share. The
presence of xed costs F > 0 implies that there is a nite maximum sustainable number
of generics that can be active in the market while earning positive prots 
gi > 0.
The equilibrium price of the branded drug does not increase with the number of generic
rms active in the market, but this cannot be directly interpreted as being incompatible
with the so-called 'generic paradox', the empirical observation in some markets that the
branded price after generic entry tends to increase with respect to the pre-entry branded
price. We have not attempted here to formalise the equilibrium branded price before
generic entry and therefore nothing can be said with respect to the relation between
branded equilibrium prices before and after generic entry.
In this model, a system of partial public nancing of pharmaceutical consumption is in
place, designed to guarantee full coverage of patient population and preserving patients'
ability to choose between branded and generic products. Consumers do not fully support
the cost of their pharmaceutical consumption, but just the additional cost incurred due
to consumption of branded drugs instead of cheaper generic drugs. In such a framework,
there is no reason why the preferences of an expenditure-minimiser government and
surplus-maximiser consumers should be aligned. The following can be shown for the
simultaneous equilibrium.
Proposition 3.2. In the simultaneous game, public pharmaceutical expenditure PX
and consumer surplus CS both decrease as the number n of generic rms active in
the market increases from 1 to 1. Although both p
b and p
g decrease with n, the price
dierential increases and so does the patient co-payment for the branded product, c
b.
The higher co-payment reduces the number of patients consuming the branded product
and increases the payment made by those patients that keep consuming it.
Proof. Pharmaceutical public expenditure can be obtained from the formula for patients'
co-payment and equilibrium prices:
PX = ! +
(1   )(1   )
2n + 1
  f (3.23)
The partial derivative of public expenditure with respect to the number n of generic
competitors:
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(1   )(1   )[1 + n(1 + )]
(2n + 1)
3 < 0 (3.26)
This result shows the tension existing between government's and patients' interest.
While governments may favour tougher generic competition as a way to reduce phar-
maceutical public expenditure, patients may be better o in a less competitive market.
The rationale behind this result relies on the fact that patients tend to pay for only a
small fraction of drugs price. If patients do not care about the size of public pharma-
ceutical expenditure and care only about their out-of-pocket expenses, then they may
prefer the market outcome that minimises the price dierential between branded and
generic drugs. This is in fact the case in the simultaneous game analysed here, where
the branded producer competes less aggressively and the branded co-payment increases
when more generic rms are active in the market.
3.2.3 A branded product facing generic competition in a sequential
game with vertical dierentiation
In section 3.2.2 we have assumed that branded and generic rms simultaneously decide
on price and quantities respectively. It is interesting to look at what happens when the
branded product is able to set its price rst, before generic actually make their decisions
on quantities. In o-patent pharmaceutical markets, the branded product is typically
an incumbent that has been in the market long before generic entry takes place. In
this section we assume that the branded producer is able to post its price and credibly
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commit to maintain it, before generic producers choose the quantities they produce. In
most countries, pervasive price regulation in pharmaceutical markets introduce rigidities
in the determination of prices. In some circumstances, branded producers may authorise
a rst generic entrant into the market through a license before loss of exclusivity. The
agreement between the branded producer and the authorised generic may facilitate price
commitment. We show that when this is possible, branded and generic producers are
able to reach a market equilibrium that is more protable for all of them than the
simultaneous game, but that is detrimental both to consumer surplus and public interest.
3.2.3.1 Timing
To formalize the eects of generic competition in a sequential game, consider the follow-
ing timing of a game played by one incumbent rm b producing a branded drug and a
number n of entrants gi producing generic versions of the same drug.
1. Incumbent b sets the price of its branded product pb.
2. A number n of symmetric generic rms compete  a la Cournot, each of them pro-
ducing a quantity dgi of generic product to serve the low-quality segment of the
market.
This framework assumes a sequential decision process where generic entrants compete
with a branded incumbent that has previously set its pricing policy, enjoying a rst-
mover advantage.
3.2.3.2 Market equilibrium in the sequential game with multiple generic
competitors
We solve this game by backwards induction, looking rst at second-stage Cournot com-
petition among generic producers. We solve the prot-maximisation problem as we did










Substituting in the inverse total generic demand we obtain the generic price as a function




[pb + n!   (1   )] (3.28)
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In the rst stage, the branded incumbent decides its pricing policy to maximise prots,
anticipating the decisions of generic producers in the second stage.







Substituting for the generic price and computing the with respect to the branded price





(1   )(n + 1)
(!   pb) + (1 + 2) (3.30)
The following equilibrium prices are obtained from combining this rst order condition
and the expression for generic price as a function of the branded price:
p
b = ! + (1   )
1 + n(1 + )
2n
p
g = ! + (1   )
1 + n(1   )
2n(n + 1)
(3.31)
All patients must pay a xed fee f, but patients consuming the branded product must














g = f (3.32)
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3.2.3.3 Comparative-statics analysis in the sequential game
In the sequential game, as in the simultaneous game, we see that the branded price is
higher than the generic price and that patients must pay a higher co-payment if they
choose to consume the branded product, as expected. In contrast, now the branded
product is able to retain a higher share of patients than the generics. Again, we look at
how the number of generics active in the market has an impact on market outcomes.5
Proposition 3.3. In the sequential game of branded-generic competition, like in the
simultaneous game, prices of both branded and generic products, p
b and p
g decrease
with the number n of generic competitors active in the market. The co-payment c
b
paid by patients consuming the branded product decreases with n in the sequential game.
Consequently, as n increases, the market share D
b of the branded product increases,
while the aggregated market share D
g of all generic products decreases.
Proof. First derivatives of equilibrium prices and the co-payment with respect to the












2n2 (n + 2)







2 < 0 (3.34)














2 < 0 (3.35)
In the sequential game, unlike what we found for the simultaneous game, as competition
amongst generics drives equilibrium prices down, the branded rm tends to compete
5As in the simultaneous game, it can be shown that the branded-generic duopoly with price competi-
tion presented in section ?? is a particular case of the more general model with one branded incumbent
setting prices and n generic producers competing in quantities in the low-quality segment.
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more aggressively for marginal consumers, the branded co-payment decreases as the
dierence between branded and generic prices gets smaller and the branded market
share increases at the expense of the generic market share. Again, the presence of xed
costs F > 0 implies that there is a nite maximum sustainable number of generics that
can be active in the market while earning positive prots  > 0.
In contrast with the simultaneous game, in the sequential game the preferences of an
expenditure-minimiser government and surplus-maximiser consumers are aligned. The
following can be shown.
Proposition 3.4. In the sequential game, public pharmaceutical expenditure PX de-
creases and consumer surplus CS increases as the number n of generic rms active in
the market increases.
Proof. Pharmaceutical public expenditure can be obtained from the formula for patients'
co-payment and equilibrium prices:
PX = ! + (1   )
1 + n(1   )
2n(n + 1)
  f (3.36)









We have already shown that, as n increases, the co-payment that patients need to pay
for the branded product decreases and a higher share of patients are willing to pay for
it. Consumers that would have in any case bought the branded product are better o
because they pay a lower co-payment, while a share of consumers that would otherwise
buy the branded product are better o because they get access to the branded product.
Hence, CS increases as n increases.
In contrast with the result from the simultaneous game, there is no tension between the
objectives of an expenditure-minimiser government and surplus-maximiser consumers.
Both governments and consumers benet from generic competition because, as the num-
ber of active generic rms increases, the branded rm tends to reduce its price relatively
more than the equilibrium generic price is reduced. Consequently, the branded co-
payment is lower with more generic rms in the market and a higher share of patients
enjoy consuming the branded product.
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The intuition behind these results runs as follows. In the simultaneous game, as the
number of generics increases, competition in the low segment of the market drives generic
prices down. The branded producer reacts by increasingly focusing on fewer patients
with highest willingness to pay, instead of following generics reducing its price. By
comparison with the simultaneous game, in the sequential game the branded producer
chooses to target fewer patients with higher willingness to pay by setting a relatively
high price even when there is only one generic in the market. The generics responds by
setting a price below the branded price such that the resulting co-payment paid by the
patient is higher in the sequential game than in the simultaneous game. As the number
of generics increases, competition in the low segment of the market drives generic prices
down. To avoid losing its few highly valuable patients, the branded producer is forced
to reduce its price.
3.2.4 Entry decisions by generic competitors
The analysis so far has been done assuming the number of generic rms n to be ex-
ogenous. As we have argued in section 3.2.1, there are a number of reasons to think
that the number of potential generic entrants into the market of a given drug may be
exogenous to a certain degree. However, it is reasonable to think that market conditions
are likely to have an impact on entry decisions by potential generic competitors, thus
recommending that n be treated as endogenous. In this section we develop a simple
way to endogenise n by letting potential generic competitors to simultaneously decide
whether or not to enter the market in the rst period, before rms actually meet in the
market.
Each potential generic competitor correctly anticipates the competitive equilibrium that
will be reach in the market in the later periods and decides to enter the market if and
only if the expected prots of entering the market are non-negative:
gi = dgi (pg   !)   F > 0 (3.38)
Substituting for equilibrium prices and quantities in the simultaneous game, we obtain






  F > 0 (3.39)
The only sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium will be that in which every generic rm
that enters the market earns non-negative prots and no additional generic rm can
Saurí, Lluís (2012), An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/37014Chapter 3. Price regulation in o-patent pharmaceutical markets 85
enter without earning negative prots. Therefore, the number of generic rms n in
equilibrium in the simultaneous game is the integer given by the following expression:








(1   )   1
#
(3.40)
Analogously, substituting for equilibrium prices and quantities in the sequential game,
we obtain that a generic rm decides to enter the market if the following condition holds:
(1   )

1 + n(1   )
2n(n + 1)

  F > 0 (3.41)
The only sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium will be that in which every generic rm
that enters the market earns non-negative prots and no additional generic rm can
enter without earning negative prots. Therefore, the number of generic rms n in
equilibrium in the simultaneous game is the integer given by the following expression:








(1   )   1
#
(3.42)
It can be shown that the number of entrants in equilibrium is higher in the sequential
game than in the simultaneous game:
n . n (3.43)





1 + n(1   )
2n(n + 1)
(3.44)
From this, it follows that n . n.
3.2.5 Anticompetitive eects of branded leadership and authorised
generics
Beyond the properties of the simultaneous and sequential market equilibria separately,
we are interested in comparing their welfare implications. In the sequential game, the
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branded producer is able to commit to a higher price than the price it charges in the
simultaneous game. Although this implies that the branded producer is able to attract a
smaller share of patients, the higher protability obtained from each patient more than
osets the negative impact that a lower demand has on prots. Branded and generic
products behave as strategic complements, meaning that a higher branded price implies
a higher generic price in equilibrium.
Proposition 3.5. Both branded and generic equilibrium prices, as well as the branded
co-payment in equilibrium, are higher or equal in the sequential game than they are in the
simultaneous game, while the equilibrium market share of the branded product is lower














Prots of branded and generic rms and public expenditure are higher in the sequential
equilibrium than it is in the simultaneous equilibrium. Conversely, consumer surplus is







CS > CS (3.46)
Proof. Let's start by showing these results when the number of generic entrants is ex-
ogenously determined to be the equal in the simultaneous and in the sequential games.
Assume on the contrary that p
b > p
b . This implies:
p
b   p
b = (1   )

1 + n(1 + )
2n
 




Which is a contradiction because the denominator of the rst fraction is smaller than
that of the second fraction, while numerators are equal. Hence, it must be that p
b < p
b .
Similarly, assume that p
g > p
g . This implies:
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p
g   p
g = (1   )








This inequality is only true if  <  n+1
n , which is contradictory with ? 2 [0;1]. Hence,
it must be that p
g < p
g .
In relation to the branded co-payments, assume that c
b > c
b . This implies:
c
b   c
b = (1   )

1 + n + (n + 2)
2(n + 1)
 




For this inequality to hold it must be that 1 + n(1 + ) < 0, which is not true. Hence,
it must be that c
b < c
b .????























Therefore, for all n, it must be that D
g > D





this implies that D
g < D
g .
Branded prots must be higher in the sequential equilibrium because the branded pro-
ducer has chosen it in spite of the simultaneous equilibrium being an attainable strategy
in the sequential game. The simultaneous equilibrium is not a prot-maximising strategy
for the branded producer in the sequential game.
Generic prots must be higher in the sequential game because both the generic price
and the generic demand are higher in the sequential equilibrium than they are in the
simultaneous equilibrium.
Let's consider now the case in which the number of generic entrants is endogenously
determined. In equilibrium the following holds:
Saurí, Lluís (2012), An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Markets 
European University Institute
 




1 + n(1   )
2n(n + 1)
(3.52)
Recall expressions 3.19 and 3.43:
p




g = ! + (1   )
1 + n(1   )
2n(n + 1)
(3.53)
This implies that when the number of generic entrants is endogenously determined and
the maximum number of sustainable generic competitors actually enter the market,
then generic prices are the same in the simultaneous and in the sequential game, p
gjn 
p
g jn. Consequently, p
g  p
g .
Moreover, we have already shown above in this proof that D
b > D
b , for all n and n.
This implies that c < c, because otherwise more patients would be willing to pay to
get the branded product in the sequential game. Given that p
g  p




PX  PX follows from p
g  p
g .





If branded and generic producers are able to communicate before meeting in the com-
petitive market place and the branded producer is able to credibly commit to a certain
preferred price p
b , as it happens to be the case in the sequential game; then the market
equilibrium leaves consumers and government worse o, compared to the situation where
the branded and generic producers are unable to communicate before competing in the
market place. Certain circumstances may facilitate this credible commitment. Price
regulation through negotiation between manufacturers and governments may facilitate
it, for instance, by making prices stickier. In some circumstances, branded producers
may authorise a rst generic entrant into the market through a license before loss of
exclusivity. The agreement between the branded producer and the authorised generic
may facilitate price commitment.
These results lead to the following corollary, which is valid irrespectively of whether we
dene government's objective as maximising consumer welfare without accounting for
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public expenditure (taxes) or as maximising consumer welfare while minimising public
expenditure (taxes).
Corollary 3.6. Branded leadership in setting prices has anticompetitive eects, lead-
ing to higher prices and prots at the expense of lower consumer surplus and higher
public expenditure. Hence, a competition authority should prevent the branded producer
from publicly committing to a given price before competing with generic producers in the
market place.
3.3 Policy interventions aecting branded-generic
competition
A government wanting to minimise public pharmaceutical expenditure may attempt
to intervene in o-patent pharmaceutical markets to foster generic competition. We
analyse in this section two policy instruments that are extensively used in European o-
patent pharmaceutical markets: price caps for generic products and nancial incentives
to modify physicians' prescription behaviour and pharmacists' dispensing practices. In
the context of our simultaneous game with vertical competition, we show that these
interventions may not always achieve their intended objectives.
3.3.1 Price ceilings and the risk of generic price coordination around
a focal point
Governments may try to force price erosion imposing a price ceiling to generic products.
Assume a price ceiling is imposed such that generic price is forced below what otherwise




By looking at the reaction functions of the branded price both in the simultaneous and
sequential games, it can be shown that branded and generic prices behave as strategic
complements, thus the lower generic price imposed by the price ceiling leads to a lower
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We have already discussed the implications for market shares, public expenditure and
consumer surplus when lower prices are the result of a larger number of generic producers
competing for the low-end segment of the market. A binding ceiling on generic price
has analogous implications. The government achieves its objective of reducing public
expenditure through the price ceiling, but the eects on consumer surplus depend on
the structure of the game. In the simultaneous game, lower prices lead to a higher
co-payment for the branded product, lower branded market share and lower consumer
surplus. In the sequential game, lower prices lead to a lower co-payment for the branded
product, higher market share and higher consumer surplus.
It is most commonly assumed that a non-binding price ceiling should not have any
eect on market outcomes. It has been however suggested in the literature (Scherer and
Ross, 1990) that non-binding price ceilings can weaken competition as they may serve
as collusive focal points for pricing decisions (Schelling, 1960). In the context of our
model, a non-binding price ceiling may serve as a focal point for generic producers when
the branded producer is unable to commit ex-ante to the prot-maximising price in the
sequential equilibrium. In this case, the ceiling would not be acting as a focal point
for both branded and generic producers, which having dierent qualities are unlikely
to be able to coordinate around the same price. The ceiling may hewever act as a
focal point for generics and become the reference price that is reimbursed by the public
health insurance, while the brande producer still prices at an even higher price. In such
circumstances, generic price and public expenditure would be higher as a result of the
non-binding price ceiling acting as a focal point for generics. While this hypothesis has
been proposed in the literature, we do not analyse here the circumstances under which
this would be a sustainable equilibrium outcome.
3.3.2 Interventions on the demand side: incentives to physicians and
pharmacists
A government may try to increase the demand for generics incentivising physicians to
prescribe generic products and pharmacists to substitute generic for branded products
when dispensing to the patient. While we do not formalise the decision processes of
prescription and dispensation, we assume that governments have the ability to move a
fraction  of patients from branded to generic products. These are patients that would
have chosen to buy a branded product if they had been given the chance to, but that
consume generic products because they have been precluded from choosing according to
their preferences. In this case, demands for branded and generic products are as follows:
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D0








   +  (3.56)
We solve for the equilibrium prices in the simultaneous game and the following equilib-
rium prices are obtained:
p0
b = ! + (1   )
n(1 +    ) + 1
2n + 1
p0
g = ! + (1   )
1    + 
2n + 1
(3.57)
Branded and generic market shares in equilibrium are the following:
D0
b =




n(1    + )
2n + 1
(3.58)
While the intervention on the demand side is successful at increasing the generic market
share, it also has unintended eects on equilibrium prices. The branded manufacturer
chooses a lower price when such a policy is in place, while generics higher demand leads
to a higher equilibrium generic price. Consequently, also public expenditure is higher
as a consequence of forcing patients to switch from the branded product to the generic.
Patients that keep consuming the branded product are better o because they pay a
lower co-payment for it, but the fraction of patients switched to the generic product are
worse o because they would have preferred to pay a higher co-payment and get access
to the branded product.
The results are analogous if this policy intervention takes place in the sequential game,
as we show in the 3.5 to this chapter.
Proposition 3.7. If a fraction  of patients that would prefer to consume the branded
product are forced to consume a generic product, then the branded manufacturer responds
by lowering its price, the equilibrium generic price increases and consequently the branded
co-payment is smaller than it would be in the absence of the policy intervention. Public
expenditure increases with the equilibrium generic price. More formally:
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PX0 < PX (3.59)
3.3.3 Patients' perceptions on the quality of generics:
commoditisation and the value of brands
Market segmentation is possible in this model because patients extract higher utility from
consuming the branded product than they get from generic products. The parameter 
determines the relative utility from consuming a generic instead of a branded product.
While both types of products are assumed to oer identical clinical ecacy, patients still
have dierent perceptions on the value of each type of product according to non-clinical
characteristics. Even when the generic segment of the market is perfectly competitive
and generic price equals marginal cost, the branded product is able to retain a share of
the patients at a higher price.
An obvious way to undermine rms' ability to benet from market segmentation at the
expense of public spending would be to reduce the degree of product vertical dierenti-
ation. In fact, as products are perceived as increasingly similar by patients, market out-








g = ! (3.60)
In such an undierentiated equilibrium all rms charge the marginal cost and none makes
any prots. We can therefore expect generic rms to prefer relaxing price competition
through product dierentiation, even if this implies focusing on the low-end segment
patients. We can see that by looking at the derivative of the generics' prot function









Prots of generic rms increase with product dierentiation, even though this means
lowering patients' perception of the quality of their products. Any attempt by the
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government to reduce the dierentiated perception of branded and generic products
by patients will be undermined not only by the branded rm eorts to preserve the
perception of high quality associated to its products, but also by generic rms eorts to
dierentiate their products as low-quality.
In the limiting case of no vertical dierentiation ( = 1), no prots are made by any rm
and incentives for generic entry onto the market disappear. We do not contemplate here
the possibility that branded and generic rms develop strategies of horizontal dierenti-
ation to satisfy the preferences of specic groups of patients in the space of non-clinical
characteristics of their products. The analysis of this question goes beyond the purpose
of this work.
3.4 Discussion of the empirical evidence
Our analysis provides a theoretical framework to interpret the results of the reduced-
form empirical analysis presented in chapters 4 and 5. Although our empirical analysis
does not explicitly attempt to test the implications of the analysis presented here, most
results in the empirical analysis are compatible with the implications of this theoretical
framework.
We have proposed a model of vertical dierentiation to represent competition between
branded and generic drugs in o-patent pharmaceutical markets. The literature has
previously looked at branded and generic drugs as vertically dierentiated products and
in particular we stay close to the framework developed by Brekke et al. [1]. When
the manufacturer of an innovative drug loses market exclusivity upon patent expiry,
it has typically been the only incumbent in the market for a number of years. The
branded recognition acquired during the period of market exclusivity makes its product
distinguishable to patients from generic versions of the drug that may eventually enter
the market. Patients' perception of branded products as of higher quality than their
generic competitors may translate into the ability of sustaining price dierentials.
In our model, branded prices are higher than generic prices in equilibrium, with both
branded and generic prices decreasing with the number of generics active in the market.
A higher number of generics makes the generic segment of the market more competitive,
driving down both generic and branded prices. Our empirical analysis supports these
results. Branded prices are indeed shown to be higher than generic prices and average
market prices are negatively correlated with the number of generics active in the market.
The empirical analysis also shows that the number of generics is positively correlated
with the value of the market. This is compatible with the structure of the market in our
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model in the presence of xed costs, that constrains the number of generics sustainable
with positive prots in the market. These results are in line with those in the empirical
literature, as we discuss more thoroughly in chapters 4 and 5.
Using a sequential game, we have shown that when the branded producer is able to com-
mit to a certain preferred price; then branded and generic producers are able to reach a
market equilibrium with higher prices that leaves consumers and government worse o,
compared to the situation where the branded and generic producers are unable to com-
municate before competing in the market place. We have argued that price regulation
and authorised generics may facilitate reaching such an equilibrium. By regulating the
branded price or by establishing a non-binding price ceiling, regulators may provide a
focal point for generics to coordinate around. This hypothesis is compatible with the
results of our empirical analysis, which indicate that price regulation is correlated with
smaller reductions in price upon generic entry. Our empirical analysis does not look at
the eect of authorised generics.
We have also looked at policies that forcibly switch patients from branded to generic
products and argued that these interventions are successful at increasing the market
share of generics, while having unintended eects on prices. In particular, we have
shown that the branded producer responds to such an intervention by reducing its price,
while in contrast generic price increases as a consequence of such a policy. Physicians
can be given nancial and non-nancial incentives to prescribe generics, typically using
the INN of drugs. Financial incentives take the form of variable retribution conditional
to not exceeding maximum prescription budgets per patient or a certain number of
branded prescriptions. Non-nancial instruments for physicians range from mere rec-
ommendations to prescribe generically to compulsory INN prescription. Incentives to
pharmacists typically consist of higher margins for generic products. Alternatively, in
occasions compulsory substitution of generic for branded products at pharmacy level
has been implemented under certain conditions.
The results of the empirical analysis conrm that obliging physicians to prescribe gener-
ics and incentivising pharmacists to dispense generics is positively correlated with higher
generic market shares. These policy interventions are also correlated with lower average
prices. This is not incompatible with our result that generic prices increase as a conse-
quence of such policies, because the net eect on average market prices depends on the
relative behaviour of branded and generic prices. The empirical analysis in chapter 5
does not however provide any support for the implication that follows from our model,
as it does not look at the correlation with branded and generic prices separately.
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In this paper we have provided a theoretical framework for the analysis of competition
between branded and generic products in o-patent pharmaceutical markets. Most fea-
tures of our framework are supported by the evidence produced by the empirical analysis.
Generic competition is successful at reducing prices of o-patent pharmaceuticals, thus
reducing public pharmaceutical expenditure where public health insurance mechanisms
partially cover the cost of drug consumption. Government intervention regulating prices
may introduce rigidities that impede the full realisation of the benets from generic
competition. Imposing generic consumption on patients may have the unintended eect
of softening competition between generics, resulting in higher generic prices.
Moreover, as long as patients perceive branded drugs as being distinguishable from
generic competitors, there may be a trade-o between minimising public pharmaceutical
expenditure and maximising consumer welfare, even if this tension does not have an
impact on clinical outcomes. Branded and generic products are clinically equivalent,
but there are non-clinical dierences between drugs produced by dierent manufacturers.
Patients may be aware of the clinical equivalence of branded and generic products, but
still they may attach dierent subjective valuations to non-clinical characteristics of
the products, which are instead irrelevant for a government that only values clinical
outcomes.
3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Market equilibrium in the simultaneous game with one generic
competitor
Firm b produces the branded drug and chooses price pb to maximise its prots:












[pg + ! + (1   )] (3.63)
The generic rm produces an homogeneous generic version of the same drug. It chooses
the quantity it produces, dg, to maximise its prots:
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g = dg (pg   !)   F (3.64)





(pb + !   1   ) (3.65)
We can obtain equilibrium prices by solving the previous equations describing optimal
responses:
p





g = ! +
1   
3
(1   ) (3.66)
All patients must pay a xed fee f, but patients consuming the branded product must
additionally pay a co-payment equal to the dierence between the branded and generic
prices:
c





g = f (3.67)










(1   ) (3.68)
3.5.2 Market equilibrium in the sequential game with one generic
competitor
We solve this game by backwards induction, looking rst at the second-stage decision
by the generic producer. We solve the prot-maximisation problem as we did in the
simultaneous game, obtaining the same reaction function.
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[pb + !   (1   )] (3.69)
In the rst stage, the branded incumbent decides its pricing policy to maximise prots,
anticipating the decisions of the generic producer in the second stage.











Substituting for the generic price and computing the with respect to the branded price










The following equilibrium prices are obtained from combining this rst order condition
and the expression for generic price as a function of the branded price:
p








All patients must pay a xed fee f, but patients consuming the branded product must














g = f (3.73)
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3.5.3 Interventions on the demand side in the sequential game
Similar results to those in section 3.3.2 can be obtained for the sequential game. We
solve for the equilibrium prices in the sequential game and the following equilibrium
prices are obtained:
p00
b = ! + (1   )
1 + n(1 +    )
2n
p00
g = ! + (1   )
1 + n(1 +    )
2n(2n + 1)
(3.75)
















Again, while the intervention on the demand side is successful at increasing the generic
market share, it also has unintended eects on equilibrium prices. The branded man-
ufacturer chooses a lower price when such a policy is in place, while generics higher
demand leads to a higher equilibrium generic price. Consequently, also public expendi-
ture is higher as a consequence of forcing patients to switch from the branded product
to the generic. Patients that keep consuming the branded product are better o because
they pay a lower co-payment for it, but the fraction of patients switched to the generic
product are worse o because they would have preferred to pay a higher co-payment
and get access to the branded product.
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Patterns of generic entry: number of entrants
and time to entry
Abstract
Generic entry is the main source of competition in o-patent pharmaceutical markets.
However, generic entry does not occur in every market and it often tends to occur with
a signicant delay from the date of loss of exclusivity by the patent holder. In this paper
we look at the patterns of generic entry in a number of European countries and identify
the main factors that attract early generic entry. In particular, we are interested in
the impact that pervasive regulation of European pharmaceutical markets has on the
occurrence and pattern of generic entry. We show that patterns of generic entry dier
signicantly across European countries and types of drugs, and identify some factors
that explain this heterogeneity. We observe that early entry is more likely in larger
markets, when price regulation is less strict and where regulatory incentives for generic
prescription and dispensation are in place.
Key words: Pharmaceuticals, Generic entry, Generic competition, Regulation
JEL Classications: I11; I18; K21; L41; L65
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4.1 Introduction
Generic entry is the main source of competition in o-patent pharmaceutical mar-
kets. However, generic entry does not occur in every o- patent market and it often tends
to occur with a signicant delay from the date of loss of exclusivity by the patent holder.
This is specially true in European pharmaceutical markets, which are subject to a se-
ries of regulations that distinguish them from the more unregulated US pharmaceutical
markets.
The literature on o-patent prescription drug markets is often concerned with identifying
the factors that drive generic producers decisions to enter the market and with assessing
the eects that generic entry has on drugs prices and market structure. Seminal papers
in the area date from the early nineties and look at the developments in the o-patent
pharmaceutical markets in the US after the approval of the Waxman-Hatch Act of
1984, which introduced the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) process. By
signicantly simplifying the requirements generic producers (hereafter generics) were
asked to meet before being granted regulatory approval, the entry cost for generics was
substantially reduced both in terms of nancial investment and of administrative time
length.
The determinants of generic entry in the US before the Waxman-Hatch Act were studied
by Hurwitz and Caves [4], identifying pre-expiry market sales as a statistically signicant
determinant of the number of entrants. In the same line, Grabowski and Vernon [3] show
that, as expected, pre-expiry protability attracts generic entry. While they hypothesise
that brand loyalty could be a deterrent of generic entry, they do not nd any negative
signicant correlation between the occurrence of entry and their proxies for the degree
of brand loyalty (number of years of market exclusivity enjoyed by the originator and
promotion to sales ratio of the originator the year before loss of exclusivity). Scott-
Morton [6] also looks at the determinants of generics decisions to enter an o-patent
market in the US. She identies larger pre-expiry revenue, share of hospital sales and
the condition of chronic treatment as factors that increase incentives for generics to
enter in a market. Interestingly, she also nds that generic rms tend to enter into those
markets in which they already have previous expertise, thus suggesting that development
and production costs may play a role in generics decisions to enter selected markets.
Bae [1] looks at generic entry as a survival problem and uses a proportional hazard
method to analyse the pace of generic entry in the US market. Consistently with pre-
vious results, he nds that generic entry tends to be faster and entry rates higher for
products with larger pre-expiry market revenues. He concludes that commercially suc-
cessful blockbusters are more likely to face early generic entry. Also drugs for chronic
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use tend to have faster generic entry, in line with the results obtained by Scott-Morton
[6].
In this paper we look at the patterns of generic entry in a number of European coun-
tries and identify the main factors that attract generic entry and facilitate early entry.
In particular, we are interested in the impact that pervasive regulation of European
pharmaceutical markets has on the occurrence and pattern of generic entry. We show
that patterns of generic entry dier signicantly across European countries and types of
drugs, and identify some factors that explain this heterogeneity. Our research provides
the most comprehensive and up to date look at the patterns of generic entry in Europe.
It conrms that larger pre-expiry revenue attracts generic entry in terms of likelihood of
entry, speed of entry and long-run number of entrants. We also provide the most exhaus-
tive study of the impact that dierent types of regulation of pharmaceutical markets in
Europe have had on the occurrence and speed of generic entry. We nd that price-cap
policies tend to discourage and delay generic entry. Incentives to physicians to prescribe
generically and policies encouraging substitution at pharmacy level tend to make generic
entry in a given market more attractive, thus leading to a higher probability of generic
entry and to earlier entry in case of occurrence.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 4.2 we provide some descriptive statistics
of the occurrence and patterns of generic entry. In Section 4.3 we present the econo-
metric analysis performed to identify the determinants of the occurrence and extent
of generic entry. Section 4.4 shows the survival analysis performed to identify market
characteristics and regulatory features that explain the delay of generic entry.
4.2 Data and descriptive analysis
The data used in this chapter 4 and in chapter 5 is described in detail in a separate
Annex in chapter 6. The various econometric models used in the empirical analysis
diered in terms of data requirements. The regression analyses involved the use of price
data, volume data, dates (date of LoE, entry date) and qualitative information (product
characteristics, characteristics of the regulatory environment).
This section provides detailed descriptive statistics about the development of prices and
generic penetration after LoE in 17 European countries. The same countries are covered
in the econometric analysis in following section 4.3. The analysis in section 4.4 required
data for all INNs in the same therapeutic category, which forced us to limit the coverage
to 9 European countries.
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Table 4.1: Share of INNs facing entry after LoE (EU average)
Head-count entry share Value entry share
Entire sample,
by the end of 2007 0.66 0.85
Entire sample,
one year after LoE 0.47 0.70
INNs expired before 2007,
one year after LoE 0.46 0.69
INNs expired before 2006,
two years after LoE 0.54 0.80
4.2.1 Extent of generic entry
Table 4.1 shows, for the EU as a whole1, the share of INNs in the sample that faced
generic entry over the period 2000 2007. All shares are presented both as a head count
(where within each country each INN2 is counted as one; left-hand column) and in value
terms (where within each country weights are given to the INN in relation to their sales
value in the year before LoE; right-hand column).
The rst row in the table gives the occurrence of entry for the entire sample of INNs
irrespective of when in the period the INN lost exclusivity or generic entry took place.
As can be seen, the share of INNs in the overall sample that faced generic entry at any
point in time over the period 2000 - 2007 is about 66% in number terms and about 85%
in value terms.
These shares may be somewhat dicult to interpret, however, in that not all INNs are
in an equal position. For instance, if LoE occurred early in the period 2000 - 2007, that
left a long time for entry to occur within the period under investigation. By contrast,
for INNs which lost exclusivity late in the period (e.g. in autumn of 2007), little time
is left for entry to occur and instances of generic entry might not be counted for these
INNs. For this reason, the table also indicates the shares of INNs for which entry took
place within one year, both for the entire sample (second row, mainly for comparison)
and the sample which lost exclusivity up to 2006 (third row). It also indicates for this
sample, the shares of INNs for which entry took place within two years (for LoE up to
2005).
1All EU averages in this section are calculated taking into account the relative weight of the individual
country, i.e. measured by sales of the relevant INNs in the country concerned, either in the year prior
to expiry (for establishing shares of generic entry, average time to entry and generic penetration) or in
the year 2007 (for the indices that track the development of prices or volumes over longer periods.)
2INN is the International Non-proprietary Name for pharmaceutical substances. A combination
product and each of the related mono-products are viewed as separate INNs.
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Table 4.2: Share of INNs facing entry within one year, by size class
Size class 1 2 3 4 5
Share 0.25 0.43 0.32 0.58 0.81
Unweighted averages
Table 4.3: Share of INNs facing entry within one year, by country
INNs headcount INNs weighted
Austria 0.48 0.59
Belgium 0.39 0.61














United Kingdom 0.54 0.80
The table shows that, focusing on patents which expired between 2000 and 2006 followed
by entry within one year, the share of INNs that faced generic entry is about 46%.
However, taking into account the importance of the INNs (in terms of sales), the entry
share is higher, at 69%.
This last nding suggests that generic entry tends to concentrate especially on INNs
with a high sales value. This pattern can also be seen to some extent in table 4.2, which
sets out the share of generic entry for individual size classes. The set of INNs is split into
ve size classes, with class 1 containing the 20% of smallest INNs (in terms of their sales
value in the year prior to expiry), class 2 the next smallest 20%, etc. Class 5 therefore
contains the 20% of largest-selling INNs. On average, the share of generic entry appears
higher for the larger size classes than for the smaller ones. This could be explained by
higher incentives for the generics to enter. From the perspective of consumer welfare,
generic entry without delay for this category is likely to be most valuable.
The EU averages indicated above hide considerable variation across European countries.
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Table 4.4: Share of INNs facing entry within one year, by country and period
LoE between LoE between
2000 and 2003 2004 and 2006
Austria 0.40 0.59
Belgium 0.31 0.47














United Kingdom 0.46 0.65
INNs weighted by value 6 months before LoE,
Table 4.3 provides an overview of the share of entry in a range of countries, both as a
head count of INNs and with the INNs weighted by value. The gure shows that in
the sample investigated, generic entry is most pervasive in Germany, Denmark, Finland,
the Netherlands and the UK, with entry shares within the rst year above 50% both in
number and value terms.
Another interesting aspect is whether the generic entry has changed over the period in
question. Table 4.4 presents the share of INNs that faced generic entry for a number
of countries, drawing a distinction between INNs which experienced LoE in the period
2000 - 2003 and in the period 2004 - 2006. As can be seen in the table, the share of
expiring INNs followed by generic entry within one year has in most countries increased
somewhat over the period 2000 2007, although there are some exceptions.
4.2.2 Time to entry
The average time gap between LoE for an INN and the rst generic entry into that
INN has been computed both as an unweighted average and as an average weighted
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Table 4.5: Average time to entry following LoE, by size class
Size class 1 2 3 4 5
Months 18.6 18.4 18.3 7.9 4.2
Unweighted averages
by market value before LoE.3 The unweighted average time to entry is about thirteen
months, whereas it is more than seven months in weighted value terms.
It takes less time for high-value products to be faced with generic entry. As mentioned
earlier, this nding is not surprising considering that top selling INNs are normally also
the most attractive to enter. The conclusion is further conrmed by table 4.5 setting
out the time to entry by size class. The set of INNs is split up into ve size classes,
where class 1 contains the 20% of smallest INNs (in terms of sales value in the year
prior to expiry), class 2 the next smallest 20%, etc. By and large, the average time to
entry appears to be smaller for the larger INNs (as measured by sales in the year prior
to expiry). However, even for the top selling category it still took about four months on
a weighted average basis before entry took place. In individual cases in this category,
the time to entry ranged from 0 months (no delay) to over 50 months.
There are equally considerable dierences in time to entry across European countries.
Table 4.6 shows the average time to entry in a range of countries. It is relatively short in
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the UK but exceeds half a year, on average, in
Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy,
Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Portugal.
Over the period, there appears to be a gradual decline in the time to entry for expiring
INNs. It is, however, dicult to provide meaningful descriptive statistics in this respect,
given that the choice of time horizon (the time one allows for expiry to take place)
heavily inuences any resulting statistic.
4.2.3 Number of generic entrants
The third aspect of the extent of entry is the number of generic companies that enter
if and when entry takes place. Table 4.7 shows the trend in the number of companies
active per INN over time.
3The period of expiries is restricted to 2000 - 2006. When calculating the average time to entry on
a collection of expiring INNs, one needs to bear in mind that not all INNs are in equal position. For
instance, for all INNs that expired towards the end of the period 200 - 2007 and for which entry can be
observed, the time to entry is necessarily short. Taking these late observations into account would not
give an unbiased estimate of the average time to entry of the sample of INNs under investigation.
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INNs weighted by value 6 months before LoE,
Before entry, the average number of companies per INN per country remains stable at
about 1.5, normally comprising the originator rm itself and/or the companies which
have obtained a licence to produce and sell the INN concerned.4
One thing which is clear from the table is that the LoE leads to a considerable increase
in the number of companies selling products incorporating the INN concerned. On
average, after one year following the LoE, about four to ve generic companies appear
to be present in the market. Within three years following the LoE the ratio of generic
companies to originators is about 6 to 1.
As with the share of INNs that face generic entry following LoE, the number of generic
rms entering also increases as a function of the value of the market as measured by the
sales of the INN in question. This is borne out by table 4.8. There is also quite some
variation when it comes to the number of companies active per INN across the various
countries. This is visible in table 4.9.
In the pharmaceutical markets in Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the UK,
France and Italy a high number of generic producers are present in the market. The
4A small proportion of 'other' companies can also be observed prior to LoE. These may relate to
INNs for which the company status had not been fully established or recorded in the IMS data set, but
also to possible 'early' entries by generic rms, i.e. entries before the date of LoE.
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Table 4.7: Number of companies active per INN
6 months 6 months 1 year 2 years
before LoE after LoE after LoE after LoE
Originators 1.63 1.62 1.64 1.58
Generics 3.85 5.13 6.44
Total 1.63 5.47 6.77 8.02
INNs weighted by value 6 months before LoE,
Table 4.8: Average number of originators and generics per INN two years after LoE,
by size class
Size class 1 2 3 4 5
Originators 1.2 1.2 1.1 0.9 1.0
Generics 1.5 1.7 2.6 3.9 5.1
Total 2.7 2.9 3.7 4.8 6.1
INNs weighted by value 6 months before LoE,
generic segment of the pharmaceuticals market in these countries appears therefore
rather fragmented.
The above ndings are also borne out by the regression analysis presented in the next
section. Among other things, the value of the market per capita at the point of LoE
and the size of the country's population are important drivers of the number of generic
entrants, holding other factors constant.
Another interesting aspect is the number of formulations which generic companies enter
with when they enter. Generic companies generally appear to enter with about 2 to
2.5 products (formulations) per INN (EU average). This is smaller than the number of
products with which originator companies are typically active (about 3.5 to 4).5 There
may be two main explanations for this. First, if and when a generic company enters a
certain INN, it makes sense to focus on the commercially most attractive formulations,
and to leave aside formulations that sell less (e.g. niche products). Second, typically,
while the INN loses exclusivity insofar as the rst formulation loses exclusivity, there
are still other formulations that remain exclusive and that only the originator rm or
its licensees can sell.
5In the calculation of this number, each single formulation (for instance, a tablet of a certain strength)
is counted as one, regardless of whether or not it is sold under more than one brand name.
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Table 4.9: Average number of originators and generics two years after, by country
Originators Generics Total
Austria 1.3 3.7 45.0
Belgium 1.2 3.0 4.2
Czech Rep. 1.7 2.5 4.2
Germany 1.7 10.9 12.6
Denmark 1.2 3.7 4.9
Spain 2.1 5.6 7.7
Finland 1.3 2.8 4.1
France 1.3 5.6 6.9
Greece 1.3 3.4 4.7
Hungary 1.4 1.0 2.4
Ireland 1.0 4.3 5.3
Italy 2.2 8.2 10.4
Luxembourg 1.1 1.5 2.6
Netherlands 1.1 10.2 11.3
Portugal 1.5 6.0 7.5
Sweden 1.1 3.8 4.9
United Kingdom 1.4 7.3 8.7
INNs weighted by value 6 months before LoE,
4.3 Analysis of the occurrence of entry and the number
of entrants
The econometric analysis presented in this section attempts to identify the main
determinants of the pattern of generic entry observed in the data on the basis of a set
of characteristics of the INN and the regulatory environment in the dierent countries.
The set of characteristics and potential determinants considered is presented in table
6.3, table 6.4 and table 6.5 in the annex in chapter 6. Table 6.3 sets out the list of INN
characteristics used in the regression analysis. Table 6.4 sets out the list of characteristics
of the regulatory environment. Table 6.5 contains other control variables used in the
analysis.
The two models presented in this section analyse how this set of characteristics may
aect (a) the probability of observing the entry of a generic in the market and (b) the
scope of generic entry in terms of total number of generic producers entering the market.
These two aspects are clearly related to each other, but nevertheless provide a dierent
perspective on the issue of generic entry. For instance, a specic kind of price regulation
in a country may make entry attractive for early generic entrants, at the disadvantage
of later entrants, thereby reducing the number of entrants observed. Another example
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might be the case in which generic entry takes place under the control of the originator
producer (e.g. via a distribution, license or settlement agreement). This constitutes
a positive realization of generic entry, but may negatively impact upon the number of
additional entrants.
For the purpose of the analysis the two dependent variables of interest, realisation of
entry and number of entrants, have been recorded one year and two years after LoE. The
relevant samples have been adjusted accordingly to those INNs with LoE before 2007
and before 2006, respectively. Estimation of the model for the number of entrants is
also carried out with a longer term perspective using the number of entrants recorded at
the end of our observation period (December 2007), taking into account the variability
in the time period during which each INN is observed since the moment of LoE (the
exposure time).
In order to test for the dierent determinants that facilitate or reduce generic entry,
the entry decision by generic producers is modelled in the period around LoE, when the
possibility of generic entry appears. For this purpose, a number of explanatory variables
have been included as measured at the moment of expiry. For the variables available
on a monthly basis, such as total revenue generated by the INN or price, the value six
months before patent expiry has been used. For those variables for which information
on an annual basis is collected, such as the regulation in place in the dierent countries,
the characteristics in the year of LoE have been used.
4.3.1 Methodologic framework
We estimate a binary outcome model to analyse the determinants of the occur-
rence of generic entry after LoE. Binary models take into account the discreteness of
the dependent variable (in our case, entry vs. no entry). Under certain distributional
assumptions, this allows us to evaluate the conditional eect of each of a set of covari-
ates or regressors (the potential determinants) on the probability of observing entry of
a generic company. The most commonly used models assume either the logistic distri-
bution or the standard normal. The rst case corresponds to the logit model, the latter
to the probit model. Although we estimate a probit model, both models usually lead to
very similar results.
Formally, let  denote the probability of observing entry of a generic company and x
the vector of regressors to be tested on their impact on this probability. The model
estimates the conditional probability as
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 = Prob[yi = 1jxi] = F(x0
i  ) (4.1)
where  is the vector of model coecients and F is the cumulative distribution function
of the logistic distribution in the logit model or of the normal distribution in the probit
model.
The second model presented is a count data model of the number of generic entrants
observed one and two years after LoE.6 The Poisson distribution is the most commonly
used distributional form for the count data model. In the Poisson distribution, the
probability mass function of yi, the number of generic entrants observed, conditional on
xi, the regressors, is given by  = Prob[yi = yjxi] = [
exp( i)iy
y! ] where i = exp(x0
i).
This distribution has the burdensome implication that the mean and variance of the
distribution have to coincide; this property is known as equidispersion. In the present
case the data do not full this requirement, i.e. the sample variance of the number of
generic entrants after 1-2 years is higher than its mean. In these cases the negative
binomial is preferred, since it allows more exibility in the distribution of the dependent
variable.7 The model is therefore estimated by maximum likelihood assuming a negative
binomial distribution of the dependent variable and computing the marginal eect of
each of the determinants on the dependent variable.
In binary models, as well as in count data models, the magnitude of the coecients
is not interpretable straightforward. The results can however be recalculated to make
them interpretable also in terms of magnitude, to provide a measure of the marginal
eect of each of the covariates on the outcome. The marginal eect of the change in one
regressor on the probability of observing a positive outcome in the dependent variable
can be obtained by dierentiating the cumulative distribution function with respect to
the regressor of interest: 
xij = F0(x0
i)?j, where F0(z) =
F(z)
z . The marginal eect of
each of the regressors changes with the point at which this eect is measured, i.e. the
value of the other regressors present in the specication.8 The most common way is to
compute the marginal eect at the sample average, which has been done in the present
case.9
6One could also consider, as an intermediate solution between the two models presented, the esti-
mation of an ordered probit model. Such a model, using a setting which is an extension of the probit
model, would estimate the impact of the regressors on the entry of each additional generic producer with
respect to the situation in which entry is not observed. For completeness, this model was also tested.
The results are fully consistent with those presented for the count data model.
7For a comprehensive discussion of the dierent properties of these models, see Verbeek [7]
8See Cameron and Trivedi [2]
9Coecients in the count data have not been transformed into marginal eects. In the case of a
count data model, as for any model with exponential conditional mean, the coecients would have to
be converted by taking the exponential of the coecient, in order to give a measure of the marginal
eect of each of the regressors. The measure obtained in this way is called the incidence rate ratio. This
modication however has not been applied and only the sign of the coecients have been interpreted.
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To obtain robust estimates, dierent sets of variables have been tested as potential
explanatory factors. Many of them, even if potentially interesting from an economic
perspective, were dropped since they were available only for a sub-sample of INN/
countries.10 To provide the more general results possible with respect to the molecules
included in the E75 list for which statistics were provided, the choice was made to only
include regressors which did not cause any further restriction in the sample.
The data set used includes the small number of INN/countries for which entry of the
rst generic appeared to take place before the date of LoE. For consistency, the analysis
was replicated on a restricted sample excluding these problematic early entries. The
results for these estimates are presented for each specication and are consistent with
the ones based on the full data set.
To control for the heterogeneity of INNs and countries in the sample, heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors were used in all the specications. The constant was also always
included (but not reported in the tables).
4.3.2 Regression results
Table 4.10 reports the main results for the regressions for the probability of observ-
ing entry one year and two years after LoE.11. In the regressions presented, attention
was restricted to a subset of variables which fullled the statistical requirements for
simultaneous inclusion in the regressions (i.e. the variables were not highly collinear).
Most standard controls (table 6.3) seem to be statistically signicant and robust across
specications. The value sales of the original drug prior to LoE, included in per capita
terms, seem to be a clear driver of generic entry. At the same time, also the geographical
size of the market, taken into account by the population of the country, seems to attract
entry of generic producers.
On average, INNs for which a high number of dierent formulations are present tend
to attract entry more than others. The negative coecient for the price prior to LoE,
having controlled for the revenue generated by the product prior to LoE, may suggest
that generic companies tend to enter in those medicines that are less innovative or
sophisticated to produce, to the extent that price reects development and production
costs.
10The variables referring to the ATC4 category of each INN were available only for certain countries.
The same applies to the variable promotional expenditure.
11Results are robust to the exclusion of early entries, as shown by the results in table 4.13
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Table 4.10: Probit estimation of ocurrence of entry
First entry within First entry within
1 year from LoE 2 years from LoE
Price caps -0.14 -0.07
(0.04) (0.05)
Compulsory substitution 0.11 0.13
(0.06) (0.06)
Physicians incentives 0.07 0.09
(0.05) (0.06)
Frequent adjustment 0.05 0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
Dierential copayment -0.02 -0.01
(0.07) (0.07)
Lowest price policy -0.06 0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Log of pre-expiry value 0.11 0.11
(0.02) (0.02)
Log of population 0.05 0.05
(0.02) (0.02)
Log of pre-expiry price -0.07 -0.07
(0.02) (0.02)




Other ATC4 0.05 0.04
(0.06) (0.06)
Countries expired 0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Controlled entry 0.41 0.35
(0.12) (0.12)
Expiry year 0.05 0.06
(0.01) (0.02)
Pseudo-R2 0.224 0.242
Sample Size 765 675
Robust standard errors in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (
), 5 (
), and 1 (
) percent
levels, respectively; constant included.
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Table 4.11: Count data estimation of number of generic entrants
1 year after LoE 2 years after LoE Long run
Price caps -0.56 -0.37 -0.28
(0.13) (0.12) (0.09)
Compulsory substitution 0.44 0.51 0.45
(0.17) (0.16) (0.12)
Physicians incentives 0.45 0.23 0.17
(0.15) (0.15) (0.11)
Frequent adjustment -0.12 -0.11 -0.18
(0.14) (0.13) (0.11)
Dierential copayment 0.03 0.05 0.2
(0.20) (0.19) (0.16)
Lowest price policy 0.11 -0.02 -0.04
(0.14) (0.13) (0.10)
Log of pre-expiry value 0.42 0.41 0.36
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Log of population 0.33 0.36 0.37
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Log of pre-expiry price -0.27 -0.23 -0.18
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Pre-expiry formulations 0.08 0.08 0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Biosimilar 0.21 0.28 0.56
(0.12) (0.11) (0.09)
Other ATC4 0.27 0.21 0.00
(0.17) (0.15) (0.11)
Countries expired 0.01 0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Controlled entry 1.17 1.20 0.63
(0.44) (0.50) (0.33)
Expiry year 0.14 0.16 0.12
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
AIC 2445.71 2558.20 3194.80
BIC 2524.59 2634.95 3271.79
Sample Size 765 675 675
Robust standard errors in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (
), 5 (
), and 1 (
) percent
levels, respectively; constant included.
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The results also show an improvement over time in terms of generic entry to markets,
both in the short term and in the longer term perspective. The probability of observing
the rst generic entry within the rst year increases on average by 5% each year.12
For what concerns the regulatory variables (table 6.4) the full set of variables was tested.
Policies involving compulsory substitution of generic products by pharmacists seem to
positively aect the probability of entry. The coecient found is positive and statistically
signicant in all the specications.13
The presence of price caps appears to negatively aect the probability of entry, at least in
the short run. The other regulatory variables included do not seem to show coecients
that are statistically signicant in a stable manner.
The regressions include a number of additional control variables (table 6.5). The rst is a
control variable for the presence of a generic entry controlled by the originator company.
The variable takes the value one for the case in which an entry took place either as
the result of a distribution agreement between originator and generic producer, or in
the context of a settlement. The coecient is positive and statistically signicant.14
In cases in which a controlled entry was recorded, the probability of observing generic
entry increases signicantly.
When deciding whether or not to enter a specic market, a generic producer may take
into consideration the fact that the product in question has lost exclusivity also in other
countries. In that case, entering in several countries might lead to economies of scale
and enhance the attractiveness of entry in one particular country. This aspect has been
taken into account with a variable that reports the number of other countries where the
12This gure should be interpreted with care since the relevant time window for the rst generic entry
(i.e. one year) overlaps to a large extent with the average time to entry calculated at a head count.
Therefore a very small downward change over time in the values situated in the proximity of the central
point (here one year) may have an important impact on the presented probability. The possible presence
of multicollinearity between the expiry year and pre-expiry value was checked (so as to see whether INNs
expiring later in the period also tend to have higher sales values and therefore attract more entry), but
the correlation coecient is lower than 0.2.
13A slightly modied version of this specication was also tested, including of the interaction between
the presence of compulsory substitution and of incentives to physicians to substitute generics. When
these two policies take place at the same time, i.e. both physicians and doctors are encouraged/obliged
to dispense generic products, the probability of observing swift generic entry seems to further increase.
14In cases in which a controlled entry was recorded, the probability of observing independent generic
entry would accordingly appear to increase. This nding may be partly explained by the fact that in
a number of cases involving controlled entry, it was not possible to distinguish the date of rst generic
entry and rst independent entry. As a result, the estimated coecient may pick up some cases of
controlled entry rather than independent entry. It is also important to bear in mind that the number of
cases identied as controlled entry is rather low. See annex in chapter 6 for further details.
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INN has previously expired. The estimated coecient has the expected positive sign,
even though it is not always statistically signicant.15
As explained above, INNs that belong to dierent ATC4 categories are present in the
data set in the form of multiple observations. It might be reasonable to consider that for
these INNs the decision to start selling products for one ATC4 class may be linked to the
possibility of selling products based on the same INN in another class. At the same time,
where the ATC4 classes are dierent there might be a selection by the generic company
to enter the simpler and/or bigger ATC4 category. In the regressions presented, this is
controlled for by the dummy variable that takes unit value when the INN belongs to
more than one ATC4 category. This control variable, even if always presents a positive
coecient, is never statistically signicant.16
Also the level of promotional eort undertaken by the originator producer before the
LoE was considered. However, an endogeneity problem may occur when including this
measure in the model specication. Being a potential tool for the originator company
to maintain brand recognition even after LoE, promotional activity might be a response
to the observed increased probability of having swift generic entry. In addition to this
econometric problem, the data availability for promotional expenditure was limited to
seven countries, signicantly restricting the sample.
With respect to the determinants of the number of generic entrants, estimates of the
count data model go in the same direction as the probit analysis. The value of the
market before expiry is positively correlated with the number of entrants while again
the pre-expiry price is negatively correlated with it, leading to the same interpretations.
The number of formulations with which the originator drug was present in the market
before expiry, seems to have a positive eect on the number of generic producers entering,
although signicant only at the 5% level in the probit regressions one year after LoE.
A positive and statistically signicant eect of compulsory generic substitution on the
number of entrants is conrmed by the statistical signicance in all regressions. The
negative eect of price caps, aecting the probability of entry only in the short run,
seems to have a consistent and long lasting eect on the number of generic entrants.
15To check robustness, alternative approaches were considered. A simple alternative is the use of a
dummy variable to account for the presence of at least one other country in which the INN in question
lost exclusivity. Another alternative is to use the aggregate value sales of the INN in these countries
before LoE. Results for these two alternatives are consistent with the one presented.
16Alternative specications were also considered to check robustness. First, a specication using
the number of ATC4 classes per INN was tested. Additionally, the probit specication was run with
standard errors clustered at the INN/country level, to take into account the possible correlation between
the choices of entering dierent ATC4 categories for the same INN. Finally, also a specication on the
data set at country/INN level, i.e. ignoring therefore the possible ATC dierentiation within INNs, was
run. The results obtained with these three variations were consistent with the base line specication
presented in table 4.10 and table 4.11
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The results for controlled entry are consistent with the probit model, as well as all other
controls, that report the expected sign.
These results are also obtained when observing the total number of generic producers
present at the end of the period of observation, presented in the last column in table
4.11. 17
4.4 Analysis of the time to entry
The econometric analysis in this section aims at identifying the determinants of the
delay of generic entry, i.e. the length of the time period between LoE and the rst actual
entry of a generic producer. Even if entry of generic producers eventually takes place,
its delay vis- a-vis the date of LoE is potentially costly to patients. Without the delay
(or with shorter delay), any potential benets to consumers from competition between
originator and generic producers would accrue earlier. For this reason, it is interesting
to search for determinants of the delay.
4.4.1 Methodological framework
Time to entry (the time span between LoE and the entry of the rst generic com-
pany) can be best analysed using methods to model time-to-event data. These methods
have been developed to describe the time an individual spends in a state until the
transition to another state and to study the relationship between the individual's char-
acteristics and transition patterns.18
The time spent in the state, in our case the time between LoE and the rst generic
rm's entry, is called a spell. The random variable to be studied is the length of the
spell. Let T be a continuous random variable representing the length of a spell, with a
cumulative distribution function F(t) and a density function f(t). The survivor function
is S(t) = 1   F(t), i.e. the probability of transition before t. The hazard rate is dened
as (t) =
f(t)
S(t), which is the 'instantaneous transition intensity' at moment t, provided
that there was no transition until t.
The hazard rate is assumed to full the proportional hazard assumption:
(t;Xijt) = 0(t)e0Xijt (4.2)
17The sample has been restricted to those country/INNs for which observations are available for at
least two years after LoE. Estimation takes into account the dierence in time period during which each
INN is observed since the moment of LoE (exposure time).
18See Jenkins [5] for a comprehensive exposition of survival analysis methods.
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where 0(t) is called the baseline hazard function and depends only on the time since
LoE, while vector Xijt depends on other factors and can be time-dependent. The hazard
rate for dierent molecules is therefore the baseline hazard multiplied by a factor related
to the vector of the characteristics of the molecule.
The hazard rate can be specied in terms of discrete or continuous time. Entry of
a generic rm can in principle take place at any point in time, so a continuous time
approach seems appropriate. On the other hand, only monthly data are available and
entries are grouped by month (so-called ties). When such cases are common, a discrete
representation of a continuous time process would be preferable. Both approaches are
used in the analysis.
4.4.2 Implementation
A panel dataset was used for this purpose. One observation in the data set is related
to a molecule in an ATC4 category, in a country, in a month. Molecules from 17 countries
were analysed and the time period covered is from January 2000 to December 2007.19
For each molecule per country, the rst observation comes from one month before LoE
and the last observation is either in the month with the rst generic rm entry or in
December 2007 which is the last month in the data set. The dataset corresponds to right
truncated spell data with varying censoring point. It means that for each country-INN-
ATC4, at the end of a spell, we observe if entry of a generic rm did or did not take place
and the length of the spell is dierent for dierent country-INN-ATC4 combinations.
The dependent variable dijt is a dummy variable which is equal to one if there was rst
generic rm entry for molecule i in country j in month t since LoE and zero otherwise.
For dierent specications of the hazard rate, dierent link functions are used.
As in the previous section, covariates from table 6.3, table 6.4 and table 6.5 are used: a
set of regulatory variables, a set of INN characteristics and a country-specic variable
population. In addition, to capture the time trend, bi-annual dummies were created
(2000 - 2001 is the benchmark and therefore omitted) to indicate in which year the INN
lost patent or data exclusivity. Discrete specications include also the baseline hazard
covariates.
The hazard proportionality assumption is checked by including into the regressions all
variables interacted with functions of time since LoE. If such interacted variables are not
statistically signicant, this indicates that their hazard is not likely to be time-dependent.
19The number of molecules diers depending on the treatment of negative delays (see above). When
an INN with a negative delay is included, it is assumed that a generic rm entry took place immediately
after LoE.
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This is done in a Cox regression with Breslow method for ties. Time functions considered
are linear, quadratic and logarithmic functions of the number of months since LoE. The
only variable that appears not to satisfy the hazard proportionality assumption is the
dichotomous characteristic identifying biologic INN. For this reason, it was not used in
the hazard models.
For several specications the shape of the baseline hazard function needs to be selected.
In continuous-time specications, the Weibull function is used because it is exible
and can have an increasing, decreasing, as well as constant shape. In discrete-time
specications, the quadratic function is used (selection based on descriptive statistics.
In addition, specications with non-parametric baseline hazard (Cox) are considered.
To account for unobserved heterogeneity of INNs (so-called frailty), an INN-country-
specic random intercept is included. Most of the regressions make distributional as-
sumptions about the random eect (normal or inverse normal), but non-parametric
frailty coming from a discrete distribution with up to two mass points is also considered.
Specically, the following ve specications are analysed:
 Cox semi-parametric hazard model:
The hazard rate in this model is specied as
(t;charijt;regijt;popijtjvij) = 0(t)e(1charijt+2regijt+3popijt) (4.3)
The baseline hazard function 0(t) remains unspecied and the partial likelihood
estimation method is used. Time is assumed to be continuous. Ties are treated as
if generated by discrete time. Variable char is the vector of INN characteristics,
reg is the vector of regulatory variables and pop is the country's population.
 Weibull model:
The hazard rate in this model is specied as
(t;charijt;regijt;popijt) = t 1e(1charijt+2regijt+3popijt) (4.4)
The baseline hazard has a shape of the Weibull function: 0(t) = t 1 where
 > 1. The shape parameter  is estimated together with coecients of regressors.
When  is greater than 1, the hazard is increasing. When  is lower than 1, the
hazard is decreasing. Finally, when  equals 1, the hazard is constant. Time is
assumed to be continuous.
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 Weibull model with frailty (INN-country-specic random eects):
The hazard rate in this model is specied as
(t;charijt;regijt;popijtjvij) = vijt 1e(1charijt+2regijt+3popijt) (4.5)
where vij is a random variable distributed independently of t, X, Y and Z and
has an inverse normal distribution.
 Discrete-time specication for an underlying continuous-time process (cloglog)
with parametric frailty:
The hazard rate in this model is specied as
(n;charijt;regijt;popijtjvij)
= (1   e exp(1n2+2n+1charijt+2regijt+3popijt+uij)) (4.6)
where n is the month, uij = ln(vij) is a random variable with the standard normal
distribution and 1n2 + 2n is the baseline hazard function.
 Discrete-time specication for an underlying continuous-time process (cloglog)
with non-parametric frailty from a discrete distribution with the support of two
mass points:
The hazard rate in this model is specied as
(n;charijt;regijt;popijtjr)
= (1   e exp(1n2+2n+1charijt+2regijt+3popijt+r)) (4.7)
For all specications except Cox, maximum likelihood estimation is used to take care
of censoring. Each observation in the data set contributes to the likelihood of the
information it carries: whether there was entry in period t or whether in period t the
INN was still the realm of the originator company.
4.4.3 Non-parametrical estimates of time to entry
First, the Kaplan-Meier estimator of the survivor function and the Nelson-Aalen
estimator of the cumulative hazard are plotted. These two estimators do not use any
parametric assumptions. Intuitively, the estimate of the survival at time t is the product
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of `survival rates' in each point in time until t, i.e. the product of the proportions of
INNs which did not face the rst generic entry at this time in the total number of INNs
that before time t still had no generic competitors. Similarly, the cumulated hazard
estimate is the sum of `exit ratios' for each month until t. Both are presented in gure
4.1.
The estimated survivor function has a large drop of about 19% in the rst month after
LoE, which means that about 19% of INN-countrypairs experienced a generic rm entry
right after LoE. Note that the full data set includes molecules with negative delays which
for the purpose of this estimation are converted to zero delays.
The rst few months after LoE, the survival probability is dropping at a decreasing pace.
Later in time, the changes in the survivor function are smaller and relatively constant,
resulting in the close-to-linear shape of the survival function.
The above observations are mirrored in the shape of the estimated cumulated hazard
function. It starts at the level over 19%. Then it grows at a decreasing and then
relatively constant pace.
The estimates suggest that the hazard rate of the rst entry of a generic rm is decreas-
ing, rst at a diminishing rate and then at a relatively constant rate.
The non-parametric estimates were also calculated for the time elapsing between the
rst and the second entry of a generic competitor. These are presented in gure 4.2.
The survival function is convex and the cumulated hazard concave, indicating that the
second generic rm entry (relative to the rst entry) seems to take place more quickly
than the rst generic rm entry (relative to LoE). Already after three months, about
50% of INN- country pairs which have experienced the rst generic rm entry face the
entry of the second generic rm. Only about 10% of INN-country pairs which have
experienced the rst generic rm entry never note entry of the second generic rm.
4.4.4 Regression results
The results for the full data set are presented in tables 4.12 and 4.13. Reported
coecients for dummy variables can be interpreted as a percentage change in the hazard
rate due to a change in the covariate, holding everything else constant.
4.4.4.1 Control Variables
In all specications, the entry of originator-controlled generics is statistically signif-
icant and greater than one. This implies that, holding everything else constant, INNs
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Figure 4.1: First generic entry after LoE: Kaplan-Meier estimator of the survivor
function and Nelson-Aalen estimator of the cumulative hazard for all INN-country
pairs analysed
Figure 4.2: Second generic entry after LoE: Kaplan-Meier estimator of the survivor
function and Nelson-Aalen estimator of the cumulative hazard for all INN-country pairs
analysed
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Table 4.12: Estimation of time to entry
Weibull with inverse
Cox Weibull normal frailty
Price caps 0.752 0.737 0.576
(0.007) (0.002) (0.001)
Compulsory substitution 1.614 1.603 1.946
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Physicians incentives 1.233 1.213 1.448
(0.104) (0.110) (0.050)
Frequent adjustment 1.103 1.106 1.158
(0.367) (0.315) (0.368)
Dierential copayment 0.766 0.757 0.722
(0.064) (0.040) (0.128)
Lowest price policy 0.940 0.950 0.939
(0.608) (0.652) (0.725)
Log of pre-expiry value 1.494 1.488 1.788
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.012) (0.011) (0.004)
Pre-expiry price 0.977 0.975 0.967
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pre-expiry formulations 1.035 1.031 1.057
(0.065) (0.065) (0.042)
Other ATC4 1.213 1.231 1.279
(0.138) (0.089) (0.204)
Countries expired 1.123 1.133 1.236
(0.258) (0.194) (0.171)
Controlled entry 2.261 1.854 3.270
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Expiry 02/03 1.668 1.603 1.988
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Expiry 04/05 2.108 1.983 2.678
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Expiry 06/07 2.363 2.548 3.596
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Frailty =0 test, p value 0.000
Weibull parameter p 0.711 1.104
Sample Size 22326 22326 22326
p values in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (
), 5 (
), and 1 (
) percent levels,
respectively.
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Table 4.13: Estimation of time to entry (continuation)
Discrete with Discrete with non-
normal frailty parametric frailty
Price caps 0.619 0.604
(0.000) (0.000)
Compulsory substitution 1.568 1.600
(0.005) (0.003)
Physicians incentives 1.450 1.507
(0.010) (0.003)
Frequent adjustment 1.055 1.131
(0.657) (0.304)
Dierential copayment 0.951 0.894
(0.767) (0.498)
Lowest price policy 0.894 0.913
(0.405) (0.481)
Log of pre-expiry value 1.567 1.555
(0.000) (0.000)
Log of population 1.299 1.153
(0.000) (0.002)
Pre-expiry price 0.974 0.973
(0.000) (0.000)
Pre-expiry formulations 1.033 1.030
(0.111) (0.147)
Other ATC4 1.228 1.221
(0.159) (0.173)
Countries expired 1.192 1.178
(0.132) (0.155)
Controlled entry 2.278 2.814
(0.001) (0.000)
Expiry 02/03 1.844 1.681
(0.000) (0.001)
Expiry 04/05 2.252 2.188
(0.000) (0.000)
Expiry 06/07 2.541 2.374
(0.000) (0.000)
Survival time 0.949 0.944
(0.000) (0.000)
Survival time squared 1.001 1.001
(0.000) (0.000)
Frailty =0 test, p value 0.000
Sample Size 23196 23196
p values in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (
), 5 (
), and 1 (
) percent levels,
respectively.
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with entry controlled by originator companies face signicantly earlier rst entry (though
not necessarily independent generic entry) than other INNs. This result is not surprising
since the data counts the controlled entry as the rst generic rm entry. However, this
result is not robust to the treatment of negative delays (see tables in section 4.6).
The variable indicating the pre-expiry number of formulations has coecients greater
than one and statistically signicant in four specications. This implies that the larger
the number of formulations, the faster rst generic entry tends to be.
The coecients of the pre-expiry market value per capita are greater than one and
statistically signicant, implying that the larger the value of the INN/ATC4/country
market, the faster rst entry of a generic competitor.
The coecients of the pre-expiry price are slightly smaller than one and always sta-
tistically signicant. Therefore, it appears that faster rst generic rm entry can be
associated with less expensive products.
The population helps to capture the eect of the size of the market. The estimated
coecients are always statistically signicant, but equal or slightly larger than one.
Two dummies are included to capture the links between the same INN across countries
and dierent ATC4 classes within one country. The coecient of the variable indicating
the number of countries were the INN had previously already expired is always greater
than one and signicant in one specication. The coecient characterising INNs that
belong to more than one ATC4 category also comes out greater than one and statistically
signicant in the second specication, suggesting that when an INN is present in several
ATC4 classes, rst generic entry may be faster than otherwise.
4.4.4.2 Regulatory Variables
In all specications the coecient for compulsory substitution is greater than one
and statistically signicant. This implies that the hazard of the rst generic entry for
molecules in countries with compulsory generic substitution policy is higher than the
hazard for molecules in countries without this policy. Therefore compulsory generic
substitution policy appears to be correlated with faster generic entry. Figure 4.3 shows
the predicted survivor and cumulated hazard functions estimated by the Cox regression
from the rst column of table 4.12.
The estimated coecient for the dichotomous variable indicating whether physicians are
encouraged to prescribe generically is always larger than one and statistically signicant
in more general specications with frailty. This suggests that, holding everything else
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Figure 4.3: Survivor and cumulated hazard functions estimated by the Cox regression,
by compulsory substitution
Figure 4.4: Survivor and cumulated hazard functions estimated by the Cox regression,
by free price policy
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constant, the INNs in countries where this policy is used have a higher hazard rate of
the rst generic company entering than other countries.
Frequent price adjustments show in all specications a coecient greater than one but
not statistically signicant. Dierential copayments show coecient always lower than
one but statistically signicant only in non-frailty regressions. Statistical signicance
also disappears in the robustness checks (see section 4.6). Therefore, the data do not
appear to identify an eect of this variable. The existence of policies obliging pharma-
cists to dispense the generic with the lowest price leads in all specications statistically
insignicant coecients. The data do not appear to identify an eect of this variable.
The presence of price caps has a signicant eect on time to entry, with a coecient
lower than one, meaning that the hazard of rst generic rm's entry for molecules in
countries with price caps is lower than the hazard for molecules in countries without price
caps. It would appear therefore that a policy of mandatory discounts or price caps for
generic rms is correlated with slower generic entry (see also gure 4.4 for illustration).
This eect is however not very strong in that it disappears in the robustness checks.
4.4.4.3 Time Trend
Bi-annual dummy variables are statistically signicant and greater than one. Fur-
thermore, when comparing their magnitude one can observe that the magnitude is the
largest for the years 2006-2007 and it gets lower the earlier LoE took place. That sug-
gests that, holding everything else constant, the hazard rate of the rst generic rm
entry is larger, the later in the time period under analysis LoE occurs. (See gure 4.5
for an illustration)
4.4.4.4 Baseline Hazard
The baseline hazard function shows the shape of the hazard rate of the rst generic
entry over time which is shared by all INN-countrypairs. When not including frailty, this
function is decreasing over time at a decreasing rate (the estimated Weibull parameter
is lower than one), just as the descriptive Kaplan-Meier and Nelson-Aalen estimators
suggested. When frailty is included, the hazard is almost constant over time (the esti-
mated Weibull parameter almost equal to one). This suggests that frailty takes away
the eect of very early rst entries from the baseline hazard shared by all INNs.
Figure 4.6 presents the baseline cumulative hazard and the baseline survivor functions
for an INN with the mean log of market value before LoE (-5.04) estimated in the Cox
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regression reported in the rst column of table 4.11. Both functions have a close-to-linear
shape.
4.4.5 Robustness
Tables 4.12 and 4.13 allow for several robustness checks of the results. The results
of continuous- and discrete-time models are to a large extent consistent. In models
with frailty, incentives to physicians to prescribe generically become statistically signi-
cant. To the contrary, dierential copayments for originator and generic lose signicance
when frailty is included. Overall, the results are almost the same for all three frailty
distributions.
Further robustness checks were done to test if the results are sensitive to the treatment
of negative delays. The regressions were repeated on the data set with all negative delays
dropped and on the dataset with only substantial negative delays dropped. Substantial
negative delays were dened as delays exceeding 3 months. Control variables are intro-
duced to ag INN-countrypairs with large and small negative delays. Tables 4.16, 4.17
and 4.18 present the results. Cox and cloglog with non-parametric frailty models did
not converge.
The coecient of the variable for compulsory substitution remains highly signicant
and greater than one in all specications. The coecient of the variable indicating
that physicians are encouraged to prescribe generically come out greater than one and
statistically signicant in all specications. The coecients for the variables indicating
the existence of dierential copayments and price caps remain lower than one but never
statistically signicant.
4.5 Conclusions
Patterns of generic entry dier signicantly across European countries and types of
drugs. In this chapter we have identied some factors that explain this heterogeneity.
Larger pre-expiry revenue attracts generic entry in terms of likelihood of entry, speed of
entry and long-run number of entrants. Dierent regulation of pharmaceutical markets
in Europe also have an impact on the occurrence and speed of generic entry. We have
shown that price-cap policies tend to discourage and delay generic entry. Incentives to
physicians to prescribe generically and policies encouraging substitution at pharmacy
tend to make generic in a given market more attractive, thus leading to a higher prob-
ability of generic entry and to shorter delays wherever entry takes place.
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Figure 4.5: Survivor and cumulated hazard functions estimated by the Cox regression,
by bi-annual dummies
Figure 4.6: Baseline survivor and cumulated hazard functions estimated by the Cox
regression
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4.6 Appendix
Table 4.14: Probit estimation of occurrence of entry
First entry within First entry within
1 year from LoE 2 years from LoE
Price caps -0.10 -0.04
(0.04) (0.05)
Compulsory substitution 0.14 0.16
(0.06) (0.06)
Physicians incentives 0.11 0.13
(0.05) (0.06)
Frequent adjustment 0.07 0.05
(0.05) (0.05)
Dierential copayment -0.02 -0.02
(0.07) (0.07)
Lowest price policy -0.07 -0.01
(0.05) (0.06)
Log of pre-expiry value 0.10 0.11
(0.02) (0.02)
Log of population 0.04 0.04
(0.02) (0.02)
Log of pre-expiry price -0.07 -0.07
(0.01) (0.02)




Other ATC4 0.05 0.04
(0.06) (0.06)
Countries expired 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Controlled entry 0.42 0.37
(0.13) (0.13)
Expiry year 0.05 0.06
(0.01) (0.02)
Pseudo-R2 0.227 0.248
Sample Size 735 649
Robust standard errors in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (
), 5 (
), and 1 (
) percent
levels, respectively; constant included.
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Table 4.15: Count data estimation of number of generic entrants
1 year after LoE 2 years after LoE Long run
Price caps -0.43 -0.25 -0.23
(0.14) (0.13) (0.10)
Compulsory substitution 0.57 0.59 0.47
(0.18) (0.17) (0.13)
Physicians incentives 0.61 0.34 0.22
(0.16) (0.16) (0.12)
Frequent adjustment -0.05 -0.06 -0.16
(0.16) (0.15) (0.12)
Dierential copayment 0.05 0.08 0.20
(0.20) (0.20) (0.17)
Lowest price policy 0.01 -0.11 -0.07
(0.15) (0.14) (0.10)
Log of pre-expiry value 0.42 0.41 0.35
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Log of population 0.32 0.36 0.38
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
Log of pre-expiry price -0.29 -0.25 -0.18
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Pre-expiry formulations 0.09 0.09 0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Biosimilar 0.29 0.36 0.62
(0.12) (0.12) (0.09)
Other ATC4 0.29 0.22 -0.03
(0.19) (0.17) (0.12)
Countries expired 0.00 0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Controlled entry 1.40 1.44 0.76
(0.51) (0.57) (0.38)
Expiry year 0.13 0.15 0.11
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
AIC 2240.00 2374.45 3017.65
BIC 2318.20 2450.53 3093.73
Sample Size 735 649 649
Robust standard errors in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (
), 5 (
), and 1 (
) percent
levels, respectively; constant included.
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Table 4.16: Estimation of time to entry: full dataset
Weibull with inverse Discrete with
Weibull normal frailty normal frailty
Price caps 0.898 0.796 0.867
(0.286) (0.217) (0.155)
Compulsory substitution 1.507 2.063 1.455
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Physicians incentives 1.218 1.498 1.297
(0.098) (0.060) (0.029)
Frequent adjustment 0.998 1.014 0.976
(0.983) (0.939) (0.810)
Dierential copayment 0.872 0.790 0.984
(0.310) (0.335) (0.912)
Lowest price policy 1.110 1.197 1.057
(0.357) (0.379) (0.627)
Log of pre-expiry value 1.479 1.966 1.456
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population 1.000 1.000 1.102
(0.145) (0.114) (0.018)
Pre-expiry price 0.980 0.971 0.982
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pre-expiry formulations 1.006 1.024 1.004
(0.167) (0.064) (0.121)
Other ATC4 1.258 1.409 1.243
(0.057) (0.118) (0.072)
Countries expired 1.070 1.159 1.079
(0.241) (0.187) (0.201)
Controlled entry 0.982 1.098 1.018
(0.929) (0.802) (0.930)
Expiry 02/03 1.590 2.164 1.614
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Expiry 04/05 1.939 2.991 1.817
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Expiry 06/07 2.771 5.266 2.281
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Large negative 12.657 84.026 9.235
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)




Survival time squared 1.001
(0.000)
Frailty =0 test, p value 0.000 0.493
Weibull parameter p 0.863 1.524
Sample Size 22326 22326 23196
p values in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (
), 5 (
), and 1 (
) percent levels,
respectively.
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Table 4.17: Estimation of time to entry: no large (>3 months) negative delays
Weibull with inverse Discrete with
Weibull normal frailty normal frailty
Price caps 0.917 0.825 0.883
(0.414) (0.305) (0.235)
Compulsory substitution 1.539 2.100 1.491
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Physicians incentives 1.287 1.652 1.350
(0.039) (0.018) (0.014)
Frequent adjustment 1.0044 1.110 1.009
(0.684) (0.579) (0.933)
Dierential copayment 0.860 0.779 0.958
(0.273) (0.300) (0.769)
Lowest price policy 1.079 1.132 1.03
(0.514) (0.546) (0.784)
Log of pre-expiry value 1.497 1.952 1.481
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population 1.000 1.000 1.103
(0.119) (0.094) (0.018)
Pre-expiry price 0.978 0.967 0.979
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pre-expiry formulations 1.010 1.034 1.008
(0.132) (0.145) (0.176)
Other ATC4 1.293 1.455 1.283
(0.041) (0.092) (0.048)
Countries expired 1.082 1.177 1.092
( 0.122) (0.143) (0.135)
Controlled entry 1.045 1.260 1.091
(0.839) (0.557) (0.689)
Expiry 02/03 1.551 2.020 1.630
(0.001) (0.003) (0.000)
Expiry 04/05 1.910 2.763 1.877
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Expiry 06/07 2.720 4.639 2.382
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)




Survival time squared 1.001
(0.000)
Frailty =0 test, p value 0.000 0.492
Weibull parameter p 0.832 1.413
Sample Size 22292 22292 23129
p values in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (
), 5 (
), and 1 (
) percent levels,
respectively.
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Table 4.18: Estimation of time to entry: no negative delays
Weibull with inverse Discrete with
Weibull normal frailty normal frailty
Price caps 0.912 0.810 0.837
(0.405) (0.259) (0.185)
Compulsory substitution 1.586 2.238 1.662
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
Physicians incentives 1.261 1.663 1.495
(0.068) (0.016) (0.011)
Frequent adjustment 1.120 1.224 1.118
(0.328) (0.301) (0.417)
Dierential copayment 0.785 0.701 0.888
(0.101) (0.151) (0.521)
Lowest price policy 1.056 1.066 1.007
(0.660) (0.753) (0.962)
Log of pre-expiry value 1.610 2.094 1.711
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population 1.000 1.000 1.126
(0.290) (0.177) (0.028)
Pre-expiry price 0.977 0.967 0.975
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pre-expiry formulations 1.016 1.045 1.025
(0.143) (0.136) (0.152)
Other ATC4 1.356 1.519 1.366
(0.021) (0.063) (0.049)
Countries expired 1.113 1.248 1.176
( 0.214) (0.187) (0.165)
Controlled entry 1.053 1.182 1.114
(0.866) (0.755) (0.784)
Expiry 02/03 1.547 1.933 1.806
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
Expiry 04/05 1.897 2.565 2.221
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)




Survival time squared 1.000
(0.000)
Frailty =0 test, p value 0.000 0.008
Weibull parameter p 0.792 1.274
Sample Size 22237 22237 23019
p values in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (
), 5 (
), and 1 (
) percent levels,
respectively.
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Eects of generic entry on market structure and
prices
Abstract
Generic entry is the main source of competition in o-patent pharmaceutical markets and
generic competition is considered to be the main mechanism to erode the market power
that patent-holders are able to enjoy during the period of market exclusivity. However,
generics do not appear to be always equally eective at driving market prices down
and at gaining market share. In this chapter we look at the development of prices and
market structure after loss of exclusivity and in presence of generic entry in a number
of European countries. In particular, we are interested in the impact that pervasive
regulation of European pharmaceutical markets has on the competitive landscape of
o-patent pharmaceutical markets. We show that prices and market shares behave
dierently across European countries and types of drugs, and identify some factors
that explain this heterogeneity. Price competition and generic uptake are positively
correlated with the value of the market, the number of generic entrants, the absence
of price controls, and the existence of regulatory incentives for the prescription and
dispensation of generics.
Key words: Pharmaceuticals, Generic competition, Regulation
JEL Classications: I11; I18; K21; L41; L65
* This chapter is co-authored jointly with Szabolcs Lorincz and Vincent Verouden, economist and senior
economist respectively within the Chief Economist Team (CET) of DG Competition, European Com-
mission, Brussels. This research was conducted during a stay as postgraduate visitor at the CET as part
of the European Commissions Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry. I wish to thank Prof. Frank Verboven for
comments and discussions on earlier drafts of this chapter. The usual disclaimer applies.
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5.1 Introduction
Generic entry is the main source of competition in o-patent pharmaceutical mar-
kets and generic competition is considered to be the main mechanism to erode the mar-
ket power that patent-holders are able to enjoy during the period of market exclusivity.
However, generics do not appear to be always equally eective at driving market prices
down and at gaining market share. Empirical evidence shows that generic competition
reduces average prices in o-patent pharmaceutical markets, but the magnitude of the
drops in prices and their speed seems to vary substantially across countries, as well as
generics' ability to gain market share. The economic literature tends to suggest that
regulation may have an impact on these competitive dynamics.
The paper by Caves et al. [1] remains a fundamental reference to understand the trans-
formation in o-patent markets dynamics post Waxman-Hatch Act. They provided a
rst picture of a number of elements that have been intensely discussed in the literature
ever since: generic entry had an impact on the pricing behaviour of producers of original
branded drugs (hereafter the originator) and on the structure of pharmaceutical markets
after patent expiration. Caves et al. [1] found that originators' price declined with the
number of generic entrants, although originators' price sensitivity decreased with suc-
cessive entrants. Generics entered at discounted prices compared to the originator price
and average generic prices fell to roughly 17% of the pre-expiry originator price in the
long run. They also observed that the overall generic market share remained moderate
despite the ratio between originators and generics prices being signicantly high.
Some of these ndings have been conrmed by more recent research, while others have
proved more controversial. Further evidence from the US market conrms that generics
tend to enter at a signicant discount with respect to the originator price and that the
number of generic entrants is negatively correlated with average generic prices. This is
the case for Wiggins and Maness [12] and Saha et al. [11].
Others have also validated these results, while calling into question the price response by
the originator to generic entry. Grabowski and Vernon [5], Grabowski and Vernon [6],
Frank and S. [4] and Regan [9] nd that the originators price tends to increase to some
extent upon generic entry in the market. This result can be explained by considering
the segmentation of the market caused by generic entry. Low-price generic entrants
may attract the more price-sensitive part of the demand and confront the originator
to a segment of the demand with lower average price elasticity, thus leading to higher
originators' equilibrium price. This phenomenon, known as the generic paradox, has
been observed mainly in the US market and its existence is a source of disagreement
among researchers.
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Generic market penetration has steadily increased in the US market over the past two
decades, since Caves et al. [1] published their ndings. This has been observed by
Grabowski and Vernon [6] and Reien and D. [10]. Most likely, moderate generic market
shares shortly after the approval of the Waxman-Hatch Act responded to a progressive
adjustment by entrants to the new legal framework and by healthcare professionals to the
new class of generic products. More recent research has observed that price competition
among generic entrants leads to a signicant shift of demand away from the originator.
Saha et al. [11] nd that within a month after the rst generic enters the market; overall
generics accumulate a 14% share of the market in volume. This gure increases to an
average of 43% within six months and to 55% one year after generic entry.
The literature that looks at European pharmaceutical markets is more limited and re-
cent. This is no surprise as generic markets have eectively been developed in Europe
only since the mid nineties, and at a dierent pace in each country. While the evidence
available conrms the main ndings from the US markets, there are some signicant
idiosyncrasies of European generic markets. In a number of European markets, the ra-
tio between generic and originator prices tends to be below the estimates from the US
and also the speed at which average prices decline after generic entry tends to be lower.
The generic paradox is not generally observed in European markets, although results
in Kanavos et al. [7] appear consistent with it. Generic market shares appear to vary
substantially across European markets, and only in countries like Germany and the UK
these shares are comparable to those observed in the US market. A fundamental factor
underlying these dierences between Europe and the US is the various ways in which
European governments regulate prices, reimbursement and usage of drugs.
Danzon and Li-Wei [2] look precisely at how regulation aects competition in pharma-
ceutical markets in a cross-country setting. They nd that price competition between
generic competitors is signicant in less regulated markets (US, UK, Canada and Ger-
many), but that regulation undermines generic competition in strict regulatory systems
(France, Italy and Japan). These results are consistent with the results in Kanavos
et al. [7] and Puig-Junoy and Moreno-Torres [8], among others. A lesson that most
authors draw form these ndings is that certain price and reimbursement regulations
common in European countries have undermined the potential for signicant savings on
o-patent drugs. Kanavos et al. [7] conclude that generic reference pricing may stave
o price competition in generic markets. This is the same conclusion in Puig-Junoy and
Moreno-Torres [8] from analysing the Spanish generic market.
In this paper we look at the development of prices and market structure after loss of
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exclusivity and in presence of generic entry in a number of European countries. In par-
ticular, we are interested in the impact that pervasive regulation of European pharma-
ceutical markets has on the competitive landscape of o-patent pharmaceutical markets.
We show that prices and market shares behave dierently across European countries and
types of drugs, and identify some factors that explain this heterogeneity. Our research
provides the most comprehensive and up to date look at the eects of generic entry in
Europe. It conrms that generics enter at a discounted price with respect to the price
of the originator, average generic prices are inversely correlated with the number of en-
trants, and overall generic market share increases with the number of generics. These
results are largely consistent with those in Kanavos et al. [7] and Wilsdon et al. [13]. We
also provide the most exhaustive study of the impact that dierent types of regulation
of pharmaceutical markets in Europe have had on the price and share eects of generic
entry. We nd that price-cap policies tend to limit both price reductions and generic
penetration in the long run. Incentives to physicians to prescribe generically, policies
encouraging substitution at pharmacy level, and dierential copayments for originator
and generics are some of the policy tools that tend to foster price competition among
generics and to facilitate generic penetration.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 5.2 we present some descriptive statistics
of the impact of generic entry on prices and market structure. In Section 5.3 we present
the econometric analysis performed to identify the factors that determine the impact of
generic entry on prices and market structure. Section 5.4 shows the exploratory analysis
of how prices of other therapeutically related drugs may react to generic entry in a given
drug.
5.2 Data and descriptive analysis
The same data set used in chapter ?? was used for the analysis of the eects of
generic entry on prices and market structure. The various types of analysis diered in
terms of data requirements. The regression analyses involved the simultaneous use of
price data, volume data, dates (date of LoE, entry date) and qualitative information
(product characteristics, characteristics of the regulatory environment). This section
provides detailed descriptive statistics for the development of prices and generic pen-
etration after LoE in 17 European countries. The same countries are covered in the
econometric analysis in section 5.3. The analysis in section 5.4 required data for all
INNs in the same therapeutic category, which forced us to limit the coverage to 9 Eu-
ropean countries. A detailed description of the the data set is provided in a separate
Annex in chapter 6.
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Table 5.1: Development of average price index for INNs with and without generic
entry
6 months 1 month 6 months 1 year 2 years
before LoE after LoE after LoE after LoE after LoE
No generic entry 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.97
Generic entry 1.00 0.97 0.88 0.83 0.74
Weighted average by value 6 months before LoE, index equal to one 6 months before LoE
Generic entry into a pharmaceutical market can have a signicant impact, as it changes
the market from one in which only the rm holding the patent could sell the product
concerned (either itself or via licensees) into one where more sources of supply become
available for the product. The most direct eect is likely to be on the average price level
of the product concerned and the sales volumes of the originator. But other products
can also be aected, both products under the INN that remain patent-protected and
products based on other INNs but competing with the product that lost exclusivity.
This section rst looks into the eects on prices for the INN concerned. It then turns to
the eects on volumes, both the total volume of products sold and the volume sold by
originators and generics respectively. Finally, it addresses, for a limited number of INNs,
the eects of generic entry on possible substitute for the product that lost exclusivity.
5.2.1 Eects on prices
The rst measure considered is the average price of the products sold under the
INN. This average price is constructed as an index, which is set at one shortly (six
months) prior to the end of the exclusivity period. Table 5.1 reports the development
over time of the average price index separately for expiring INNs with generic entry and
without generic entry.
Comparison of the two rows clearly shows that the average price index drops considerably
on markets with generic entry, but not on markets without it. In markets with entry,
average prices dropped by almost 20% after the rst year following LoE and about 25%
after two years. In rare cases, for some medicines in some European countries, the
decrease in the average price index was as high as 80-90%.
Of course, it must be borne in mind that entry will not take place immediately after LoE
for every INN. The gradual drop in levels observed in table 5.1 is therefore the result
of the combination of average price levels coming down quickly in those markets where
entry took place quickly and average price levels coming down later because entry took
longer.
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Table 5.2: Development of average price index for INNs with generic entry
6 months 1 month 6 months 1 year 2 years
before entry after entry after entry after entry after entry
Average INN price 1.00 0.95 0.83 0.79 0.69
Average originator price 1.00 0.97 0.89 0.86 0.82
Average generic price 0.75 0.69 0.65 0.57
INNs weighted by value 6 months before entry, index equal to one 6 months before entry
A dierent picture emerges when not the date at which the INNs lost exclusivity, but the
date of rst generic entry is taken as the reference point. The resulting price development
is illustrated in table 5.2.
Taking the date of entry as the reference point, the decreases in average prices emerge
a little more clearly. The dierence can be observed in the form of a somewhat sharper
average price decrease in the month of entry, with the dierences between the two graphs
diminishing after one year.
It seems reasonable to expect a dierent pricing behaviour between originator and generic
producers. One might expect average generic price to be signicantly lower than the
originator one. Another issue relates to the reaction of originator companies in their
pricing strategy when facing generic entry. While in general originator producers might
be expected to adapt their price to the generic one, they may well decide to take advan-
tage of the brand recognition of their product and focus on a subset of loyal patients,
willing to pay a higher price than the one of generics.
Table 5.2 shows that generics typically come onto the market at a price that is about
25% lower than the price of the originator products prior to LoE. In other words, the
generic-originator price ratio on entry is about 0.75. After 2 years, the generic-originator
price ratio drops to about 0.57.
Also the price levels of the originator products for INNs facing generic entry appear
to decrease, albeit to a lesser extent. This may be related to a range of factors. For
those products that lost exclusivity, there may have been a price response by originator
companies in the face of increased generic competition. The presence of price regulation,
which in some countries obliges originators to keep the prices of their products within
a certain range from the lowest priced generic products, may also have played a role.
At the same time, originator companies may have continued to enjoy a certain degree
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Table 5.3: Average number of originators and generics two years after, by size class
Originators Generics
1 year 2 years 1 year 2 years
after entry after entry after entry after entry
Austria 0.78 0.69 0.52 0.48
Belgium 0.76 0.65 0.55 0.45
Czech Rep. 0.63 0.56 0.55 0.51
Germany 0.80 0.62 0.54 0.49
Denmark 0.90 0.87 0.30 0.23
Spain 0.97 0.90 0.69 0.64
Finland 0.92 0.69 0.63 0.45
France 0.97 0.93 0.61 0.58
Greece 1.04 1.02 0.81 0.82
Hungary 0.97 0.79 0.80 0.63
Ireland 1.00 0.98 0.78 0.78
Italy 0.70 0.66 0.57 0.57
Luxembourg 0.85 0.82 0.37 0.36
Netherlands 0.98 0.94 0.95 0.72
Portugal 0.97 0.84 0.63 0.59
Sweden 0.84 0.78 0.46 0.34
United Kingdom 0.90 0.83 0.78 0.55
INNs weighted by value 6 months before entry
of brand recognition or loyalty on the part of patients and doctors, allowing them to
charge a higher price than generic companies.1
These EU averages reported so far hide considerable variation across European countries.
Table 5.3 provides an overview of the price impact in a range of countries, measured one
year and two years after entry, respectively.
The table shows that generic entry leads to the biggest generic price decreases in coun-
tries such as Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Austria, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg.
In each of these countries average generic prices after two years appear to be more than
50% below the price of the originator price prior to LoE. In Sweden, Denmark and Lux-
embourg price drops of this nature are typically achieved within the rst year of entry
already. Also within each country, there was quite some variation among the various
INNs.
The indices reported so far relate to the prices of all products sold under the INN. The
originator index may include products that have lost exclusivity and products that are
1Further, not all products belonging to a given INN of an originator company may have lost exclusivity
at the same time, allowing an originator company to continue to charge mark-ups on these exclusive
products. It should be noted that the price index for originator companies displayed in table 5.2 is a
composite index of all products sold by the originator companies under the INNs concerned.
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Table 5.4: Generic penetration (EU average, all INNs with entry, weighted by market
value)
Share of volume Share of market value
INNs expired before 2007,
one year after rst generic entry 0.30 0.25
INNs expired before 2006,
two years after rst generic entry 0.45 0.38
INNs weighted by value 6 months before entry
still protected. An alternative way to look at the impact of generic entry on prices
is to consider only the prices of originator formulations which have been exposed to
generic entry. The results are fully consistent and no signicant dierence is observed.
Although this measure is more focused than the average indices described earlier, it is not
necessarily more accurate or informative. It provides a dierent perspective. After all,
as part of the life cycle strategy for INNs, originator companies may well have succeeded
in shifting some of the demand towards formulations of the INN that still benet from
exclusivity (including second generation products) or even to other still protected INNs
altogether.
5.2.2 Eects on volumes
The second main dimension in which generic entry may have an impact is on the
volume of products sold and the market shares of the originator and generic companies.
The combined market share of the generic companies is often referred to as the \generic
penetration rate. The higher the penetration rate, the greater the savings for the health
system are likely to be for a given market size.
Table 5.4 presents, for the EU as a whole, the generic penetration rate for the INNs in
the sample covered by our data set that faced generic entry. The penetration rate is
measured one year and two years after LoE. Once again the set of INNs is limited in
order to allow enough time to lapse before measuring the impact of generic entry. It is
given in both volume2 and value terms (right-hand column).
Again, there is considerable variation across European countries. Table 5.5 shows the
generic penetration rate in a number of countries, again measured one year and two
years after LoE, by volume and value respectively.
2For this volume index, IMS data on Standard Units are used in order to be able to aggregate
consumption across dierent types of formulation (tablets, capsules, injections, etc.)
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Table 5.5: Generic penetration as share of volume and market value, by country
1 year after entry 2 years after entry
by volume by value by volume by value
Austria 0.32 0.26 0.45 0.41
Belgium 0.21 0.16 0.38 0.32
Czech Rep. 0.60 0.58 0.68 0.66
Germany 0.61 0.55 0.75 0.70
Denmark 0.61 0.36 0.67 0.46
Spain 0.14 0.10 0.21 0.16
Finland 0.25 0.18 0.31 0.24
France 0.33 0.25 0.47 0.37
Greece 0.06 0.05 0.22 0.18
Hungary 0.24 0.14 0.26 0.23
Ireland 0.11 0.09 0.17 0.14
Italy 0.26 0.25 0.33 0.31
Luxembourg 0.13 0.06 0.34 0.17
Netherlands 0.20 0.23 0.17 0.20
Portugal 0.38 0.27 0.58 0.47
Sweden 0.47 0.28 0.55 0.38
United Kingdom 0.40 0.37 0.49 0.43
INNs weighted by value 6 months before entry
Entry by generic companies appears to have had a very strong eect in Germany, the
Czech Republic, Denmark and the UK. In Germany and the Czech Republic, generic
companies built up shares above 50% both by value and by volume already within the
rst year. Measured only by volume, Denmark also shows a market share of generic
companies exceeding 50% within the rst year after entry.
Generic entry, especially when it is accompanied by signicant price reductions, may also
lead to an increase in overall consumption of the medicine. In the three years before
LoE, the consumption volume index remained fairly close to the unit benchmark, but
after generic entry the volumes consumed started to rise steadily. This maybe partly
related to the fact that the lower prices for the INNs losing exclusivity draws demand
away from substitute products based on other INNs.
5.2.3 Responses by originators
There are a number of ways in which the originator can anticipate or react to the
entry of generics into the market. For instance, the originator can react through product
proliferation, advertising, pricing or litigation.
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In terms of number of brands per corporation there appears to be little dierence be-
tween originators facing entry and not facing entry. Nor do there appear to be major
developments over time in this respect, although a very slight increase might be ob-
served in the number of brands per company in the period leading up to LoE in those
instances where entry took place. The average number of formulations per brand before
LoE appears to show an increase in those instances where entry took place, whereas
a relative decline in the number is visible in instances without entry. One tentative
conclusion is that in the period before the INNs lose exclusivity, originator rms facing
the prospect of entry have a tendency to increase the number of formulations per brand
in anticipation of future generic entry.
Promotional activities (i.e. in the form of detailing activities, sales representatives in-
forming doctors, advertisement) are another tool that may be used to inuence the
demand for individual products. In particular, it could make sense to divert promo-
tional expenditure away from products that have lost exclusivity to products that are
still protected. It appears that already well before the time of LoE promotional activities
decrease signicantly. Around the time of LoE, these activities stand at less than 10%
of the level attained four years earlier. There is quite some variation across countries
and INNs, however.
5.3 Price eects of generic entry and generic penetration
In order to assess the nature of the post generic entry structure of the pharmaceu-
tical markets an econometric analysis of the post-entry change in the average price level
and producers' market share was carried out.
Two main cross-sectional model designs were set up. In the rst design the long-run
market structure was analysed, which amounts to modelling the change in average drug
prices at the end of the observed period relative to the price level prior to LoE, and the
end-of-period shares of generic producers.
The second design is capturing four intermediate stages, or vintages, of the market. The
rst vintage model analyses price drops and generic shares one year after the rst entry.
Likewise, the second, third and fourth vintage models describe price drops and shares
two, three and four years after the rst entry, respectively.
The following variables were created to be used as dependent variables in the regression
analysis:
Saurí, Lluís (2012), An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/37014Chapter 5. Eects of generic entry 147
 Long-run price drop: the percent drop of the average price level between the last
data period and the level prior to LoE for a given country/INN pair.
 Price drops after one, two, three and four years after generic entry: the percent
drop of the average price level between the last quarter of the rst, second, third
and fourth years after rst entry, compared to the level prior to entry for a given
country/INN pair.
 Long-run generic shares: volume shares of generic products in a given country, in
a given INN, in the last quarter of the sample. This variable is a measure of the
generic products' market penetration.
 Generic shares one, two, three and four years after generic entry: volume shares
of generic products in a given country, in a given INN, in the last quarter of the
rst, second, third and fourth year after rst entry in the country/INN pair. This
variable is also a measure of the generic products' market penetration.
5.3.1 Models
5.3.1.1 Price-drop regressions
The long-run price drop model attempts to shed light on the factors aecting the
most complete price changes observable in the data and potentially related to the generic
entry process. More formally:





where dprice is the percent price drop, ngenr is the number of generic producers, char
is the vector of INN characteristics, reg is the vector of regulatory variables, pop is the
log of the country's populations, ndel is a dummy variable for negative delay cases and
 is the error term. INNs are indexed by i and countries by c.
The model's coecients can be interpreted as eects on the longer-term state of the
market after the occurrence of entry. Positive coecients can be interpreted as factors
inducing to tougher price competition, and the negative ones as those softening compe-
tition. Individual coecients in the model represent partial eects. It means that each
coecient represents a complementary additional eect of a given explanatoryvariable
holding the other variables constant.
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The estimation sample was restricted in each country to those INNs in which entry took
place before 2006, for which two years of post-entry history had been observed. In the
cross section, some INNs are 'older' which means that more time passed since the rst
entry, while others are younger (but still are at least two years old). This variation
across INNs is captured by the generic age variable which counts the number of periods
since the rst entry on the given INN.
Additionally, four vintage price drop regressions were estimated. The corresponding one,
two, three and four-year price drops were regressed against the same set of explanatory
variables as in the long-run price drop regressions.
The series of vintage price drop models, relative to the long-run model, attempt to shed
light both on the shorter and longer term eects after entry. Hence, the coecients can
still be interpreted as eects on the state of the market but this state is not necessarily
the one where the market would eventually be stabilized, especially in the earlier vintages
(the rst and second years). Positive coecients can be interpreted as factors conducive
to tougher price competition, and the negative ones as those softening pricing.
5.3.1.2 Generic-share regressions
Similarly to the price drop regressions, generic share regressions attempt to shed
light both on the short and long run eects of generic entry in terms of market structure,
and on the determinants of these eects. Again regressions were estimated for long-run
generic shares and for four vintage generic shares. All regressions were regressed against
the same set of explanatory variables. More formally:
gen shareic = 0 + pgprice genic + poprice oriic + char0
icchar
+reg0
icreg + poppopc + ndel0
cndek + ic
where gen share is the volume share of generic products, price gen is the average price
of generic products, price ori is the average price of originator products, char is the
vector of INN characteristics, reg is the vector of regulatory variables, pop is the log of
the country's populations, ndel is a dummy variable for negative delay cases and  is
the error term. INNs are indexed by i and countries by c.
Positive coecients can be interpreted as factors conducive to higher generic penetration.
Individual coecients in the model represent partial eects.
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The estimation sample for the long-run generic share regressions was again restricted in
each country to those INNs which already had at least two years of post-entry history.
The technical details of the long-run share regressions are similar to those of the long-run
price drop regressions.
5.3.2 Results
All models are linear regressions where the variation in the left hand side variable
(explained variable) is explained by the right-hand side variables (explanatory variables).
5.3.2.1 Results from price-drop regressions
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 summarise the main results from the price drop regressions. The
baseline long-run price drop model (Model VI) shows that the coecient of the number
of generic entrants is positive and statistically signicant even though its value is small.
In the long-run price drop regressions, regulatory variables are statistically signicant.
The signs, with the notable exception of the price-cap regime indicator, are positive.
The pre-expiry value per capita, generic age and biosimilar variables have positive and
statistically signicant coecients. The pre-expiry number of formulations estimate is
negative and statistically signicant. As it is explained in chapter ??, this variable tends
to have a positive eect on both the probability of entry and the number of entrants.
The explanation of the dierent signs in the price drop and entry models could be
that the number of formulations is a measure of product dierentiation within a given
INN. A market with more product dierentiation attracts more entry and provides an
opportunity to price relatively higher. The other variables do not seem to signicantly
contribute to the explanatory power of the regression.
The baseline vintage price drop models (Model I-V in table 5.7) show that the coecient
of the number of generic entrants has a small, statistically signicant, positive estimate.
From the main regulatory variables, the price caps and lowest price policy variables
are always statistically signicant, the former having a negative, the latter a positive
estimated coecient. Variables signalling frequent adjustment of prices, incentives for
physicians to prescribe generically and compulsory substitution at pharmacy level are
signicant and have a positive eect in most vintage regressions. Dierential copayment
is statistically signicant only in the rst two vintages with positive estimates.
The pre-expiry value of the INN per capita is also positive and statistically signicant.
Population has a statistically signicant and negative estimate in most vintages. Possibly
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Table 5.6: Price drops following entry
Model I Model II Model III
1-year 2-years 3-year
price drop price drop price drop
Price caps -0.103 -0.145 -0.137
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Compulsory substitution 0.078 0.087 0.144
(0.025) (0.067) (0.001)
Physicians incentives 0.138 0.153 0.170
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Frequent adjustment 0.028 0.123 0.110
(0.211) (0.000) (0.002)
Dierential copayment 0.144 0.121 0.050
(0.001) (0.000) (0.202)
Lowest price policy 0.074 0.082 0.104
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log of pre-expiry value 0.007 0.016 0.032
(0.445) (0.062) (0.468)
Population -0.028 -0.040 -0.049
(0.010) (0.001) (0.406)
Pre-expiry formulations -0.011 -0.012 -0.007
(0.048) (0.027) (0.002)
Biosimilar 0.025 0.050 0.021
(0.215) (0.031) (0.327)
Other ATC4 -0.027 0.042 0.039
(0.515) (0.236) (0.862)
Already expired 0.005 -0.004 0.008
(0.877) (0.914) (0.449)
Other countries expired 0.006 0.006 0.007
(0.217) (0.352) (0.007)
Number generics 0.029 0.017 0.012
(0.000) (0.000) (0.419)
Controlled entry -0.042 -0.076 1.007
(0.013) (0.000) (0.001)
Negative delay -0.001 0.051 0.036
(0.981) (0.222) (0.641)
Negative delay 3 -0.098 -0.143 -0.128
(0.099) (0.053) (0.157)
Constant 0.459 0.761 1.007
(0.013) (0.000) (0.001)
R squared 0.336 0.413 0.389
F-test of joint signicance, p value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ramsey's RESET test, p value 0.829 0.486 0.086
Sample Size 464 368 260
heteoscedasticity robust p values in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (
), 5 (
), and 1 (
)
percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5.7: Price drops following entry (continuation)
Model IV Model V
4-year price drop long-run price drop
Price caps -0.166 -0.201
(0.000) (0.000)
Compulsory substitution 0.144 0.168
(0.000) (0.000)
Physicians incentives 0.176 0.230
(0.001) (0.000)
Frequent adjustment 0.122 0.126
(0.002) (0.000)
Dierential copayment 0.017 0.078
(0.589) (0.006)
Lowest price policy 0.159 0.054
(0.000) (0.056)
Log of pre-expiry value 0.039 0.034
(0.235) (0.016)
Log of population -0.046 -0.020
(0.123) (0.012)




Other ATC4 0.088 0.007
(0.573) (0.305)
Already expired -0.028 -0.035
(0.032) (0.146)
Other countries expired 0.021 0.009
(0.037) (0.096)




Generic age squared 0.000
(0.096)
Controlled entry 0.058 -0.022
(0.010) (0.589)
Negative delay -0.007 -0.004
(0.936) (0.944)




R squared 0.498 0.380
F-test of joint signicance, p value 0.000 0.000
Ramsey's RESET test, p value 0.268 0.302
Sample Size 181 394
p values in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (
), 5 (
), and 1 (
) percent levels,
respectively.
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it picks up some of the country eects. The other variables do not seem to signicantly
contribute to the explanatory power of most of the regressions.
5.3.2.2 Results from generic-share regressions
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 summarise the main results from the generic share regressions.
The baseline long-run generic share model (Model VI) shows that both generic and orig-
inator prices have a statistically signicant estimate with the expected signs (negative
and positive, respectively).3
Among the regulatory variables price caps, frequent price adjustments, incentives for
physicians to prescribe generically, and compulsory substitution at pharmacy level are
statistically signicant. The signs, with the exception of price caps, are positive.
Pre-expiry value per capita, generic age, biosimilarity and population have positive and
statistically signicant coecients. The controlled entry estimate appears negative and
signicant. The other variables do not seem to signicantly contribute in a stable way
to the explanatory power of the regression.
The baseline vintage generic share models (Model I-V in table 5.9) show that both
generic and originator prices have a statistically signicant estimate with the expected
signs (negative and positive, respectively).
From the main regulatory variables, price caps and compulsory substitution are always
statistically signicant, the former having a negative, the latter a positive estimated
coecient. Frequent price adjustments, lowest price policy and incentives for physicians
to prescribe generically are only signicant with positive coecients in the second and
third vintages, respectively. The dierential copayment is not signicant statistically in
any of the main generic share regressions.
The controlled entry variable has a statistically signicant negative eect in two vintages.
The biosimilar indicator appears statistically signicant with a positive coecient in
three vintages. The other variables do not seem to signicantly contribute in a stable
way to the explanatory power of the regression.
3It should be noted that the price variables used in the generic share regressions are the current prices
as opposed to the pre-expiry price variable in the entry models in chapter 4. The coecients on the
price variables in the share regressions measure own and cross-price eects (with respect to originator
products of the same INN) on the generic shares.
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Table 5.8: Market share following entry
Model I Model II Model III
1-year share 2-year share 3-year share
Price caps -0.156 -0.151 -0.150
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Compulsory substitution 0.124 0.151 0.192
(0.000) (0.001) (0.106)
Physicians incentives 0.080 0.065 0.076
(0.009) (0.096) (0.104)
Frequent adjustment 0.078 0.091 0.058
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Dierential copayment -0.026 -0.010 -0.018
(0.423) (0.781) (0.674)
Lowest price policy 0.092 0.081 0.054
(0.001) (0.014) (0.186)
Log of pre-expiry value -0.003 0.000 0.002
(0.775) (0.969) (0.400)
Population 0.010 0.023 0.014
(0.318) (0.067) (0.622)
Pre-expiry formulations -0.002 -0.009 -0.005
(0.624) (0.147) (0.889)
Biosimilar 0.039 0.069 0.070
(0.082) (0.011) (0.582)
Other ATC4 0.011 0.015 0.026
(0.696) (0.690) (0.427)
Already expired -0.058 -0.031 0.034
(0.052) (0.384) (0.163)
Other countries expired 0.010 0.010 0.011
(0.092) (0.138) (0.382)
Generic price -0.002 -0.005 -0.005
(0.048) (0.000) (0.033)
Originator price 0.001 0.004 0.008
(0.017) (0.018) (0.337)
Controlled entry -0.052 -0.101 -0.129
(0.191) (0.051) (0.033)
Negative delay 0.194 0.159 0.130
(0.000) (0.004) (0.051)
Negative delay 3 -0.275 -0.178 -0.164
(0.000) (0.018) (0.064)
Constant 0.063 -0.048 0.187
(0.725) (0.824) (0.515)
R squared 0.322 0.295 0.278
F-test of joint signicance, p value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ramsey's RESET test, p value 0.009 0.182 0.971
Sample Size 463 387 272
heteoscedasticity robust p values in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (
), 5 (
), and 1 (
)
percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5.9: Market share following entry (continuation)
Model IV Model V
4-year share long-run share
Price caps -0.150 -0.138
(0.001) (0.000)
Compulsory substitution 0.044 0.074
(0.283) (0.013)
Physicians incentives 0.120 0.102
(0.047) (0.024)
Frequent adjustment 0.264 0.205
(0.000) (0.000)
Dierential copayment -0.043 0.005
(0.392) (0.894)
Lowest price policy 0.033 0.038
(0.484) (0.280)
Log of pre-expiry value 0.043 0.087
(0.280) (0.003)
Log of population -0.006 -0.006
(0.549) (0.320)




Other ATC4 0.013 0.004
(0.780) (0.921)
Already expired 0.001 0.000
(0.945) (0.972)
Other countries expired 0.019 0.049
(0.357) (0.000)
Generic price -0.056 -0.107
(0.375) (0.026)




Generic age squared 0.037
(0.000)
Controlled entry -0.136 -0.001
(0.001) (0.026)
Negative delay 0.053 0.086
(0.485) (0.099)




R squared 0.332 0.367
F-test of joint signicance, p value 0.000 0.000
Ramsey's RESET test, p value 0.013 0.672
Sample Size 192 385
p values in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (
), 5 (
), and 1 (
) percent levels,
respectively.
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5.3.3 Robustness checks
In order to assess the stability of the results, various robustness checks were imple-
mented.
First, the models were re-estimated by (i) dropping observations related to negative
time to entry larger than 3 months, and (ii) dropping all negative time to entry related
observations. Results are generally robust to these sample changes.
Second, the models has also been estimated using (i) robust regressions, controlling for
potential outliers, and (ii) instrumental variables estimations controlling for potential en-
dogeneity of the number of generic producers, the price of originator and price of generic
products variables. Endogeneity of these variables might arise as prices, quantities and
the number of rms is determined simultaneously in an industry equilibrium. The im-
plemented two-step ecient GMM estimation used Hausman-Taylor-type instruments:
the average number of generic producers, average prices of originator and generic prod-
ucts in other countries. These instruments can be motivated using the assumption that
dierent countries represent separate markets with country specic demand shocks.4
The main results and qualitative conclusions from robust regressions and instrumental
variables estimation, as shown in tables 5.12, 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15 in 5.5, are unchanged.
5.3.4 Conclusions on the eects of generic entry
The main patterns emerging from the regression analysis of price drops and generic
shares can be summarised as follows:
 The price-cap policies seem to have a negative eect both on the extent of price
competition and on the penetration of generic drugs. A possible explanation could
be that in the longer run the price cap becomes a focal point for the generic
companies, i.e. the producers align their pricing to this focal point and even
though they could potentially undercut this price they stick to it instead. This
might result in higher average prices than without a price cap.
 The frequent adjustment, physicians encourage and compulsory substitution, low-
est reimbursed price and, in a somewhat less pronounced way, the dierential
copayment policies tend to have a positive eect on the extent of price competi-
tion.
4On instrumental variables estimation see Chapter 5 in Wooldridge [14]
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 The magnitudes of the coecients on the regulatory variables (with the exception
of dierential copayment) in the price drop regressions tend to increase from the
earlier vintages to the older ones. This pattern implies that the full eect of the
dierent regulatory regimes on the extent of price competition is built up gradually
after the rst entry.
 Compulsory substitution and, in a somewhat less pronounced way, frequent price
adjustments, incentives for physicians to prescribe generically and lowest reim-
bursed price policies tend to have a positive eect on generic drug penetration.
 The results also provide some evidence that, in the case of INNs in which con-
trolled entry was observed, overall generic market share penetration (controlled
and independent) tends to be lower.
 Consistent with standard demand theory, the average price of generic products
has a negative, while the average price of originator products a positive eect on
the shares of generic drugs.
 The number of generic producers of the same INN tends to positively aect price
competition.
5.4 Potential eects of generic entry on other INNs in
the ATC4 class
When a generic company enters with a generic version of a given INN, in the sense
that it starts selling (some of the) formulations of the INN that have lost their exclusivity,
this may have an impact not only on sales of the INN concerned (in particular, the total
level of sales and the sales of the originator company), but also on the sales of other
products based on dierent INNs.
In particular, generic entry in a given INN that lost its exclusivity and the subsequent
reduction in the average price of this INN may attract consumption away from other
INNs. ATC 4 classes contain INNs that share, to a greater or lesser extent, some
therapeutic characteristics. Therefore, they constitute a reasonable starting point for
the group of INNs within which to analyse patterns of potential substitution across
INNs.
To identify such potential switching eects, the analysis looks at the evolution of volumes
of other INNs that were active in the same ATC4 class when the LoE took place. Most of
the analysis focuses on the extent of correlation between, on the one hand, the volume of
INNs sold in the same ATC4 class after LoE and, on the other hand, the prices of the INN
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of reference losing exclusivity. It should be emphasized, however, that this subsection
does not necessarily pretend to reect causal relations, but rather correlations. The
coecients studied in this section are merely an indicator of potential eects of generic
entry on other INNs. Further, no position is taken on the economic signicance of
the estimated coecients, e.g. whether they are large or small in the context of the
ATC class. With respect to the previous subsections, the analysis presented below is
characterised by having mainly an exploratory purpose.
The principal dataset was combined with monthly data on sales, volumes and prices
obtained from IMS for all the INNs in any ATC4 class to which at least one INN in
our sample belongs. The analysis was based on 9 Member States (Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and UK).5
Consumption volumes of the various formulations relating to given INNs were converted
into daily dened doses in order to compare volume measures across dierent INNs
within the same ATC4 class. The conversion was made using a data set obtained from
the World Health Organisation. For those formulations for which this information was
not available, the whole ATC4 class to which they belong was excluded from the analysis.
In a number of ATC4 classes, more than one INN lost exclusivity during the period
2000-2007. LoE by multiple INNs within the same ATC4 class in a short time span
substantially complicates the identication of potential eects of generic entry on other
INNs in the ATC4 class. In the analysis, attention was therefore focused on those ATC4
classes where only one LoE occurred during the period of interest. Additionally, the
sample is restricted to those ATC4 classes in which the INN losing exclusivity faces
generic entry, as only in these instances potential eects of generic entry on other INNs
could be expected.
Volumes of other INNs were analysed over a period covering 24 months before and 24
months after the date of generic entry. Given that a key factor in the analysis is the
variation of volumes over time, only INNs with observations over at least two years,
containing the month of LoE, were considered.
The nal sample used in the analysis included 190 INNs belonging to 29 dierent ATC4
classes in nine dierent countries. The set of INNs (and of ATC4 classes) observed is
dierent from one country to another. In total, 57 country-ATC4 pairs were studied.
Descriptive statistics provide some indication of potential volume eects of generic en-
try on other INNs following LoE. On average, volumes consumed of an INN increased
steadily after its LoE. This may be partly related to the fact that the lower prices for
5See chapter 6
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the INNs losing exclusivity may stimulate demand for the product as such (e.g. lower
copayments) but it might also draw demand away from other products based on other
INNs.
Regression analysis was used to study patterns of potential switching at the more disag-
gregated level of individual INNs. The rationale for such switching is that generic entry
in a given INN after LoE may drive its prices down and attract consumption away from
other INNs in the same ATC4 class. Therefore, one might expect to observe a positive
correlation between the average price of the INN loosing exclusivity and the volumes
consumed of other INNs in the same ATC4 class.
For each INN in the sample that did not lose exclusivity during the period 2000-2007,
volumes consumed every month could be regressed against a set of explanatory variables;
i.e. the average price of the INN itself (the own price), the average price of the INN that
has lost exclusivity in the same ATC4 class (the cross price) and a linear time trend.6
The results of this type of analysis should however be taken with caution. In this type
of model, prices would be potentially endogenous as they are an outcome of a market
process where prices and quantities are simultaneously determined. The ordinary least
squares estimator would produce biased estimates of the parameters in the model if the
regressors are endogenous. In order to correct to some extent the potential endogeneity,
panel data analysis on the pooled data for all INNs was performed.
We used the pooled data for all the INNs in the sample to make more ecient use of all
the information contained in the full dataset and to lter to some degree the potential
endogeneity of prices. In previous subsections, pooled-data analysis made use of a larger
set of regressors than are used in this subsection. Here the analysis exploits the time
dimension of the panel data, while most regressors used in previous subsections do not
provide enough time variability to allow their use here. Hence, volumes consumed every
month were regressed against the following set of explanatory variables:
 the average price of the INN itself (the own price);
 the average price ofthe INN that has lost exclusivity in the same ATC4 class (the
cross price);
6A similar approach to the one proposed by Engstrom et al. [3] was followed to estimate this correla-
tion using regression analysis. They estimate a single coecient for the dierence between the own price
and the cross price. This is equivalent to imposing a restriction on the coecients of these two variables.
The null hypothesis that this restriction holds was tested and rejected for a substantial number of INNs
in the sample analysed. Therefore, the less restrictive specication was chosen and both coecients were
estimated separately for each INN. They also include lags of the dependent variable in the specication
to control for autocorrelation. After performing the Durbin Watson alternative test, the null hypothesis
of no serial correlation was not rejected in most of the cases for the specication without the lagged
dependent variable. Therefore, the specication without lags was chosen. It should be noted that the
sample used in the study by Engstrom et al. [3] was related to the Swedish market only and therefore
diers from the sample analysed here.
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 a time trend.
More formally, the following set of specications were estimated:
volume salesit = 0 + ownpriceit + crossprice refit + timetime excit
+fix0
ifix + it
Where volume sales are the sales of the INN in number of ddd, price is the average price
of the INN, price ref is the average price of the INN losing exclusivity within the ATC4
and country, time exc is the control for time since LoE (missing in some specications,
an either as a linear trend or time dummies in the others), fix is the vector of xed
eects (INN and country eects separately in some specications, INN/ATC4/country
eects in the others) and  is the error term.
Given that the data was pooled for all the markets in the sample, xed eects were
introduced in the regression to control for specicities in each market that may ex-
plain dierences in levels of consumption across markets. Fixed eects partially solve
the problem of endogeneity by ltering any time-invariant endogeneity of prices. The
potential time-variant endogeneity left may advise to interpret results as conservative
estimates of the actual price eects. All regressions include a dummy for each INN in
each ATC4 and country. With respect to the intercept, the same INN in dierent coun-
tries or ATC4 is treated independently. Only the coecients for the prices are shown.
In all regressions, the coecient for the own price is negative and signicant.
Regression 1 in table 5.10 reports the results when no control for time is included in the
specication. In this case, the coecient for the cross price is positive but non signicant.
Regression 2 includes a linear time trend while regression 3 includes dummies for the
time passed since the date of LoE. One reason to think that time may matter is that a
series of events happen after the LoE that may aect the environment in the market.
Including a control for time passed since LoE may to some extent account for this
fact, which otherwise may induce a biased estimation of the correlation between volume
and cross-price. The linear time trend implies a linear relation between consumption
and time, which may not be appropriate. The time dummies allow for a more exible
relationship between consumption and time. The coecient for the cross price is positive
and signicant in regressions 2 and 3. Positive correlations can be interpreted as an
indication of positive volume eects of generic entry in other INNs in the same ATC4.
As expected, in all regressions own-price coecients are higher in absolute value terms
than cross-price coecients.
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Table 5.10: Shares of cross-price coecients from one-by-one regressions at INN /
ATC4 / country level
No time control Linear trend Time dummies
Log own price -0.34 -0.33 -0.33
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Log cross price 0.03 0.14 0.17
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
R squared 0.98 0.98 0.98
Sample size 14478 14478 14478
standard errors in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (
), 5 (
), and 1 (
) percent levels,
respectively.
Table 5.11: Shares of cross-price coecients from pooled-data regressions
No time control Linear time trend Time dummies
Sig. Non-sig. All Sig. Non-sig. All Sig. Non-sig. All
Positive 0.20 0.33 0.53 0.25 0.39 0.64 0.27 0.38 0.65
Negative 0.15 0.32 0.47 0.11 0.25 0.36 0.10 0.25 0.35
Partially based on IMS data
Results in table 5.10 provide additional indication about the existence, on average, of
correlation between the price of the INN losing exclusivity and the level of consumption
in other INNs in the same ATC4 class.
To allow for dierent cross-price coecients across settings, a similar model was esti-
mated where dummies for each INN in each ATC4 and countrywere interacted with the
cross-price. This exercise, by allowing coecients for the cross-price to dier across mar-
kets, gets closer to a disaggregated analysis. Table 5.11 reports the share of positive and
negative estimated cross-price eects from the model in dierences. Again positive cor-
relations can be interpreted as an indication of potential volume eects of generic entry
between these two INNs. Negative coecients indicate a negative correlation between
volumes consumed and cross prices. They might be potentially related to idiosyncratic
characteristics of some markets. For instance, they may denote some degree of comple-
mentarity between INNs, which would be compatible with therapies that combine more
than a single INN (e.g. cocktails of medicines). This presumption has not been further
explored as it is out of the scope of this analysis.
As previously, three specications were estimated, without time control, with a linear
time trend and with time dummies. The latter provides a higher share of positive cross-
price eects, which may be due to better controlling for changes in the market after
LoE.
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5.4.1 Conclusions on eects of generic entry on other INNs
Overall, the analysis shows that in a signicant number of cases, generic entry after
LoE appears to have had an impact not only on the sales of the INN concerned, but also
on the sales of a number of other products based on dierent INN. At the same time,
there is considerable heterogeneity across INNs with respect to the estimated cross-price
eects seem to vary considerably from one INN to another.
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5.5 Appendix
Table 5.12: GMM estimate, endogenous variable: number of generics
Model I Model II
2-year price drop long-run price drop
Price caps -0.134 -0.205
(0.000) (0.000)
Compulsory substitution 0.035 0.158
(0.523) (0.002)
Physicians incentives 0.194 0.294
(0.000) (0.000)
Frequent adjustment 0.164 0.170
(0.000) (0.000)
Dierential copayment 0.138 0.068
(0.000) (0.042)
Lowest price policy 0.077 0.044
(0.018) (0.162)








Other ATC4 0.071 0.038
(0.065) (0.244)
Already expired 0.059 0.010
(0.218) (0.796)
Other countries expired 0.001 0.008
(0.934) (0.218)




Generic age squared 0.000
(0.970)
Controlled entry -0.024 -0.001
(0.633) (0.970)
Negative delay -0.046 -0.070
(0.420) (0.279)




R squared 0.194 0.267
F-test of joint signicance, p value 0.000 0.000
Ramsey's RESET test, p value 0.018 0.004
Hansen test, p value 0.967 0.155
rank test, p value 0.000 0.000
Endogeneity test, p value 0.002 0.002
Sample Size 368 394
p values in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (), 5 (), and 1 () percent levels, respectively. a H0:
overidentication restrictions hold b H0: rank condition does not hold c H0: exogeneity of endogenous variable
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Table 5.13: Robust estimates of price drops
Model III Model IV
2-year price drop long-run price drop
Price caps -0.140 -0.198
(0.000) (0.000)
Compulsory substitution 0.129 0.176
(0.000) (0.000)
Physicians incentives 0.183 0.215
(0.000) (0.000)
Frequent adjustment 0.114 0.145
(0.000) (0.000)
Dierential copayment 0.113 0.064
(0.001) (0.067)
Lowest price policy 0.085 0.054
(0.003) (0.050)
Log of pre-expiry value 0.015 0.039
(0.082) (0.000)
Log of population -0.042 -0.010
(0.001) (0.399)




Other ATC4 0.029 0.027
(0.347) (0.370)
Already expired -0.019 -0.030
(0.560) (0.337)
Other countries expired 0.005 0.009
(0.376) (0.072)




Generic age squared 0.000
(0.463)
Controlled entry -0.050 -0.027
(0.191) (0.463)
Negative delay 0.040 0.033
(0.322) (0.393)




R squared 0.412 0.422
F-test of joint signicance, p value 0.000 0.000
Ramsey's RESET test, p value 0.012 0.367
Sample Size 368 394
p values in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (), 5 (), and 1 () percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5.14: GMM estimates, endogenous variables: prices
Model I Model II
2-year share long-run share
Price caps -0.169 -0.155
(0.000) (0.000)
Compulsory substitution 0.141 0.206
(0.004) (0.000)
Physicians incentives 0.076 0.112
(0.064) (0.011)
Frequent adjustment 0.121 0.087
(0.000) (0.003)
Dierential copayment 0.006 0.020
(0.878) (0.603)
Lowest price policy 0.086 0.024
(0.008) (0.493)
Log of pre-expiry value -0.004 0.019
(0.704) (0.066)
Log of population 0.023 0.049
(0.082) (0.000)




Other ATC4 0.025 0.005
(0.538) (0.892)
Already expired -0.003 0.009
(0.944) (0.801)
Other countries expired 0.005 0.000
(0.474) (0.945)
Generic price -0.004 -0.005
(0.000) (0.000)




Generic age squared -0.001
(0.011)
Controlled entry -0.144 -0.116
(0.009) (0.011)
Negative delay 0.179 0.070
(0.001) (0.162)




R squared 0.336 0.377
F-test of joint signicance, p value 0.000 0.000
Ramsey's RESET test, p value 0.631 0.815
Hansen test, p value 0.679 0.524
rank test, p value 0.075 0.000
Endogeneity test, p value 0.103 0.135
Sample Size 326 377
p values in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (), 5 (), and 1 () percent levels, respectively. a H0:
overidentication restrictions hold b H0: rank condition does not hold c H0: exogeneity of endogenous variable
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Table 5.15: Robust estimates of market shares
Model III Model IV
2-year share long-run share
Price caps -0.166 -0.173
(0.000) (0.000)
Compulsory substitution 0.169 0.239
(0.000) (0.000)
Physicians incentives 0.081 0.120
(0.039) (0.005)
Frequent adjustment 0.097 0.102
(0.002) (0.001)
Dierential copayment -0.012 -0.023
(0.772) (0.595)
Lowest price policy 0.080 0.027
(0.020) (0.414)
Log of pre-expiry value 0.003 0.025
(0.782) (0.007)
Log of population 0.027 0.053
(0.061) (0.000)




Other ATC4 0.017 0.000
(0.657) (0.991)
Already expired -0.034 0.009
(0.384) (0.809)
Other countries expired 0.012 0.002
(0.064) (0.724)
Generic price -0.005 -0.005
(0.046) (0.022)




Generic age squared -0.001
(0.061)
Controlled entry -0.105 -0.085
(0.024) (0.061)
Negative delay 0.174 0.105
(0.000) (0.026)




R squared 0.306 0.411
F-test of joint signicance, p value 0.000 0.000
Ramsey's RESET test, p value 0.056 0.175
Sample Size 387 385
p values in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (), 5 (), and 1 () percent levels, respectively. a H0:
overidentication restrictions hold b H0: rank condition does not hold c H0: exogeneity of endogenous variable
Saurí, Lluís (2012), An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/37014Chapter 5. Eects of generic entry 166
Bibliography
[1] Caves, R. E., Whinston, M. D., and Hurwitz, M. A., 1991. Patent expiration, entry,
and competition in the US pharmaceutical industry. Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, Microeconomics, 1991, 1{66.
[2] Danzon, P. M. and Li-Wei, C., 2000. Does regulation drive out competition in
pharmaceutical markets? Journal of Law and Economics, 43, 311{357.
[3] Engstrom, A., Jacob, J., and Lundin, D., 2006. Sharp drop in prices after the
introduction of generic substitution. LFN.
[4] Frank, R. G. and S., S. D., 1997. Generic entry and the pricing of pharmaceuticals.
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6(1), 75{90.
[5] Grabowski, H. G. and Vernon, J. M., 1992. Brand loyalty, entry, and price compe-
tition in pharmaceuticals after the 1984 Drug Act. Journal of Law and Economics,
35, 331{350.
[6] Grabowski, H. G. and Vernon, J. M., 1996. Longer patents for increased generic
competition in the US: the Waxman-Hatch Act after one decade. Pharmacoeco-
nomics, 10, 110{123.
[7] Kanavos, P., Costa-Font, J., and Seeley, E., 2008. Competition in o-patent drug
markets: issues, regulation and evidence. Economic Policy, 2008, 499{544.
[8] Puig-Junoy, J. and Moreno-Torres, I., 2010. Do generic rms and the spanish public
purchaser respond to consumer price dierences of generics under reference pricing?
Health Policy.
[9] Regan, T. L., 2008. Generic entry, price competition, and market segmentation in
the prescription drug market. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26,
930{948.
[10] Reien, D. and D., W. M., 2005. Generic drug industry dynamics. Review of
Economics and Statistics, 87(1), 37{49.
[11] Saha, A., Grabowski, H. G., Birnbaum, H., Greenberg, P., and Bizan, O., 2006.
Generic competition in the US pharmaceutical industry. International Journal of
the Economics of Business, 13(1), 15{38.
[12] Wiggins, S. N. and Maness, R., 2004. Price competition in pharmaceuticals: the
case of anti-infectives. Economic Inquiry, 42(2), 247{263.
[13] Wilsdon, T., Attridge, J., Chambers, G., and Serota, A., 2008. Competition in the
o-patent market post generic entry. Charles River Associates for EFPIA.
Saurí, Lluís (2012), An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Markets 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/37014Chapter 5. Eects of generic entry 167
[14] Wooldridge, J. M., 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data.
MIT Press.
Saurí, Lluís (2012), An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Markets 
European University Institute
 




Annex on data sources and management
6.1 Data
This section describes the data sources used for the analysis conducted in chapters
4 and 5 as well as the methodology applied to prepare the datasets.
6.1.1 Data Sources
The analysis is based on two main sources of data. First, the analysis used data
collected from pharmaceutical companies in the context of the sector inquiry conducted
by the Commission. All data from the companies were gathered for each of the 27 EU
Member States, except for price data, where the set of countries in which the companies
were requested to provide data was limited to ten: Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom.
Second, the analysis has used data requested from IMS Health, a provider of pharmaceu-
tical data services. IMS data were obtained for all 27 Member States. The data obtained
from IMS included, for the period 2000 - 2007 and for each company active in the INN
concerned, monthly data on sales (local currency), volumes, prices and discounts (local
currency) at the pack level, as well as dates concerning loss of exclusivity, launch dates.
For some Member States, IMS data were also available as regards the level of promo-
tional activity (on a quarterly basis) at the brand level. Most emphasis has been given
at sales and prices at the ex-manufacturer level. Finally, for the ten countries mentioned
in the previous paragraph, IMS data were also obtained for all INNs belonging to ATC4
classes, within which LoE took place at some point in the period 2000 - 2007.
The IMS dataset and the datasets from the companies were integrated into one dataset.
The IMS dataset served as the \central" dataset into which the corresponding data items
169
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of the companies were combined (except where company data were not available or in
individual cases where these data appeared inaccurate or incomplete).
The two datasets must be seen as complementary. The combined use of the IMS dataset
and the company datasets made it possible to use company data to the largest extent
possible, while being able to ll in gaps in one dataset with information available in the
other dataset.
For instance, in order to keep the informational burden on companies limited, informa-
tion on prices was asked for 10 Member States only (see above). All analyses of price
developments in the other 17 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxemburg, Malta,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden) therefore rely on IMS data. Likewise,
the calculation of EU averages involved the use of IMS data for the price component
relating to the 17 countries mentioned. Furthermore, the sample of rms to which ques-
tionnaires were sent did not comprise the entire universe of rms active in the production
and supply of medicines for human use. The sample contained 43 originator companies
and 27 generic companies. The IMS dataset aims at tracking the sales of all actors in
the eld. For that reason, for those companies not part of the inquiry the analysis relied
on information provided by the IMS dataset.
On the other hand, some types of data were only available from the companies them-
selves, not from IMS. For instance, the IMS dataset only contained expiry dates for
Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom: in other
words, for most of the EU 15 Member States plus the Czech Republic. In addition, IMS
expiry dates were sometimes only available for some of the relevant products within the
countries, not for all products.
Similarly, information on actual average transaction prices and discounts granted by the
companies was not available in the IMS dataset, as this is information to which IMS has
no access. IMS bases itself mainly on public sources, such as list prices and regulated
prices. It then applies a conversion factor to take into account what it understands to be
normal discount applicable to that industry level. Prices in the IMS dataset are therefore
not actual average transaction prices. In the sector inquiry, by contrast, companies were
specically asked to provide actual average transaction prices.
For each INN, the date of LoE in the country concerned was dened as either the date at
which the rst product based on the INN lost patent protection (including SPC protec-
tion) or the date at which the INN seized to be protected by data exclusivity, whichever
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was the more recent in time.1 This applied to all INNs for which this information was
provided by the companies. IMS only reported a single date (month and year) for the
date of LoE, but its denition of LoE is based on the same principles.2 Finally, in a
number of cases, a given INN is used for distinct medical indications and is part of sev-
eral distinct ATC classes. These cases have been treated separately as the LoE and/or
entry date for a given INN may dier across ATC.
The date of rst generic entry was established on the basis of the rst occurrence of sales
by generic companies as recorded in the IMS sales dataset, combined with information
provided by the companies. During the analysis, the Commission services received
data corrections from a number of companies as well as additional information on the
presence of SPCs and data protection. Further, in a number of cases, the Commission
corrected entry dates, where they did not appear to reect entry by independent generic
companies, but rather the launch of a company's own generic product or the launch of
a product by companies authorised to do so by the originator company, e.g. as part of
a distribution or licence agreement.
Consumption volumes of the various formulations relating to given INNs were converted
into DDD (Daily Dened Dosage) in order to compare volume measures across dierent
formulations based on the same INN. This conversion was made using a dataset obtained
from the World Health Organisation. For the small number of formulations for which
this information was not available, volumes in mg were used to the extent possible for
the volume analysis at INN level.
Information on the regulatory framework in the various Member States was compiled on
the basis of the big report of 20063, the answers given by the authorities of the Member
States to the Commission questionnaire of July 2008, information from the Pharma
Forum, as well as other sources.4
1During the public consultation it was submitted that for the purposes of measuring delays to generic
entry caused by the behaviour of originator companies, the loss of patent protection (or SPC protection)
cannot be compared with the loss of data protection given that generic companies were, during the
reference period 2000 - 2007, only able to submit abridged applications for marketing authorisation to
the competent authorities after the moment of loss of data protection. However, the concept of time to
entry is not conned to delays to generic entry caused by the behaviour of originator companies, but also
comprises other factors such as the time that generic companies need for standard regulatory procedures
in the country concerned (including requests relating to the pricing and reimbursement status). In any
event, the number of instances (INNs and countries) in which loss of data protection came after patent
expiry (including SPC protection) was 52, out of a total of 713 for which it was possible to make the
comparison. It appears, therefore, that the impact of these cases is rather limited on the descriptive
statistics.
2For a description of the determination of the LoE date by IMS, see CRA International, Factors
Aecting Generic Entry in Europe, June 2008.
3OBIG [1]
4Information was coded for each year between 2000 and 2007, taking into account possible evolutions
in the dierent regulatory systems. Nevertheless, a large majority of the variables listed is time invariant.
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6.1.2 Selection of INNs
The rst list of INNs selected were the 75 top-selling INNs that faced the LoE in
the period 2000 - 2007 in France, Germany and the UK. In each of the three countries,
this list represented well over 90% of value sales of all INNs that faced LoE in the period
2000 - 2007. The combination of the top 75 molecules in each of these countries provided
a nal list of 128 INNs. In this paper, this list is referred to as \E75".
The second group of INNs was chosen from the list of the 50 top-selling INNs (whether
protected or not) for each of the three countries mentioned above. In total, this led to
the identication of 90 INNs (of which 61 INNs were not part of the E75 list). It is
referred to as \T50".
The third group of INNs was selected by choosing the 50 top-selling INNs having faced
rst generic entry in each of the selected countries. This led to the identication of
95 INNs (30 new INNs in comparison with the E75 and T50 lists mentioned above).
Finally, the list contained a number of INNs that might be of interest in the light of
other market information available to the Commission.
The combination of these three lists, with a view to obtaining a sample of INNs likely to
be representative for the EU as a whole, makes up the nal list of 219 INNs presented
in 6.6.
The main part of the analysis was performed on the basis of the "E75" list of INNs for
which the Commission requested information from the companies.
For each of the Member States, the relevant sample was dened as the national subset
of the E75 list, i.e. those INNs that (i) were eectively sold in that Member State and
(ii) that faced LoE in the period 2000 - 2007 in that Member State.
As the result, based on the IMS dataset, the national subsets of INNs in the various
Member States contained the numbers of INNs reported in table 6.1.5
As is clear from the above table, there are major disparities between the subsets of
molecules that were subject to analysis. This is a natural consequence of signicant
disparities between the national markets for pharmaceutical products in the EU.6 7 The
dierences are explained in part by the fact that the set of INNs sold in each country
5The dashes (-) in the table relate to the fact that the IMS dataset did not contain expiry dates for
these countries.
6For similar observations, see Wilsdon et al. [2]. They observe that out of the 271 molecules that
lost protection in the period 2000 - 2007 in one of the ve largest national markets for pharmaceutical
consumption in the EU (namely France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and United Kingdom), only 30 of them
lost protection (in the same time frame, 2000 - 2007) in all ve countries.
7A factor that may also have contributed to the disparities may be that IMS expiry dates were
sometimes only available for some of the relevant products within the countries, not for all products.
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Table 6.1: Number of INNs on the E75 list relevant to each Member State
Austria 68 Germany 82 Netherlands 25*
Belgium 75 Greece 38 Poland -
Bulgaria - Hungary - Portugal 35
Czech Republic 15 Ireland 55 Romania -
Cyprus - Italy 71 Slovakia -
Denmark 63 Latvia - Slovenia -
Estonia - Lithuania - Spain 51
Finland 56 Luxembourg - Sweden 71
France 93 Malta - United Kingdom 84
* The fact that the number of expiring INNs for the Netherlands is somewhat low is related to the fact
that data for the Netherlands are available only as of April 2002.
diers. Further, the dierences relate to the period considered and the fact that INNs
may have dierent LoE dates in dierent Member States. For a given Member State,
if an INN lost exclusivity before the year 2000 or after 2007, it was excluded from the
sample. Consequently, the requirements (i) and (ii) mentioned in the previous paragraph
resulted in subsets of molecules that were dierent (in size and composition) among the
various Member States.8
After merging company information with IMS dataset, the number of INNs that could
be used for the analysis in a number of countries changed to a mild extent.9 The merged
dataset led to national subsets of INNs in the various Member States with the numbers
of INNs reported in table 6.2.
Only a few INNs were available for study in Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Estonia, Cyprus and Malta. A contributing factor to the relatively low number of
observations may be that few INNs may have eectively faced LoE in the relevant period
2000 - 2007 in the countries concerned. However, a substantial number of companies
appeared unable to provide comprehensive information on the patent expiry date in
these countries (many entries contained "N/A"). Further, the process of merging the
company data with the IMS data turned out, from a technical perspective, less successful
than for the other Member States. For this reason, chapters ?? and ?? do not contain
descriptive statistics for these countries.
8Focusing on products with the majority of their sales in the retail segment, CRA (2008) reports
that the total number of products losing exclusivity in the period 2000 - 2007 was 105 in the UK, 143
in France, 114 in Germany, 106 in Spain and 141 in Italy. In each of these countries, the top 50 of the
products losing exclusivity in the period 2000 - 2007 (in terms of value) accounted for over 85-90% of
sales of all products losing exclusivity. CRA International, Factors Aecting Generic Entry in Europe,
June 2008 (p. 23-24).
9In the public consultations, it was noted that the number of INNs went slightly down in some
countries. It is primarily because by applying company information the LoE date was revised to a date
falling outside the reference period 2000 - 2007. Further additional data cleaning led some INNs to be
removed from the lists in some countries.
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Table 6.2: Number of INNs on the E75 list relevant to each Member State
Austria 61 Germany 75 Netherlands 25
Belgium 73 Greece 38 Poland 5
Bulgaria 14 Hungary 17 Portugal 35
Czech Republic 15 Ireland 59 Romania 11
Cyprus - Italy 73 Slovakia 5
Denmark 63 Latvia 3 Slovenia 6
Estonia 1 Lithuania 4 Spain 56
Finland 48 Luxembourg 41 Sweden 76
France 91 Malta - United Kingdom 83
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry
The number of available observations (INNs) for Romania and Bulgaria, who became
Member States in 2007, is also small. Further, there were data issues in the informa-
tion provided for these countries. For this reason, chapters ?? and ?? do not contain
descriptive statistics for these two countries.
Correspondingly, the analysis was based on 17 countries, i.e. all EU Member States with
the exception of Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Cyprus, Malta,
Romania and Bulgaria.
The various types of analysis further diered in terms of data requirements. The regres-
sion analyses involved the simultaneous use of price data, volume data (in DDD), dates
(date of LoE, entry date) and qualitative information (product characteristics, charac-
teristics of the regulatory environment). For six INNs, such comprehensive information
was not available and therefore they were not used for the regression analysis.
Ultimately, the principal dataset used for the regression analyses was based on 1085
observations in total (cross-sectional, by country-INN-ATC4), relating to 17 countries,
122 INNs and 924 country-INN pairs.
The analysis of substitution within ATC4 classes presented in chapter ?? was performed
on the data available in 9 countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy,
the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom), i.e. all countries for which information
on ATC4 classes was obtained from IMS with the exception of Poland.
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6.2 Methodology for data management
6.2.1 Measures Analysed
All EU descriptive statistics (entry rates, market shares, price indices, etc.) pre-
sented are calculated taking into account the relative importance of the individual Mem-
ber States as measured by the sales of the relevant INNs in the Member State concerned,
either in the year prior to expiry (for establishing shares of generic entry, average time
to entry and generic penetration) or in the year 2007 (for the indices that track the
development of prices or volumes over longer time periods).
The rate used for the conversion of exchange rates is the average exchange rate in the
year 2007.10
Descriptive statistics on the impact of generic entry are mostly presented both as a
\head count" measure (where within each country each INN is counted as equal) and as
a weighted measure (where within each country each INN receives a weight to account
for its relative importance).11 Two types of weights are used for the latter purpose,
depending on the context. For the purposes of establishing shares of generic entry,
average time to entry and generic penetration, the weight is the sales value of an INN
in the year before the LoE. This weight is constant over time. By contrast, for the
indices that track the development of prices over longer time periods, the weight used
is the contemporary value sales of each INN sold in the month concerned. The use of
contemporary weights (as opposed to constant weights, e.g. related to a xed year)
avoids problems one might encounter in relation to months where a given product is in
fact non-available. The same approach is used for tracking volume indices over time.
When descriptive statistics were given by size class, the following approach was used.
First, the 128 INNs on the E75 list were divided into ve classes, with class one referring
to the 20% of lowest-selling INNs in terms of EU sales value in 2007, class two to the
next lowest 20%, etc. Class ve thus refers to the 20% of highest-selling INNs onthe
E75 list. Then, for each INN, the relevant statistic in each country was obtained and
weighted using country weights. Finally, within each size class, the weighted average
was taken over all INNs in that class.
10For consistency, prices and values in the dataset were expressed in Euro terms for all countries. In
order to properly identify developments in local currency prices and values in a given country over time,
it was decided to apply a xed conversion rate (relating to 2007), not contemporaneous, uctuating
rates.
11As mentioned above, in a number of cases, INNs are used for distinct medical indications and are part
of several distinct ATC classes. These cases have been treated separately as the LoE and/or entrydate
for a given INN may dier across ATC, except in the case of headcount measures (as the importance of
individual INNs would be inated when it is part of multiple ATC classes).
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For the average price indices, the index level is set to 1 (i.e. unity) six months prior to
the end of the exclusivity period. The benchmark was taken 6 months prior to the end
of the exclusivity period instead of at the very moment exclusivity ended in order not
to let incidental price cuts or small errors in the date of expiry inuence the benchmark
price level.
The same approach is used for the volume indices.
6.2.2 Treatment of Early Entries
The measurement of time to entry was complicated by the fact that in the IMS
dataset there was a number of instances, where generic products appeared to have
entered before the LoE of the INN in the country concerned. For those INNs, for
which the entry date appeared to be just preceding the LoE, the small time gap can be
interpreted as a measurement error. The INNs with a longer time gap are more dicult
to interpret. These instances may relate to cases where the companies made a mistake
when providing the date of LoE, where the IMS dataset records the date incorrectly or
where there was an \early" entry by a generic rm, i.e. entry before the reported date
of LoE.
The accuracy of the entry dates was improved using information on independent generic
entry from the companies. Whenever the originator company indicated a later date for
the rst independent entry than the presumed entry date on the basis of IMS data, this
later date was used as the date of the rst independent generic entry.
Where the dates continued to point to early entry, the observations were further com-
pared witha dataset prepared by CRA and IMS in the course of the sector inquiry.12
Where this dataset gave a more plausible date of LoE and/or entrydate, this date was
used. Where the INN was not considered as expiring in the country concerned in the
period 2000- 2007, the country-INN pair was dropped from the analysis. For the still
remaining cases with negative time to entry, the following procedure was used.
Where the negative time to entry was less than or equal to three months (\small neg-
atives"), the time to entry was taken to be zero, on the basis that these cases may
represent a small measurement error. This related to 55 cases (country-INN pairs).
Where the negative time to entry was more than three months (\substantial negative"),
the time to entry was also put to zero. This related to 39 cases (country-INN pairs). In
view of the limited number of cases, such treatment of these observations is not per se
problematic for the analysis, but its correctness depends on certain assumptions. For
12Dataset used in Wilsdon et al. [3]
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the so-called controlled entries (e.g. companies entering via distribution agreement or
license), it would have to be assumed that these entrants turn eectively independent
at the LoE (because they are no longer restricted by patents), which is not necessarily
the case. In cases of \early entry" due to an incorrectly specied LoE date, it is not
clear whether entry really took place early (i.e. before the date of LoE), took place
at the rst moment the opportunity arose (i.e. at LoE), or took place later (i.e. after
the real moment of LoE). For the purpose of obtaining conservative estimates and not
overstating the time to entry for generic companies, it was preferred to interpret that
entry took place at the rst moment the opportunity arose (i.e. at the LoE).
In the regression analysis, the cases involving \substantial negative" time to entry were
agged (using dummies) and analysed further. Further robustness checks suggest that
the results are insensitive to the method used.
Information on company agreements further shed light on some of the remaining sub-
stantial negatives. A number of supply/distribution and settlement agreements whereby
originator companies allowed early entry to a generic company were used to interpret
signicant negative delays. These cases, 20 in total, were interpreted as a form of con-
trolled entry. In the subsequent regression analyses, they have been specically agged
with a dummy variable. The above procedures for treating early entries were tested for
robustness (both as regards the descriptive statistics and the regression results). Check-
ing the robustness of the results vis- a- vis the above handling of early entries was done
by
 running the regression analysis both with and without the observations with the
negative time to entry;
 changing the number of months above which an entry is regarded as substantial
negative time to entry (e.g. taking 6 months as a threshold) and running the
analysis without country-INN pairs exhibiting a relatively substantial negative
time to entry;
 using a dummy variable to indicate whether or not the country-INN pair is a
substantial negative time to entry.
These tests conrmed the robustness of the results towards the applied procedures.
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6.3 Variables used in the regression analysis
Table 6.3: INN characteristics used in the regression analysis (control variables)
preexp value per capita Value sales per capita (EUR) of the INN six months before
patent expiry (per country)
lnpreexp value (idem natural log)
preexp price Average price (EUR) per DDD of the INN six months before
patent expiry (per country)
expiry year Year of loss of exclusivity (per country)
exp 02 03 Loss of exclusivityin 2002 or 2003 (dummy variable, per
country)
exp 04 05 Loss of exclusivity in 2004 or 2005 (dummy variable, per
country)
exp 06 07 Loss of exclusivity in 2006 or 2007 (dummy variable, per
country)
pre exp numform Number of formulations available at the moment of patent
expiry in the country
main chron Indicates whether INN is used mainly for chronic indications
(dummy variable)
biosimilar Indicates if INN is a biosimilar (dummy variable)
ngenr Number of generic companies
ngenr2 (idem -squared)
gen age Number of months that generic companies were present in
the INN (up to 12.2007)
gen age2 (idem -squared)
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Table 6.4: Regulatory Variables Used in the Regression Analysis
price caps Indicates existence of a price cap or mandatory discounts
for generic products (dummy variable, by year). The vari-
able equals 1 if generic companies, when they enter, have
to respect a maximum price level or have to price a certain
percentage or amount lower than e.g. the price charged by
the originator at the time of entry.
freq adjust Indicates whether there is frequent adjustment (e.g. once
every 6 months) of maximum reimbursement prices.
physicians encourage gen Indicates whether physicians are required or encouraged to
prescribe an INN, rather than a specic brand (by budget
restrictions or budget incentives).
compulsory substit Indicates whether pharmacies are obliged to dispense generic
products when these are available and less expensive (com-
pulsory substitution).
di copay Indicates whether patients need to pay the dierence be-
tween the price of the product purchased and the reference
price.
lowest price policy Indicates whether the reimbursement level, at whatever
point it is xed, is set at the price level of the cheapest
generic available on the market.
Table 6.5: Other Control Variables Used in the Regression Analysis
controlled entry Indicates whether there has been controlled generic entry
(e.g. through an early distribution agreement, license agree-
ment or settlement agreement
neg delay Indicates whether the implied time to entry is negative
neg delay3
large neg3 Indicates whether the implied time to entry is negative by
more than 3 months
small neg3 Indicates whether the implied time to entry is negative, but
less than 3 months
population Population of the country
n countries expired Number of other countries in which the INN had already
lost exclusivity at the time of LoE.
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6.4 List of INNs
Table 6.6: List of the 219 INN's included in the data set
ACARBOSE * ADALIMUMAB ADRAFINIL
ALENDRONIC ACID * ALFUZOSIN * AMISULPRIDE *




ZOLE + CLARITHROMYCIN *
ANASTROZOLE
ATENOLOL ATORVASTATIN AZITHROMYCIN *
BALSALAZIDE * BECLOMETASONE BENAZEPRIL *
BISOPROLOL * BRIMONIDINE * BRIVUDINE *
BUDESONIDE * BUDESONIDE + FOR-
MOTEROL
BUFLOMEDIL
BUPRENORPHINE BUSERELIN * CABERGOLINE *





CAPSAICIN CAPTOPRIL + HY-
DROCHLOROTHIAZIDE *
CARTEOLOL * CARVEDILOL * CEFATRIZINE *
CEFIXIME * CEFPODOXIME PROXETIL * CEFTIBUTEN *
CEFTRIAXONE * CEFUROXIME AXETIL * CELECOXIB
CELIPROLOL * CETIRIZINE * CICLETANINE *
CICLOSPORIN * CIPROFIBRATE * CIPROFLOXACIN *
CISAPRIDE * CITALOPRAM * CLARITHROMYCIN *











DOXAZOSIN * EBASTINE * ENALAPRIL *
ENOXAPARIN SODIUM EPOETIN ALFA * EPOETIN BETA





ETODOLAC EZETIMIBE FELODIPINE *
FENOFIBRATE FENTANYL * FEXOFENADINE *
FINASTERIDE * FLECAINIDE FLUCONAZOLE *




GABAPENTIN * GALANTAMINE GLATIRAMER ACETATE













IBANDRONIC ACID ILOPROST * IMATINIB
INFLIXIMAB INSULIN ASPART INSULIN GLARGINE
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Table 6.6 { continued from previous page
INSULIN HUMAN BASE INSULIN HUMAN BASE + IN-
SULIN HUMAN ISOPHANE
INSULIN HUMAN ISOPHANE
INTERFERON BETA-1A INTERFERON BETA-1B IPRATROPIUM BROMIDE +
SALBUTAMOL *
IRBESARTAN ISOTRETINOIN ITRACONAZOLE *
LACIDIPINE * LAMOTRIGINE * LANSOPRAZOLE *
LETROZOLE LEUPRORELIN * LISINOPRIL *
LORATADINE * LOSARTAN LOSARTAN + HY-
DROCHLOROTHIAZIDE




MIRTAZAPINE * MODAFINIL * MOMETASONE *
MONTELUKAST MOXIFLOXACIN MOXONIDINE *
NADOXOLOL NADROPARIN CALCIUM * NEDOCROMIL *
NICARDIPINE * NICORANDIL * NIFEDIPINE
NIZATIDINE * NOMEGESTROL * NORFLOXACIN *
NORGESTIMATE +
ETHINYLESTRADIOL *
OCTREOTIDE * OFLOXACIN *
OLANZAPINE OMEPRAZOLE * ONDANSETRON *
OXALIPLATIN * PACLITAXEL * PANTOPRAZOLE
PAROXETINE * PEGFILGRASTIM PERGOLIDE *
PERINDOPRIL * PERINDOPRIL + INDAPAMIDE
*
PIOGLITAZONE




QUINAPRIL * QUINAPRIL + HY-
DROCHLOROTHIAZIDE *
RABEPRAZOLE
RAMIPRIL * RANITIDINE RIBAVIRIN
RILMENIDINE * RISEDRONIC ACID RISPERIDONE *
ROFECOXIB ROSIGLITAZONE ROSUVASTATIN




SIMVASTATIN * SIMVASTATIN + EZETIMIBE SOMATROPIN *
SUMATRIPTAN * TAMSULOSIN * TELMISARTAN
TERBINAFINE * TESTOSTERONE * TIAGABINE
TIBOLONE * TILIDINE + NALOXONE TINZAPARIN *
TIOTROPIUM BROMIDE TIZANIDINE TORASEMIDE *
TRAMADOL TRAMADOL + PARACETA-
MOL
TRAZODONE
TRIPTORELIN * VACCINE, HEPATITIS B VACCINE, HEPATI-




TIS B + VACCINE,
DIP.TET.PERT.POLIO + HIB.
VACCINE, INFLUENZA VACCINE, PNEUMOCOCCAL
VACCINE, PNEUMOCOCCAL
CONJUGATE
VACCINE, TICK BORNE EN-
CEPHALITIS
VALACICLOVIR
VALPROATE SEMISODIUM * VALSARTAN VALSARTAN + HY-
DROCHLOROTHIAZIDE
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Table 6.6 { continued from previous page
VENLAFAXINE VIGABATRIN * ZOLPIDEM *
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